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ESSAY

ON

MUNDANE MORAL GOVERNMENT

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ON

MUNDANE MORAL GOVERNMENT

DEMONSTRATING ITS ANALOGY

WITH THE

SYSTEM OF MATERIAL GOVERNMENT

BY

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"TRUE LAW OF POPULATION," ETC.

"Jam, vero, animum ipsum, mentemque Hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam, qui non Divina cura perfecta esse perspicit, is his ipsis rebus mihi videtur carere."—CICERO, De Natura Deorum, lib. ii. p. 59.

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PREFACE.

THE Author of the following Treatise has been, throughout the whole of a long life, an attentive student of General History. He has also been no inattentive observer of the political events which have occurred during his own time—that is to say, during the last fifty years. In the course of this reading and observation, he could not fail to be impressed by the various examples of failure in the many attempts made to ameliorate political institutions, even when made by energetic, accomplished, honourable, and disinterested men. History is full of such examples; but even during the period of his own life, he has witnessed revolutions accompanied with vast bloodshed and suffering, by which only a few prominent evils were removed, without the occurrence of a social advance worth the expense of misery incurred. He has witnessed other explosions, evidently arising out

of the indisposition of rulers to change institutions in accordance with the progress of opinion, education, and general knowledge — from which, however, no good result was obtained; and he has been the spectator of organic ameliorations, apparently undertaken with a sufficient combination of boldness and of caution, the fruits of which have been nearly as valueless. In all these cases, theories the most plausible, as to forms of government and the details of civil polity, laid down and enforced by men of subtle intellect and of undoubted philanthropy, have been followed by results as dispiriting as the anticipations were brilliant. He was thus irresistibly led to the consideration of the question—How comes this to be? It required no long period of reflection to induce him to acquiesce in the probability that the Maker of mankind should not leave his creatures to that which is vulgarly called Chance. He was early led to perceive the improbability that a beneficent Creator should suffer society to be modelled by the passion or shortsightedness of so imperfect a being as man; or that He who had subjected the material world to laws, at once so stringent and so complex, should leave the moral world to the caprices of speculatists, or the fantastical combinations of philosophers. This, upon an abstract view of the matter, seemed to be the

most natural conclusion. The results, however, of the various attempts which history records to alter even the least of those forms which society spontaneously takes, led him a step further. These results led to the conclusion, not only that Moral Government exists, but that its laws are both minute and stringent; and that the perpetual ill success of all those who undertook to remodel communities, arose out of some violation of those unseen laws, of the very existence of which it was probable these social adventurers never even dreamed.

The next step was to discover, if possible, the laws by which Mundane Moral Government, assuming it to exist, was regulated. To accomplish this seemed almost impossible, so apparently insuperable are the difficulties of such an investigation. The phenomena of the laws which regulate material existence are in some measure palpable to view; but the machinery of moral regulation must of necessity be hidden from sight. This necessity arises out of another. Man is a free moral agent; that is to say, man is free to do what he wills to do. If he were not so, he could not be the object either of praise or blame, or of reward or punishment. It is necessary, therefore, that the mode of Mundane Moral Government, be it what it may, should be such as not to interfere with this freedom

of action in accordance with the determinations of the will. There must be no physical coercion over human acts; because, if there be, these acts cease to be those of a moral agent. They, in that case, spring from a material necessity *ab externo*, and not from the will of the agent, and are therefore not moral acts. This sort of coaction was therefore to be avoided; and the machinery of Moral Government was necessarily to be of such a nature as to be mental, and to act through the human will, as influenced by the circumstances amidst which the moral agent happens to be placed. It at last occurred to the Author of this Treatise, that there might, possibly, be some analogy between Moral Mundane Government and Material Mundane Government; and that some great primal principle, like that of the attraction of gravitation, might be the foundation of the one, as that great principle is of the other. Taking this clue as his guide, the Author persevered in his investigation; the result of which is the Essay now offered to the world. If it proves anything, it proves that this analogy between Mundane Moral and Mundane Material does exist, and may be traced everywhere, with more or less of distinctness. The reader will perceive that, if the following Theory be just and true, one great motive and ruling principle is the basis, from which all the rest springs. The modi-

fications which it assumes arise out of external circumstances, necessary and inevitable in their own nature; at the same time, the freedom of man's moral actions is never interfered with, though, by an arrangement of circumstances as beautiful as it is beneficent, the human will is induced to take certain great lines of direction, from which it never departs, and within which all its other acts are performed and carried out in action. Between these great outlines of the scheme of Moral Government and that of Mundane Material Government, the reader will discover a wonderful analogy; and he will likewise trace that analogy in the more minute arrangements of both. To his judgment and decision the Author leaves his work and himself, premising only that this Theory will not be found to lead to any consequences which either the divine can regret or the moralist condemn.

There remains, however, one consideration, which the Author of this volume must press upon the attention of his reader. In the course of the following pages, various references are made to various portions of ancient and modern history, embodying statements as to events which, as the Author conceives, corroborate the principles as to Mundane Moral Government laid down in this Essay. These references must, of course, be considered merely as indicative of the appli-

cation of the event to the principle. Neither censure nor commendation of any particular act is intended to be involved; and the passages of history referred to are instanced only as affording, with more or less of clearness, examples of that wonderful, though veiled machinery, by means of which the moral government of the human race is conducted by its omniscient and divine Author.

NEWCASTLE-UPON-TYNE,
1*st January* 1852.

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MUNDANE MORAL GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE ABSTRACT PROBABILITY OF A MORAL GOVERNMENT, BY GOD, OF THIS WORLD.

If we look abroad throughout created nature, we find everywhere proofs the most palpable of the divine government of all things that are, properly speaking, material. We perceive the solar system, of which this our earth is but a minute portion, subjected to fixed and undeviating laws—of so nice, and at the same time so stringent, a nature, that calculations at once the most stupendous and exact are to be certainly founded upon them. Hence, our knowledge of the planetary system, of which our own world is a part, is as precise, as far as it goes, as any other sort of knowledge that we possess. We can, from our certain

knowledge of the rate of the earth's motion, and the form of its orbit, joined to a similar knowledge of the laws which regulate the movements of its lunary satellite, predict eclipses of that body. This we only do because we have been enabled to perceive correctly the periodical motions of the two bodies in relation to the sun, which enables us to see, long beforehand, the precise periods when the earth's shadow shall be projected upon the moon. The same sort of knowledge of the movements of the different planets, enables us to calculate beforehand the eclipses of the sun—the transit of Venus over the sun's disc—the revolutions of Jupiter's satellites, and those of Saturn; and lastly, the wonderful precision of this knowledge has led M. Leverrier to discover a new planet, next in size to Jupiter—and thus to enlarge immensely the known limits of our solar system, by deducing, from certain disturbances in the motion of the planet Uranus, the place of that other planet whose attraction caused these remarkable deviations. Descending a step lower, and contemplating the phenomena of the globe which we inhabit, we find abundant evidence of the same divine government exerted upon creation. Singular, however, to relate, minuteness eludes us more than immensity. We can ascertain to a single second the rates of the movements of various heavenly bodies, and lay down the law of gravitation by which they are regulated; but of many of the minor phenomena more immediately

under our notice, our knowledge is much less perfect and complete. We cannot explain nor foresee the lesser variations of our own atmosphere. The winds evade our research in their causes, and the currents of the great ocean baffle us. Still we know amply enough to afford proof demonstrative that the most minute and evanescent operations of nature are regulated by laws undeviating and all-embracing. To the regular diurnal motion of the earth upon its own axis, we owe the alternations of day and night; to the obliquity of the ecliptic, or track of the sun's apparent course, is due the regular procession of the seasons, and the varieties of climate; to the moon's attraction may be attributed phenomena of the tides of the ocean—so wonderful, yet so beneficial.

With the minor phenomena of our globe our acquaintance is less intimate. Of its interior we really know nothing. Of the system of volcanic action, as well as that of the distribution of water below the surface, we are ignorant. But we see enough to convince us that these hidden arrangements are part of a vast plan, and that the results are beneficent. To the action of internal combustion we probably owe the distribution of metals and other minerals, so important to man in their uses. By the wonderful distribution of internal springs of fresh water, aided by the system of surface evaporation and rains, the earth is rendered habitable by living

beings. This we plainly see, though of the machinery and plan of these benevolent arrangements we can perceive little or nothing. Of the laws which govern the vast collection of waters over the surface of the globe, our perception is equally imperfect. We can trace the causes of the tides, but who can explain the causes of the oceanic currents, or those of the more internal seas, in all of which they are found? Who can afford even a plausible theory of the motion, course, and temperature of the great gulf-stream? Or who can explain the phenomena of the current of the Bosphorus between the Euxine and the Mediterranean?—or of that which sets perpetually through the Straits of Gibraltar? At these phenomena and their causes, plausible guesses have been made by Dr Halley and others; but beyond a guess we cannot yet go. Still, however, there is no reason to doubt that these appearances are the results of fixed and immutable laws, resulting in ends the most beneficent and wonderful. We may predicate the same of that constant slow change which is going on in the distribution of land and water over the whole orb which we inhabit. Here coasts gradually crumble away and yield to the inroads of the sea; there new islands are submerged by volcanic action, or are builded slowly up—the work of thousands of years—by minute marine insects. Whilst we contemplate this process, we also collect evidence demonstrative that the countries of which we are

inhabitants have been at some period beneath the water. Here we get a glimpse at a great law of change, evidently providential in design and end; but further we cannot at present go.

Of the atmosphere that surrounds us, and its wonderful phenomena, our knowledge is just as imperfect and limited. We can ascertain its composition, but of the laws which govern its movements and changes we can state nothing that is certain. That storms and tornadoes are most powerful between the tropics is quite certain; and the circular motion of these atmospheric convulsions seems ascertained. Hence these phenomena have been plausibly attributed to the sudden formation of a vacuum, and heat or the electric fluid, so prominent in thunder-storms, has been set down as the agent. This is probable; but, be it so or not, it seems evident that a pernicious stagnation of the atmosphere is to be avoided by a constant recurrence of motive causes; and that, whilst man is sometimes wrecked by a tempest, or wafted by a trade-wind, he is also deriving benefits unseen from both.

The atmospheric agencies are mysterious, at the same time that they are instructive: but what shall we say of the chemical agencies? Here is opened a field which appears to be illimitable, and in which every step affords a fresh wonder. To that grand principle of the Creator, which causes all known

bodies to tend towards a centre, the name of "the attraction of gravitation" has been given, and the laws by which it acts have been calculated and fixed to a degree of minute certitude that must have astonished even the mighty mind that achieved this grand result. A moderate power of reflection, however, may serve to convince us that the law of attraction, as demonstrated by Newton, constitutes only the outline of the system of the universe, as far as it is visible by human eye. That this great law may pervade everywhere, is possible, and somewhat probable. All visible bodies of a fixed nature, beyond this earth, seem to be spherical, whether they be planets, satellites, suns, or fixed stars. The satellites revolve round their primaries by similar laws, the attraction balancing the centrifugal impulse. Light is either given out or reflected by all these bodies, obeying the same regulations of impulse and refraction. So much is certain; and upon these facts inferences the most stupendous, and at the same time the most pleasing, may possibly be established. But within the circle of this grand law of the universe exists a system of minor and more complicated natural legislation, distinct and separate from the law of gravitation. This system is that of the chemical affinities and agencies. These may some day, perhaps, be proved to be modifications of that which we call the attraction of gravitation; but at present they

must be held to be distinct, and to be phenomena complete *per se*. We here establish the extraordinary principle of elective attraction or chemical affinity. Chemistry at once takes the field, and demonstrates that there exists a minor code of more minute regulations, by and under which certain substances attract and repel other substances, through a mysterious system of laws totally different from that of gravitation in bodies. By this means chemistry teaches us that a perpetual action and reaction are at work amongst the substances, whatever these may be, of which the world is composed. There is an everlasting recomposition and decomposition of all things. Gases are given out and again absorbed. Compounds are decompounded to form new compounds—which are again decomposed for the formation of others. Metals become alkalies—alkalies unite with acids to form salts, which are again decomposed either into their primitive principles, or to form and enter into other composites. Gaseous bodies unite, now to form liquids, now to become solids; but these solids and liquids, in their turns, are redissolved into their primitives for a new distribution. That this perpetual distribution is requisite for the sustentation of the vegetable and animal creatures which cover and live upon the globe's surface, cannot be doubted. The general end is apparent. The system is manifest. But the complications and niceties of the mechanism

are too recondite, possibly, for human research. We cannot be sure that any of the substances we call simple are really so. All we know is that things are most easily obtained in the forms in which they are the most useful; and that, where elements are wanted, there they are supplied. The mystery of the magnetic attraction is ever ready for the service of the navigator; but, of its nature or its causes he knows absolutely nothing; and, except in so far as it ministers to him, understands no more of its office or its province in the mundane system, than does the child of yesterday. Of the laws of the agencies of light, and of heat, and of electricity, we do not know much; but feel, in every moment of our lives, that these agencies are beneficial in the extreme. The action of heat, of light, and of electricity upon vegetable vitality alone teach us this, with a voice all-eloquent.

These considerations naturally, and by a familiar sequence, bring us to the contemplation of the vegetable and animal creation. Here we see the same wonderful and complicated arrangements of causes and effects that are presented by inanimate nature. Vitality, so esteemed by us, now becomes apparent. We perceive a distant, but certain, analogy between the life of plants and that of ourselves. Sea and land we perceive equally to teem with life; and we perceive that these lives are caused to originate and to be

sustained by combinations the most intricate and wonderful. Over the land and over the ocean it is apparent that the seeds of both animal and vegetable life are sown, with a mysterious profusion that puzzles all calculation. Not a stone is without its parasitic moss. Upon the most minute vegetable feeds some minute animal or animalcule. As soon as the local conditions are changed, so are the inhabitants, vegetable and animal. If a piece of ground, after being inundated, becomes dry land, a new vegetation and new animals forthwith appear. Lay it again under water, and its pristine condition returns. Aquatic plants again take the place of the former regulation; and a new class of animals—insect, reptile, fish, and bird, again find food and shelter amidst this vegetation now congenial to their nature. Between the minor and the major conditions of animal life a similar connection is everywhere apparent. The animalcules come first, and they appear everywhere. Change the conditions of any substance as you may, or make what compound you will, they will, in course of time, be found to give birth to, and sustain a race of, living animalcules, which, in their turn, help to support another race of animals of higher organisation. Thus, animalcules are the support of most of the reptiles, of many species of fish, and of some species of birds. These, again, afford food for larger animals of other species, until we end with largest carnivorous

quadrupeds and birds, and with the phocæ of the great deep. Vegetation is subject to the same law. Insects of innumerable kinds accompany it wherever it appears, and it pervades all localities. These, together with the vegetation itself, afford sustenance to innumerable animals of a higher organisation, until the highest is reached. Be the vegetation terrene or submarine, it is subject to the same laws; and whilst the elephant, rhinoceros, elk, giraffe, and buffalo, browse in the forest, the hippopotamus, alligator, and dugong, feed at the bottom of sea, lake, and river.

Finally, then, we arrive at a conclusion which, even with our imperfect knowledge, seems to be inevitable—that is to say, that the physical creation is ruled by its Creator, through means of a code of natural laws, at once the most comprehensive and the most minute; that all the parts of this complicated and stupendous machinery depend upon each other; and that, consequently, all natural phenomena are only a vast series of causes and effects, the certain and calculated results of an Intellect that embraces everything and directs everything. To this conclusion we necessarily add another, which is, that, in the material creation, "chance" is a term absolutely without a meaning. Under such a system as is described, there cannot be any such thing. And we must conclude further, that if, under the physical government of the universe,

"chance" or "contingency" cannot have place, neither can the will of man be of effect to alter one jot or tittle of that great scheme which regulates the phenomena of that creation of which he is a part. In his physical relations, therefore, with other created things, man is the creature of a stern and complete necessity. He must be as he is. He cannot modify the laws which cause even two grains of sand to unite or disunite, as circumstances may dictate. To the consequences of these laws all his volitions, schemes, inventions, enterprises, labours, and combinations, must be at all times subject. He holds his material existence amid immutable laws; and these immutable laws regulate and control the whole course of that material existence—its beginning, its middle, and its end. He is what they have made him—and nothing but that.

Thus, then, having arrived at a conclusion which seems to be unavoidable, and which every advance of our knowledge only serves to confirm, that the material universe and all its phenomena are governed in every particular through the medium of natural laws, by an Intellect which at once bewilders by its vastness and staggers by its minuteness, we are naturally led to another question—that of Moral Government, as contradistinguished from material or physical. We have seen that the physical or material man is free to act under certain immutable laws, but in no other

manner. Nature impels him to certain ends; but he only attains these ends by acting in obedience, and not in opposition, to the natural laws under which he exists. He is free to do much, but only under stringent limitations. He is free to change the face of nature: he can clear and cultivate. He is free to provide shelter as well as food: he can excavate or build. He is free to pass from place to place: he can move over the surface of the earth, or glide along the bosom of the waters. Yet all this he only does by acting in obedience, and not in opposition, to a code of laws as stringent as it is extraordinary. He cannot evade its minutest dictate for one moment of time. Gravitation will not cease at his bidding for a single instant. In vain does he struggle against the weakest chemical affinity, or essay to baffle for a second the law which bids the chrystal take form, or the solid resolve into the gaseous. His most perfected freedom of action is limited on every side; and when he moves, he must follow nature's direction, or stand still. Nor do we complain of these laws; because we at once feel and perceive that they are essential to our being, and to all we enjoy in consequence. No sane man ever wished to see nature's laws repealed; because, in such case, he must, he knows, also cease to be. In chaos there can be no room for such a creature as man. The dissolution of nature involves the dissolution of his physical being; and the law of his actions is also

the law of his existence. This is true of material human existence; but the nature of man is twofold. He is not only a material but a moral agent; and his moral capabilities far exceed his material endowments. Hence the framework of all society is built in adaptation to the intellectual rather than the material wants of the human race. The mere animal requirements of man are of course few, and easily supplied. Food, shelter, and the continuation of the species, nature imperiously demands; but these demands are readily supplied. To obtain them it was hardly necessary that man should be a gregarious animal. To secure the moral and intellectual aspirations of his higher nature, however, society becomes necessary. Without society there could be no intellectual progress; without society there could be no government; without government there could be no law; without law there could be no property. To obtain these, man must become a citizen. He must become a member of a civil community. With civilisation comes pure and refined religion, and also literature and the arts. Without extended communities, such things cannot be supposed to exist. Society, then, takes being in obedience to man's moral and intellectual wants, and has little to do with his mere physical necessities. Government and society exist that he may be a moral and intellectual being; in short, that he may be contradistinguished from the brute animal creation. By

means of these alone, he becomes emphatically "a man having a reasonable soul;" and, through these means only, fulfils those higher destinies which set him so far above all the other portions of mundane creation.

If, then, these be obvious and uncontradicted truths, in which all men are ready to acquiesce, we are led by them, naturally and directly, to the question of moral government. We are at once brought into a position where we cannot avoid asking ourselves, if, as it seems to be undeniable, God has included man's *material* existence—which is of the least consequence to him—under a stringent code of laws, is it reasonable to suppose that he should leave man's *moral* existence—which is to him all in all—at the mercy of chance or caprice, or the blindness or depravity of the moral agent? As a question of probabilites, this inquiry seems to admit but of one answer. It is hardly possible to suppose that the Creator, who has subjected the material universe to regulation so minute, should leave the moral world unregulated and ungoverned, save by the volitions or passions of the agents. This it is hardly possible to suppose; and this conclusion brings us to another step in this argument. If, it may be asked, it be true that the great Maker of all things governs the moral world even as he does the world that is material, there must, in all probability, be some analogy between the two modes of

government; but whether this be true or not, if a moral government there be, why is the evidence of its existence not obvious, as are the proofs of the scheme of material government? This is a natural and necessary question, flowing directly from all that has been laid down. Let us now address ourselves to discover the true and proper answer.

In the first place, it must be obvious to all who inquire into this nice question, after due consideration, that it is *not* reasonable to expect that evidence of a moral government of the world should be of the same manifest and external nature with the evidence of the material laws by which all material and visible existence is governed. It is *not*, we repeat, reasonable to expect this; for if we inquire, as we now necessarily must do, as to what is the foundation of moral agency, we must as necessarily come to the conclusion that this foundation is in the human will. Moral actions are only the consequences of human volitions. Man is free to act as he wills to act; and by the decisions of his will his actions are governed. They are voluntary, because they flow from volition alone. Were this not so, man would be a mere machine, and not a moral agent, capable of being acted upon by hope or fear, by praise or blame, or by any of those motives to action which are properly called "moral." Man, then, if morally governed at all, must be, for a moral purpose, governed through his will. This is the only

mode by which he can be subjected to a moral regulation, that is conceivable. It must be confessed that, on a first view, this would seem to bring the inquiry to the difficult point of determining the mode by which the human will is itself determined. On full consideration, however, it will certainly be found that this is not the case. We may prove the fact of a universal or general law, and yet not prove the *modus operandi* by and through which that law is carried out in effect. No one doubts the law of the attraction of gravitation; but no one pretends to explain *how* gravitation in bodies acts. All we know is the bare fact of the tendency of bodies to a common centre; of the efficient and proximate cause of the tendency, we are totally ignorant. Of the precise causes of the various modifications of this tendency in particular bodies, we know just as little. We know the phenomena of crystallization, magnetism, and the chemical affinities; but of the *modus operandi* of nature in all these cases, we have not arrived at any comprehension. If, then, we can prove a general or universal determination of men's wills in certain directions, for which they themselves may be unable to account, we may, in such proofs, find the foundations of a general law of moral government; and if we can prove the constant recurrence, under certain circumstances, of certain modifications of this general tendency in the volitions of mankind, we may, in such modifications, discover various minor

regulations of a moral government, acting upon and through the intellect, although the individual may not be cognisant of the law which he is really obeying: and as no one doubts of the reality of the laws of gravitation, chemical affinity, magnetism, or crystallization, because not only the facts, but the uses of these facts, are apparent to the mind; so, if we can show the moral uses of these various constantly recurring determinations of the human will in certain directions, we have, in truth, the same sort of evidence of moral government as we have of the material government of the world. We cannot explain the *modus operandi* of either; but we can deduce, from the constant recurrence of certain facts, the existence of a regulating law, as clearly and as logically, and therefore as surely, in the one department as in the other.

The moral conclusions from the foregoing argument are, then, two. We must conclude that the existence of a moral government of the world by its Creator is, *prima facie*, probable. We must also conclude that the immediate subject of that moral government must be the human will. The next step is to inquire into the nature of voluntary action amongst mankind, and to distinguish, as completely as we can, the principles upon which it is regulated. In doing this there is not the slightest need, nor is it the intention of the author of this tract, to go, in any way, into the much-contro-

verted question of the "freedom of the human will." It may be a question of metaphysics how far the will is necessarily determined by the prevailing motive, or how far it determines itself, by its own activity, to yield to the motives in accordance with which it acts. The decision of this *vexata questio* is not, however, by any means required for the purposes of the present essay. When we see men's wills, under certain given circumstances, tend almost uniformly to act in one direction, we are not called upon to decide whether they are necessarily determined by the motives or impulses which they obey, or whether they determine themselves. It is sufficient to conclude, as we may safely do, that they act thus and thus, and decide in one certain way rather than in another, in obedience to some law of Providence, be the *modus operandi* what it may. All we are called upon to conclude is, that there exists some natural cause, reason, or inducement, for the mind's preferring the line of action which it does prefer. This cause, reason, or inducement, is, of course, a part of the machinery of God's moral government; but as to the method of its action upon the will, we are not called upon to dogmatise or to theorise. We conclude that the will does not prefer or choose one thing rather than another without cause or ground of preference; that is all. All that we would affirm is, that there are efficient and sufficient grounds, reasons, or causes, for all determinations of the human

will, whether those causes exist without or within the mind itself. We have merely to inquire if there be any great principle, like that of gravitation, under the influence of which the moral acts of mankind come to pass. With the mode of its influence we are not called upon to meddle.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE PRINCIPLE UPON WHICH MORAL ACTION DEPENDS.

If we inquire what the great principle is by which men's minds are kept in action, and the great and complex business of the moral world carried forward, we shall find the answer in the word "Excitement." Under this word is included all the various impulses, preferences, and motives, by which the mind is moved, and without which it cannot be conceived to move at all. Metaphysicians may fancy a certain internal and intrinsic activity in the soul or intellect, by force of which it may, of two perceived modes of action, choose or determine itself to one rather than the other. Such a power as this of free choice metaphysicians may fancy they can comprehend; but no one can conceive the mind to act without the excitement of some motive or other. This is totally impossible; inasmuch as it is impossible to conceive the mind to choose or prefer, without anything being presented to it as to which it can exert its faculty of choice or preference. And further, it may be observed that, if such a thing were

conceivable, such conception would amount to an absurdity only ; as it would be to conceive the occurrence of an effect without any cause, which is contrary to all reason, of which it cuts away the very foundations. We are thus, as it would appear, absolutely driven to the conclusion that excitement is the great moving power of the moral world, as without it that world would not and could not have any being. And this is evident in the consideration that, if we imagine for a moment a mind divested of and cut off from all excitement from without, of whatever sort ; then, in that case, we can only conceive of such a mind as in a state of total abeyance; indued, doubtless, with certain faculties, but unable, and deprived of means, to exercise one of them. For to say the will of man can act without external inducement or object to excite it to action, is as ridiculous as to say the eye may see without any visible object at which to look. If, then, the excitement of external motive be supposed to be annihilated, such supposition includes the annihilation of all moral action ; and that is only saying in other terms that the moral world is annihilated. If any further evidence be desired of this truth, it may be found, probably, in the experience of every man who has yet lived. There is, perhaps, not any human being who has not, at some moment of his life, felt a partial negation of motives for exertion. All men are aware how painful is even such a partial negation. It

is this which makes solitude so insupportable by most persons, and which renders the lives of those unhappy whose destiny has put it in their power to enjoy all the ordinary objects of human desire or human ambition. To such persons life becomes a dreary and painful blank. They are the victims of *ennui* and melancholy; or they seek for motives to action so depraved and extravagant as to produce their own ruin. Of such persons it is needless to give instances. History abounds with them. It may be concluded, then, that the destruction of all excitement to moral action is the destruction of the moral man; and, if this be applied to all men, of the moral world, for the individuals make up the aggregate.

Here, then, we come to consider the first great analogy which exists between the material and the moral world. If we essay to conceive for a moment the destruction of the universal law of gravitation, we come at once to a material chaos. We perceive that the arrangement which constitutes that which we call "the universe" must, in such case, come at once to an end. There could be no longer any solar system. The whole structure of our earth, as it exists, must then come to a complete termination. The causes of that division which separates water from land would immediately cease. Rivers would, in such case, cease to flow, vapours to ascend, or rains or snows to fall. The agencies of light and of heat would be at an end.

The solid, the fluid, and the gaseous, would lose their distinctions, and be compounded. Nor would the confusion end there. It would descend and distract the remotest and most minute arrangements. It is impossible to conceive of the minor arrangements of matter but as partial modifications of the great prevailing law of attraction and gravitation. If, then, one ceases, so must the others, for the greater includes the less. The abeyance of the pervading and universal law of attraction must carry with it the cessation of those minor modes of it which are exhibited in the chemical affinities, in the process of crystallization, and in the phenomena of electricity and of magnetism. Hence, under such a supposition as is laid down, the entire coherence of things, in that order which constitutes the order of nature, is necessarily seen to be at an end. All, in that case, is cast loose. Nothing can be conceived to remain but the original elements of things, devoid of order, plan, arrangement, method, coherence, stability, tendency, or mode of any sort, imaginable or unimaginable. In short, between the prevalence of this great law and of utter chaos, there is not any medium to be apprehended by the human mind. The death of order is the birth of confusion. One follows the other, as the cessation of day of necessity includes in itself the creation of night.

If, however, we consider this matter attentively and carefully, it will be found to follow, that the annihila-

tion, or total abeyance, of the great principle of excitement, would carry with it a more complete annihilation of the moral world, than can the destruction of the principle of gravitation bring on in the material world. It is true that this may appear to be so, because our reasoning faculties are not perfect enough to permit of its appearing otherwise. This may be true; but as we have to deal with human reasonings, as grounded upon human faculties, we must, of necessity, take them as they are, those faculties remaining as they are. It is admitted on all hands that the human intellect cannot conceive the creation of the material world, as it seems to exist, out of nothing. We may believe that it is within the power of an Omnipotent Being to perform such a miracle; but of the nature or mode of the act of such creation, we cannot arrive at the slightest idea. We may assent to the proposition as stated in words, but beyond that assent we cannot go. The *quo modo* is utterly beyond our reach. This being admitted, the converse seems to follow of course. If we cannot conceive *how* something can come of nothing, just as little can we conceive how something can be resolved back to nothing. In short, we have no more notion how matter once existing can be annihilated, than how matter non-existing can be created out of nothing. Our utmost idea of "chaos" consists in a fancied resolution of all order, and the return of all nature—that is to say, of all material nature—to its

original elements. In the destruction of gravitation, we only embody the destruction of all coherence, arrangement, and order ; but, even in thought, we cannot form an idea how this should include a total destruction of matter itself in the abstract. In fact, having conceived of matter as once existing, we cannot shut out its continued existence, in some shape or other, from the mind. Chaos is a cqnfusion of matter, but cannot be imagined to be a negation of it. For as it is impossible to conceive how the universe should come out of a universal nothing, or how, if there ever were nothing, it is possible there should be anything ; so, having once perceived the existence of things as they are, it is equally impossible to imagine any process by which they should cease to be, or return to a state of nothing.

With the human mind, however, this does not hold good. Of our own minds even we have no visible, or tangible, or definite idea. We feel that we possess a faculty which enables us to receive impressions and sensations. This faculty we call mind, to distinguish it from that which is material. We conclude it to be not material, first, because it is connected with phenomena which are themselves not material—for the mind is only recipient and storehouse of impressions and of ideas ; and, next, though we feel we have a faculty of thinking, we are destitute of any visible or tangible idea or impression of that through means of which we think,

or of that which thinks, as applied to other men. We feel we are thinking beings, but there our knowledge stops. We can neither see nor touch the thinking faculty, nor assign it shape, consistence, nor colour. This being the case, it follows, of course, that the existence of our mental sensations is the only evidence we really have of the existence of our own minds. We know we have thoughts, because we think, and can recall ideas when once received. But to receive, there must be a recipient; and thus we infer the existence of a mind, from mental phenomena; and in this necessary inference resides our whole knowledge; for no other sort of proof of the existence of mind can be supposed to exist. If, then, we conceive all mental excitement to be annihilated, we, in that act, shut out all possible perception of the existence of that which is excited. Of a mind which neither feels, thinks, perceives, hopes, fears, likes, nor dislikes anything, we have positively no idea. We cannot have, because mind is perceived even by ourselves only through its own acts. We infer the existence of the mind that receives impressions, from the impressions themselves. This is our only means of knowledge. "I think, therefore, I am," was the aphorism of Des Cartes. There is, of a verity, no other proof to be found. To annihilate sensation, then, is to annihilate mind; for of its separate existence, apart from sensation, we cannot conceive. Thus, then, we cannot resist the

conclusion, that a negation of all excitement would be a more complete annihilation of the moral world than would the cessation of gravitation be of the material world. We may conceive atomic matter to exist, destitute of all laws; but of mind, apart from all sensation, we cannot form a conception, even for a single moment.

Having arrived, then, at the conclusion that excitement performs in the moral world an office analogous to the attraction of gravitation in the physical world, it may be further observed, that the various modifications of the laws of attraction, which, under the names of cohesion, chemical affinity, radiation of heat and light, principles and laws of crystallization, magnetic and electric and galvanic influences, assist to form the wonderful arrangements of the material universe, will probably not be found to be more numerous than the various descriptions and modifications of motive which impel men to play their various parts in the moral world. Nor do we despair of showing that these various motives and impulses which govern and regulate the characters and deeds of men, are calculated to bring about the same beneficent moral effects, upon the whole, that have their prototypes in the material world and its various productions. We shall probably be able to trace the same balancing of moral forces that is seen to exist, on various occasions, amongst material forces; and to adduce the strongest reasons

for supposing, that though the moral government of human society by means of motive is necessarily much more hidden and concealed, much less palpable, and infinitely more difficult to trace, than are the material processes of this globe, yet the existence of such a system of moral government is not less certain, within the limits of which man is free to act as his individual will impels him to act, even as he does under the laws of material existence.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE MODIFICATION OF MORAL EXCITEMENT INTO MOTIVES, GENERAL AND PARTICULAR, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, AND ON CERTAIN PERVADING MORAL AND PHYSICAL PHENOMENA.

It can hardly be made a subject of doubt by any person accustomed to reflect deeply upon such subjects of inquiry, that all moral motive, whether exalted or debased, has its root and foundation in the love of self. These terms need not, however, and ought not, to be understood in any low, gross, or insidious sense. All that is meant to be conveyed is, that the mind must have some ground or reason, relative to its own pleasure or satisfaction, to induce it to move at all. This pleasure or satisfaction may be of the most refined description, and arising out of desires the most holy, and, in any reasonable sense of the word, disinterested. Still, however, in any moral act, there must arise a satisfaction to the mind of the agent in doing it, and he must contemplate some feeling of pain if he forbear to move, or else all intelligible ground or reason for acting, *quoad hominem*, as far as the individual is concerned, must be wanting. This only amounts to

affirming that men must feel some sort of interest in that which they do, or they would not act at all; for acts require the impulse of inducement for their cause. But this inducement may be the reverse of all that is mercenary, gross, or selfish, in the ordinary meaning of these terms. It may arise from the most extended philanthropy, or that sublime satisfaction which individuals feel in conferring benefits upon mankind. In any case, and in all cases, however, the satisfaction derived by the individual must be the ground of his acting, for without excitement he could not act in any way. Thus the whole range of moral motives may, doubtless, be resolved into the pleasure of the individual; but the various sorts of pleasurable excitement sought by different men are almost as many as the men themselves. The end and intent of these modifications of motive is clear. As, in order to produce the infinitude of material effects requisite to constitute the material world, a vast variety of causes are called for; so, in order to fulfil the various functions of the moral world, an equal variety of motive is demanded. The range of these is, of course, only limited by the quantity and variety of moral actions which are necessary to make up the entire moral system of the world. They are of all grades, from the grossest selfishness up to the most extended philanthropy, the purest patriotism, and the most resigned devotion to religious duty. It must be evident that the greater divisions or classes

of these motives can alone be specified. Into such divisions, however, they naturally separate themselves ; and the specification of these divisions must necessarily precede any inquiry into the particular uses and consequences which they produce in the moral machinery by which human society is regulated.

Before proceeding to this classification, however, it may be proper to say a few words as to that (as it would seem) needless controversy which has been raised as to the causes of the inequality in talent and characters which exists amongst the human species. It has been boldly asserted that all men are born equal in point of natural capacity, and that to differences of education alone are to be attributed those inequalities of ability and mental character which diversify humanity. This assertion, were it supposed to be true, does not advance us one step to a satisfactory result. If men set out thus equal, the education of each man's child must have been alike. Whence, then, came the first inequality ? If it be answered that material causes, beyond man's control, might happen perpetually to prevent this equality of education being carried out by parents, then comes the question,—What is the use of an equality, at the mercy of the first accident, and which, when once lost, could clearly never be regained ? We may surely as well admit a natural inequality, *ab initio*, as predicate an equality at the beginning, which was sure to be violated, through

natural causes, in the very infancy of the species. Besides, all evidence is against such a supposition. We see the children of the same parents, educated in the same house, with the same care, by the same instructors, turn out as varied in talent and genius as in stature and countenance. If, then, this inequality of talent and character be necessary to the formation of the moral framework of society, how should we avoid, or why should we avoid, the belief that it was intended by the Creator from the beginning, for beneficent purposes and adaptations—all requisite to the support of society, and to its progress as we see it exist and move onward, in fact? That this inequality is as necessary in the moral system, as is the difference in the ponderosity, affinities, and forms of matter in the material world, or of the habits of animals in the brute creation, we shall hereafter find; and if we find this, what further apology shall we require for its existence?

He who attempts to class and to range under heads the varieties of motive which govern mankind, will probably soon discover that they arrange themselves under a quadruple system of division. This seems to be the order of nature; and although, as is ever the case with natural productions, it is difficult to fix the precise lines where *genera* and where *species* may be affirmed to separate themselves from each other, yet it will be found that the general truth and propriety

of such divisions and subdivisions are quite undeniable, and that such exist in nature, albeit the exact limits of each are not easily perceived, defined, and determined. The motives which impel or induce the human will, and are the causes of all moral acts, are clearly to be divided into two grand portions. These may be named "general" and "particular." "General motives" are those that embrace considerations for others as well as individual considerations. "Particular motives" are those in which individual considerations fairly predominate, and where self is the principal and almost sole object. But these, again, as naturally range themselves under the heads of "positive" and "negative." "Positive motive" arises from the desire of something to be attained. "Negative motive" arises from the fear of something, which is striven to be avoided. Under this quadrupartite division, human motives may be very clearly and comprehensively classed. In some few cases, there may be a doubt whether certain mixed motives may be most properly placed under the head of general or particular. These, however, are not many; and it may perhaps be presumed, without any undue arrogance, that the following Table will meet the ideas of a majority of those who think at all on topics so delicate, yet so important :—

GENERAL.	PARTICULAR.
(Positive.)	*(Positive.)*
Love of God.	Love of existence.
Love of virtue.	Love of wealth.
Love of liberty.	Love of power.
Love of country.	Appetites for food.
Love of locality.	Appetites for the other sex.
Love of friends.	Appetites for warmth.
Love of family.	Appetites for shelter.
Love of fame.	Appetites for personal display.
Love of praise.	Personal emulation.
National emulation.	Personal arrogance.
Intellectual emulation.	Personal pride.
(Negative.)	*(Negative.)*
Hate of crime and vice.	Fear of death.
Dislike of foreigners.	Fear of poverty.
Dislike of other climates.	Fear of degradation.
Dislike of despotism.	Fear of scorn.
Dislike of obscurity.	Jealousy.
Dislike of foreign dominion.	Envy.
National revenge.	Fear of loss of rank.
	Personal revenge.

It is by no means intended to be implied, in presenting the foregoing Table, that it would not be easy to add to it. Nor could such additions be in the slightest degree improper. On the contrary, in so far as they might render the list more complete, they would be both proper and useful. It is only hoped that the enumeration, as it stands, may be found complete enough for the purposes of this essay, which only aims at a general demonstration of the general

truth of the theory which it lays down, leaving the more minute and microscopic ramifications of a subject so extensive to be traced by abler hands and pens. Of the motives classed under the denomination of "general," it may be predicated that they relate to matters which not only interest the individual, but also contemplate the interests, or rather are connected with the interests, of others. Those under the denomination of "particular" relate to matters which interest the individual solely, or nearly so, and may be styled selfish, some being properly so, and some improperly so. The reasons for the enumeration under the heads of "positive" and "negative" are more obvious. "Positive motives" are motives arising from desire to obtain some object we like. "Negative motives" are the desire to avoid something which we dislike. These may be proper or improper, as the case may be. On the whole, it is hoped the object aimed at, and the method pursued, are sufficiently clear and simple to distinguish without perplexing, and to particularise without confusing. It now remains to explain the manner in which the whole is to be used, in order to demonstrate the manner in which men's wills are directed to the moral ends and purposes for which society alone exists.

If we look abroad into the world, and contemplate the circumstances in which are placed the multitudes that inhabit it, we shall find many very striking and

marked peculiarities. We shall discover also, that these peculiarities are not novel in origin. On the contrary, it will be found that they have existed from times immemorial, and before any epocha of historical record, or even of tradition. In short, we shall see every reason for arriving at the conclusion that these marked peculiarities are coeval with the human race itself, and have existed contemporaneously with every phase, step, and change of society. Thus, as far back as our knowledge extends, we find the great family of the human race divided into great divisions, agreeing amongst themselves in each division, in manners, language, and habits, and having also a strong bond of mutual interest. These divisions agree in a mutual scheme of protection, live under some code of law or usage in accordance with the state of civilisation at which each has arrived, and are strongly impressed with the notion of the excellence of the habits of life, civil regulations, and form of religion, that prevail in each. But the power of motive which thus keeps them united, seems, like magnetism and electricity, to have a negative as well as positive quality. It attracts, but also repels. Hence, between these divisions, in all ages, have been rivalries, animosities, and jealousies perpetual, leading to frequent conflicts and a continual antagonism. Out of this have come encroachments on territory, commercial opposition, wars, and the use of military and naval arts, mechanical and other inven-

tions in great numbers, and also a spirit of devotion to the good of the many, sometimes to the almost annihilation of self-interestedness, which could not have existed under a different system of existence.

These great divisions are found to exist amongst men the most savage as well as the most civilised; though, when civilisation is great, it evidently leads to more extensive combination than in a ruder state of society. Hence the great national divisions of modern times are clearly formed out of a number of smaller ones, drawn at last into a union of interests, and ending for the most part in a general system of polity for the whole. These great divisions, however, though for the most part opposed to each other in language, habits, laws, arms, trade, and commerce, and arts, and even sciences, yet embody certain minor peculiarities common to all, which are of course remarkable for being thus common where so much is opposed or varied, and which the purposes of this argument require us to carefully note and examine.

In pursuance of this it may be observed, that there does not exist any known people or tribe, whether uncivilised, or semi-barbarous, or highly civilised, in which some germ of belief as to a first cause and a future state, however rude, is not prevalent, and in which some mode of worship, however barbarous and superstitious, is not to be traced. In the modes and forms of religious belief the different divisions of man-

kind differ as widely and as strangely as they do in language and habits ; but none are destitute of some belief and some worship. There is no tribe of mankind without a glimmering notion of the existence of other beings superior to themselves—of a first cause or maker of all that they see—and some mode of propitiation or adoration. These differences have caused some of the most violent animosities that exist between people and people ; but the principle is common to all. There is not, nor ever was, a tribe of atheists ; and it is agreed by all that nothing is so hopeless as any attempt to extirpate or alter by force any system of religious belief. Thus, then, religious belief, in the abstract, is a principle that runs through the human family. It exists under the most opposite usages, manners, morals, and grades of civilisation, and is to be found in some shape wherever man himself is to be found.

Another peculiarity, to be noted in the progress of this argument, is this, that, be civilisation amongst any people in what state it may—be it high or low, diffused or confined to classes, of an intellectual or of a more material character—it yet produces no effect upon that inequality of condition, and rank, and power, and property, which also exists everywhere, amongst every people, and under all systems of government or polity, rude or refined. It is observable that, let the political ideas of any division of mankind be what they may,

whether based on highly refined and abstract ideas of human equality of rights, and privileges, and duties; or whether, looking to certain individuals or families as the depositories sole of all the powers of government, the phenomena now pointed out are, and ever have been, the same. No nation ever established an equality of property; and, as a sequence, no people ever had in reality an equality of rank or influence, though in name such equality may have been pretended to be set up. Thus, in all divisions of the human race there are rich and poor, influential and uninfluential, weaker and stronger. No social system has ever yet achieved the slightest effectual alteration in this principle of society. Inequality has always been and is amongst all men, however named, located, combined, or civilised.

Amidst this inequality of rank there is, however singularly manifested, one pervading principle of equality in condition, which is very striking. In all grades and states of mankind we find them arranged in families. This is the case with high and low, rich and poor, weak and powerful. In no state of society were the relations of husband and wife, and of parent and child, ever unknown; and although in some parts of the world the sensuality and covetousness of human nature has set up institutions in appearance at variance with this arrangement, these institutions have ever been found powerless in social effect, and the

natural arrangement of ties has remained as before for all practical consequences.

The foregoing is an enumeration of the principal motives by which men's actions are known to be caused, and of the principal moral phenomena which arise out of the regulations of the great human family in its social state. Having made the enumeration and noted the phenomena, we now naturally arrive at the consideration of the uses to be made of both. Nor are their uses in reasoning far to be sought. We see here undeniably that the moral acts of men can only, and do only, arise out of the force and influence of motives. We see, also, with equal certainty, that, under this arrangement, certain moral phenomena have manifested themselves, and prevailed in all states and ages of mankind of which we possess any knowledge. How then, admitting these facts, are we to avoid or eschew the conclusion that these motives must necessarily be so arranged as to produce the phenomena? It would be no objection to this conclusion if we were even unable to produce any direct evidence for such an arrangement of motives. Nor would it be any sufficient objection were we unable even to point out the moral uses and moral probability of such a system. These would be no valid objections, because it would still remain undeniable as a fact, that the phenomena were, and are, in existence, and that it is impossible to conceive them to be produced except by the influence

of the human will. It may be impossible to show exactly the process by which the volitions of so many individuals are swayed constantly and perpetually in certain directions. Or it may happen that reasoners may produce different theories to account for the facts. It may arise from certain ideas, and associations of ideas, being necessarily, from his birth, in a certain position or locality, implanted in the mind of the individual. Or it may arise from the principle of imitation and of habit to which the mind is subject. Or it may arise in some other way. Let the *modus operandi* be what it may, however, we cannot disbelieve facts, of which we have evidence the same that we have for various material facts that no one dreams of doubting. Or, if we believe one and reject the other, we must be guilty of gross inconsistency. There are, unquestionably, various phenomena in the physical world, of which we can neither lay open the proximate and immediate causes, nor point out the precise uses with certainty. For instance, there are many atmospheric and marine phenomena as to which we are in this very position. Who can detail the exact causes that produce, on one hand, the trade-winds in all their wondrous regularity ?—and, on the other hand, the tornadoes of the tropics, so tremendous in effect, so uncertain of occurrence ? Who can account for the gulf-stream, or the eternal current setting from the Euxine on one hand, and the ocean on the other,

into the Mediterranean? Or who can supply the explanation of the magnetic phenomena, or of the mariners' compass—though of their uses, in one particular, there can be no doubt? Of these various occurrences in the material world, no one can demonstrate the proximate causes, nor the exact uses. But we infer, almost irresistibly, that which we cannot directly prove. No reasonable mind really doubts that trade-winds, tornadoes, currents, and the magnetic phenomena are subjected to arrangements the nicest and most minute; or that their office, in the physical world, is necessary and efficient to carry out in its integrity that wonderful arrangement which is necessary to its completeness as a system. This we infer from the regularity of their occurrence within certain limits, and from the perpetual succession of their appearances. There seems to be no reason, however, for our limiting such inferences to the appearances of the material creation. From a constant moral phenomenon to a moral cause of that phenomenon, the inference is as strong as from a material effect to a material cause. We cannot conceive either to exist without a cause; and, from a regular recurrence of effects, the presumption of a regular arrangement of causes necessarily flows. Of the mode by which a cause produces the effect, we are in both cases equally ignorant. As far as our knowledge extends, cause and effect, whether moral or physical, are a mere

sequence. No range, or depth of human research, or human subtlety, has yet been of power to show the *ligamen* or connecting link between the two. Hence, then, it seems to follow—and clearly to follow—that our evidence of a moral government of the world is of precisely the same sort as is our evidence of a material government of the universe. It also seems clearly to follow, that it is just as strong, inasmuch as we know no more of the *modus operandi* of material causes than of moral causes. In short, it is evident that all which we perceive, in either case, is constant sequence; and from that we necessarily infer that there must be a necessary connection betwixt the effect and its cause, although we cannot perceive the *ligamen*. But this inference is just as necessary, as strong, and as true, between moral effects and their causes, as between material effects and their causes; and therefore the conclusion, that the evidence in either case is equally good and of the same sort, is unavoidable. Thus, then, we arrive at the demonstration wished for—that is to say, that, if we can point out a constantly recurring series of moral phenomena, we have as good a foundation for reasoning as is afforded by material phenomena, as far as it goes. The series may be less extensive in one case than in the other. The foundation on which to build a system of logical deduction may be narrower. Still, however, as far as each goes, they are similar in goodness; the sole differ-

ence being in the number of the facts, and not in their quality nor applicability to the purposes of human reasoning.

But the reasoning from which we infer a providential and beneficent scheme of the material universe, does not, by any means, rest solely upon the constant recurrence of the phenomena. We not only perceive the phenomena themselves, but we evolve, in part at all events, the uses of that which we see, from a contemplation of the natural effects. The argument for the divine origin of the laws of gravitation, magnetism, chemical affinity, electricity, and crystallization, is perfect, as far as it rests on the constant and regular recurrence of a series of causes and effects. If we went no farther, this is enough; but we have other arguments corroborative of this; and these arguments are derived from the uses of all that we see, as regards ourselves and inferior living beings. We see that, without the operation of these great pervading primary laws, the world, as it is, could not exist; and we further see, that if the world, as it is, did not exist, neither could we ourselves nor the inferior animals exist. Nothing can be more evident than this. It is by the law of gravitation only that the world is divided into the two grand divisions of land and water, without which, all living beings must cease to live. It is by the laws of chemical affinity and crystallization, in addition to gravitation, that the metals,

and various modifications of them, such as the alkalies, and their modifications again, such as the neutral salts, are combined and held together. The same laws, with the additional modification of capillary attraction, are requisite to enable the law of vegetation—another modification of the first grand law—to act; and upon the law of vegetation, submarine and superterrene, it should seem that animated nature depends—vegetation feeding those, which, in their turn, become aliment for the rest. Thus, then, in the beautiful arrangements of material physiology, we discover a corroborative reason, irresistible in its force, for the divine origin of the material world; this argument not resting upon the sequence of cause and effect, but upon the uses of such sequence. This grand argument is summed up in the beautiful text—"And God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was *very good!*" That is to say, not only perfect in itself, but "*good*" for those whom he willed to enjoy it. This may be called the argument of use; and upon this beautiful adaptation of means to ends, we, arguing upwards, and inferring cause from effect, rest our proof of the existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and benevolent First Cause, which we have no means of proving *a priori*, though some subtle intellects have imagined the possibility of such demonstration. Thus it is from this physiological adaptation of means to ends benevolent, as well as of certain recurrence,

that we obtain our more complete notion of the divine "government" of the material world properly so called. We first prove an *efficient* cause from a constant sequence of events; we next prove a *benevolent* cause, from the uses, to ourselves and others, of that peculiar sequence of causes and effects which go to make up the globe that we inhabit; and these two make up our idea of *government* as applied to the material universe.

Now, then, it remains to inquire whether that constant sequence of moral causes and effects, which go to make up what is called "the moral world," is not equally susceptible of this argument derived from uses, and whether those modifications of the great law of excitement, which arise out of the moral phenomena to which we have adverted, and which go to form the various motives which form the moral machinery of human society, may not be shown to be equally beneficent in their ultimate effects? To answer this question in the affirmative, and to demonstrate that such answer is true and indubitable, must be the next step; and to this must we accordingly address ourselves. It will be our business to show that the greater and lesser divisions of human society, first into nations, and then into classes, and then into families, are calculated to bring about results the most beneficent; that the various systems of religious belief, which have at all times existed in the world,

are calculated to promote similar ends. And again, that the varieties of power and influence arising out of the irregularities between the material possessions of one nation and of another, and of one class and another, and of one family and another, are also all intended to produce similarly excellent effects. And that further, without these arrangements, the various enumerated motives which are necessary (just as material minor causes are requisite to the material system of the world) to the moral structure and action of the moral world, could not exist nor have place; and that, therefore, they are all necessary to each other in regard to utility as well as causation; inasmuch as moral action, as we see it carry forward the moral world under certain limitations as stringent as those of the material world, could not go on without it.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE GRAND DIVISION OF MANKIND INTO NATIONS, AND THE MORAL PHENOMENA CONNECTED WITH IT.

THE great and distinguishing feature of human society is indubitably the division of mankind everywhere, and wheresoever he exists, into nations; these nations all differing from each other in language, dress, manners, usages, national feelings, and oftentimes religions. We see that this division is quite universal, and that it appears, without deviation, in all climates, and under all the known stages and states of civilisation. It is clearly the first modification of that great law of human nature which makes man a gregarious animal. In order to obtain that excitement which is necessary to his pleasurable existence, man the unit must, to a greater or less extent, associate with other men. If shut out from this association, he pines and dies, body and mind together, of mental inanition; for to feed the body will not suffice, if the mind be totally starved. But this grand regulation of gregariousness, arising as it does directly out of our nature and constitution, bodily and mental, we soon see is not unmodified. A

modification immediately takes place ; and as chemical affinity, and the laws of crystallization, together with gravitation, impel material bodies to congregate together in certain forms and masses, so we see mankind impelled by a parallel moral law to do the same. Men invariably congregate into nations which are palpably distinct from each other, and which contain a principle of repulsion; the men of one nation having not only an imperfect sympathy with, but a certain distaste to, those of another. And so universal in its effect is this modification of human society, that it is impossible, perhaps, to find a man free from its influence entirely. It is true that men sometimes change their country ; but then it is always seen that in casting off one allegiance they adopt another ; just as a man sometimes disinherits a profligate son and adopts another man's child, whom he soon comes to treat as his own. It is also further to be observed, that though geographical circumstances often seem to cause, or help to cause, this division of men into nations, yet these circumstances are by no means necessary to produce this effect. It is perfectly true that Spain is insulated by the sea and the Pyrenean mountains; Italy by the sea and the Alps ; and England by the sea solely : and that, in these circumstances, there appears to be a natural and material ground for national division. But then it is equally true, on the other hand, that there are many more national divisions now existing,

which have no circumstances of this description connected with them. Thus the greater German states, such as Austria and Prussia, are not separated by natural barriers or land-marks; nor is Poland from these; nor is Russia and her Sclavonic tribes from Poland; nor is Holland from Belgium; nor, again, is Belgium from France. Yet all these nations are just as distinct from each other, and as national in feelings, usages, and language, for the most part, as are China or Japan. This tendency towards national division, and consequent difference in tongues, habits, dress, and usages, exists, as far as we know, equally under all the stages of civilisation. It is equally manifest amongst the Red Indians of the American Continent; the Negroes of Africa; the Arabs of the Desert; the wandering tribes of the Polar Regions; the arid plains of Asia, and their various castes, septs, and clans; and the civilised regions of Europe. In short, the feature is so striking, that no one who has the slightest knowledge of the actual state of the globe and its inhabitants can fail to see it at once. It is as palpable as is the earth itself which these nations cover.

When we see the wills of all mankind tend thus universally in one direction, without any exception, we may, without inquiring further, safely assume that there must be some strong, efficient, and pervading motive for an effect so universal and extraordinary. This we might safely assume; for even if it were pos-

sible to conceive of such a thing as "chance," in the rigid interpretation of the word, no human being would ever dream of attributing to chance an effect so universal—pervading, as it does, all ages and stages of civilised or uncivilised life. The moral causes of this curious arrangement are, however, probably to be traced to the desire of protection and fear of a stranger, which men from the beginning must have felt. Individuals scattered about a country, acting each family for themselves, and without general concert, sympathy, or union of any kind, must always have seen and felt themselves to be at the mercy of those who might act in a combined body against them. Hence would first arise clans and tribes; and from them, by a slower process of amalgamation, would come nations as we now see them all over the globe. The amalgamation would stop as each nation felt itself secure from any force that could easily be brought against it. Hence, where strong natural barriers, such as mountains, lakes, great rivers, deserts, or morasses, intervened, these became "national limits." This is very evident on an examination of the actual positions and constitutions of most countries as they exist at this day. We may trace the whole process almost everywhere. Thus, in England, we have not only the divisions of England proper, Scotland, and Wales, now forming one united nation, but we have county differences of dialect, usages, and features, arising out of

the lesser clanships into which the region was formerly severed, at and anterior to the period of the heptarchy. In Spain and Portugal the same process of amalgamation of different minor kingdoms, to form the Spanish monarchy, is just as manifestly to be seen ; the mountains of the Pyrenees, at last, forming the natural boundary of the whole. In France the like process is also easily to be distinguished ; the division of that monarchy into various independent duchies, such as Navarre, Anjou, Burgundy, Alsace, &c., being of comparatively modern date. Germany is thus divided at this hour ; and the same process of joining one tribe to another is at this day forming the Russian empire. The adoption of a mode not very dissimilar, and wise because it is founded on nature, is gradually working to fashion the great republic of the United States of America ; and in this manner have arisen all great countries, which are really such ; for we shall afterwards see, on examination into the history of nations, that no bond except that of a unity of feeling, cemented by usage, language, law, and habit, is sufficient to bind a monarchy or system of government together in perpetuity. That fear and desire of security first bound together mankind into tribes and nations, is evident in the fact that, where the means of defence are very peculiar, the nation is generally the smallest ; and that, where this is not the case, divided countries have even lost their independence,

and almost sense of nationality, and become degraded. Thus, for instance, the islands in the Lagune, at the head of the Adriatic, were the cause of the Venetian republic; so were the mountains and lakes of Switzerland the cause of the confederate cantons; and so were the dykes and marshes of Holland the foundation of the Dutch republic. And hence Italy, in modern times, has been a degraded country, because it has never recovered the breaking up of the Roman empire, nor re-amalgamated like France, England, Spain, Germany, and other countries subjected to the same revolutions.

Such are the grand moral motives that have evidently been the efficient means of causing to take place those great national divisions which exist throughout the great family of mankind. The divisions being thus effected, the different combinations are cemented and bound together by a gradual unity of laws, religion, usages, tongue, and modes of life; and that this union or national sympathy is stronger even than that which binds together families or orders of men, all experience and all history testifies. We see families divide and come to be at variance, one portion with another; we see men desert their rank in society, and eagerly seek another; but we rarely find men who can bring themselves to betray their country, or consent to see it blotted from the map of nations. Such instances are rare in comparison with the other two; and such men have in all ages been

held in general loathing and detestation. The immense power of the tie of country, and of national feelings and sympathies is, however, more clearly evidenced in the history of nations. We shall there find that all the attempts made forcibly to incorporate one nation with another, or to bring one under the perpetual sway of another, have ultimately failed, though some may appear to have succeeded for a length of time. Thus, the Jews, though frequently subdued by the larger nations around them, have, through the lapse of many ages—amidst the assaults of the Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, and after their final dispersion by the Romans, and the successors of the Romans — yet preserved their nationality. Thus, also, we see that all those ancient monarchies which conquerors have built up by forcibly combining different nations under a foreign rule, have invariably broken to pieces; whilst the national divisions remain safe and intact, as formed by God's moral government. The Egyptian empire of Sesostris and his successors has passed away. The Assyrian monarchy is a name only; the Persian empire is no better. The empire of Alexander fell to pieces with the hand that made it; and the Roman empire felt its weakness most when it had reached the height of its ambition, and embraced the known world. The nations which it subdued, lost, for the time, that sense of nationality which is their only defence. The empire

became to be defended by mere mercenaries, enlisted from subdued barbarians, and destitute of the feelings of the Roman citizen. Hence Rome sank, at length, under the assaults of unknown savages, which, when less extended, she easily repelled; and this because the charm and bond of nationality were now wanting. If we come down to more modern times, we find the same results, wheresoever we turn. The empires of Zingis-khan, of Timur, of Aurung-zebe, of Nadir Shah, have in turn fallen to pieces; and, in Europe, the empires of Charlemagne and of Napoleon have shared the same fate. Nay, the empire of Mahomet, cemented as it is by religion—being yet the fruit of conquest—is rapidly crumbling to pieces; and it is not easy to say how long that of China may now remain.

If, however, the immense efficiency of those moral sympathies which go at once to combine and to divide nations be apparent in the history of the rise and fall of empires, it is not less so in that of the preservation of nations, despite all attempts to exterminate or subdue them in perpetuity. If we look round the whole records of the world in search of a nation destroyed, we shall hardly find one, unless it be the Carthaginians, who were, no doubt, totally extinguished by the Romans, slain, or carried off and sold into slavery. The Tyrians, another mercantile nation, seem to have had a fate not very dissimilar; but other instances would be difficult to find. On the contrary, all history

abounds with instances in which the spirit of a nation has preserved it against odds apparently overwhelming and totally irresistible. Thus the Grecian republics, with a handful of men, resisted the myriads of the Persian empire. Thus the Poles, several times, preserved themselves, and with themselves perhaps all Christian Europe, from the assaults of the Turkish power when in the plenitude of its fierceness. Thus the Swiss have ever kept at bay the armies of France on one hand, and of Austria on the other; and thus the Dutch and Belgians have preserved their nationality from the mighty power of Spain and the Duke of Alva, and Louis XIV. and his marechals, when the conflict was to all human appearance hopeless. In the same spirit, the Scottish nation has resisted all invaders from the era of Agricola to that of the Tudors; and, in the same way, England, numerically weak, has shattered the Armada of Spain and the combined fleets of Napoleon. These are the results alone of those natural divisions into which God, by moral means, has divided his human creation. The results themselves only prove the invincibility of the principle which holds nations together, and at the same time divides them from each other. There still remain other varied and multiform phenomena, arising out of this great principle of national divisions, to which our attention must be directed.

When the Almighty Ruler so constituted the human race, that these divisions between nation and nation

necessarily took place, He must have foreseen and willed the vast variety of motives, acts, and institutions that was assuredly to take rise from such an arrangement. The human intellect does not, until after long consideration, come to see the immense and extended importance of this simple arrangement of men into nations, in so far as it is the real source of a vast number of those moral combinations which refer themselves to the concerns of a people collectively, and not as individuals; but to the Almighty Architect the whole must have been present at a glance. These are multiform, and almost innumerable. From national divisions must have arisen the first idea of national property, which with many tribes has, undoubtedly, been the first kind of property. Men in various climates, unquestionably, hunted and grazed flocks, in common, over a territory which they called *theirs*, before the right of individuals to smaller portions became known, claimed, or acknowledged. From the division into nations must also have arisen the whole code of the duties of men as citizens, and the international states of peace or war, between which the duties of citizenship are divided. To the same source, that of combination for safety, we must trace the institution of governments of every sort that can be called national. To the rivalries, real or apprehended, between governments, we must attribute the origin of all treaties, and the growth of the entire code of international law,

known as the "Law of Nations;" and to the breach of these treaties, owing to national ideas of aggrandisement or self-interest, or to religious zeal or prejudice, we owe war, and the whole art of strategy, together with all the modifications of human character and motives that of necessity spring from it. Here is a field, embracing objects almost interminable in number, yet all having vast moral effects, and all forming a part of the machinery of the moral government of the world. Into these various states, institutions, and modifications of society, it will be a part of our task to examine in detail; but before proceeding to this, a few general observations, of great importance, first present themselves to our notice.

It may to some ears sound paradoxically at first, but there seems to be every reason for believing that, from this division of mankind into nations, really arise a class of moral acts of a higher value than any other which a human being can perform. That is to say, it seems to follow, if the matter be examined and dissected closely, that from this source spring actions of a more disinterested nature, and less allied to gross self-interest, than all those actions which more relate to the minor divisions of ranks and families. Hence it has come to pass that the duties of the citizen to his country have, by all civilians and moralists, been placed before the duties between one individual and another. The first rank higher, because they are of a much less obvious

and more abstract nature. It is easy to see the temporal benefits of the ordinary duties. It is easy to see the propriety of the rich relieving the poor man, in order that, in case of need, he may in his turn receive a similar benefit. This is so obvious, and bears so directly and palpably upon a man's self-interest, that the merits of apprehending it are small. But the duties of citizens to the state are of a much less manifest nature, and more remote and abstract. The return which the individual receives for the sacrifice of a portion of his worldly goods, of his time, and perhaps for the risk of life and limb, is by no means so visible. The due apprehension and performance of these duties must, therefore, always be more praiseworthy, because they are more difficult, and depend more upon the exertion of the intellect, and less upon the grosser motive of a palpable and patent self-interest. But, in so far as a man acts from the conclusions of intellect, and not from the impulse of self-love, he is exalted; and he who can place happiness in acts which conduce to the wellbeing of his fellow-men, rather than to his own immediate gratification or gain, comes as near to disinterested benevolence as human nature is capable of coming. Of this description, however, will all national acts and duties be found to be; and in proportion as they are willingly performed, and from the right motive, a full appreciation of their superior importance, must they tend to elevate and

purify the mind of the doer. It is true that, in all states, these duties are often, and most commonly, gone through under mixed motives—partly from compulsion, partly from custom, and partly from hope of gain or distinction. Still, that their real tendency is such as has been described, cannot be doubted; nor do moralists and writers on civil law seem to have doubted it, they having always held that the interests of individuals must yield to that of the community; and that, *e converso*, our duties to the state are paramount to those which we owe to each other. It will be found, when we come to examine in detail the motives which cause this class of acts, that this conclusion arises necessarily out of the premises, and therefore it is that this division of mankind into nations may, with propriety, be called the most important of all. We shall see that it not only produces a large proportion of that excitement to action which is necessary to the being of man, but that the class of acts to which it excites are really the highest in their moral nature, and only likely to be performed, in their purity, by men who are also sensible of the weight of those more familiar and everyday duties, which it is the business of religion especially to enforce and recommend to mankind.

It is also proper further to remark the close analogy which exists in this instance between the material and moral government of the world we inhabit. By the means of the greater physical actions to which the

material globe is subjected, we see certain peculiar circumstances created which help to cause, and which promote the popular divisions, and consequent modifications, of national character which of necessity result from them. Thus, by means of the obliquity of the ecliptic or apparent course of the sun, working with the various laws of nature which go to form the material world as we see it to exist, we see varieties of climate created. By the interposition of seas, rivers, lakes, chains of mountains, sterile deserts, and impassible morasses, we behold barriers of demarcation and separation between nation and nation set up. Out of these separations and varieties of climate, we perceive varieties of dress, language, arts, usages, and habits of life to arise. These are the physical effects of this natural distribution of sunshine, land, and water. The moral effects are almost equally marked and certain, if not quite so. Thus the great natural strength of Spain as a defensible country, and the insulated position of Great Britain, have, doubtless, owing to a consequent sense of secure independence, given rise to that intensity of national pride and hauteur for which both are remarkable. On the other hand, the want of national independence in the Italian, and his constant sense of the interference of others, have produced that peculiar suppleness and treachery by which that people are distinguished. At the same time, the absence of all national duties and feelings has no doubt given

leisure and opportunity for that cultivation of letters and the fine arts which often adorn, and partly compensate, the servitude of nations. If we go further, we may attribute the bellicose spirit, which is the national characteristic of Frenchmen, to that constant exposure to which a frontier almost defenceless has subjected them ever since they were a nation, and to the perpetual mutual encroachments between them and the neighbouring people, which it has ever produced. Again, we may also attribute that huckstering spirit which has ever marked the national acts of the states of Venice and Holland to the moral effects upon the people of a narrow territory, which has induced them to seek for power and wealth in the acts of commerce and the homely chicaneries of a trading people. If we go farther, we may easily trace the excessive but natural vanity of the Chinese to their position as a great nation, insulated by deserts on one hand, and the sea on the other; surrounded by roving or semi-barbarous tribes; and having reared for themselves such advantages of civilisation as they possess. And again, in the lofty stoicism and high honour of the Turk, we may trace the moral peculiarities of a people engaged (as they thought) in at once founding a new religion and a new empire, which were to raise them to an elevation over the rest of their fellows imperishable and perpetual. To the action and reaction of all these circumstances upon each other—to the necessity

of each nation preserving its own integrity—to the dread of the predominance of one over the rest—to the desire for a balance of power—to the efforts of each people to add to its own—we owe all that which constitutes the higher business of life. To discover how that portion of our business works with the rest, and how it conduces to the moral government of the whole human race, must be the aim of the succeeding chapters. In the mean time, the reader will have observed how the physical and moral schemes of the world thus far harmonise with each other. The natural divisions are only prototypes of the moral divisions, and both are pointed clearly to the same ends and results. In fact, it seems impossible, under under any other view, reasonably to account for either. Whilst the physical ends of the varieties of climates, altitudes, soils, and products, are fulfilled, the moral ends of the same sort of moral differences are also beautifully carried out; and the minds of nations are subjected to a moral process so similar to that which difference of position exercises upon their bodily functions, that a unity of purpose seems to be as plainly written as if it had been made the purport and object of a revelation. Both arise necessarily from irresistible and pervading causes, the sole difference being, that the moving or efficient power or cause is material in one case, and moral in the other—the two, however, being so closely interwoven, that to draw a perfect line of demarcation seems to be, in some

respects, an operation so nice as almost to be impossible. This difficulty, it must be remembered, is not, however, by any means peculiar to the present case. In all classification, whether the phenomena be physiological or mental, the like difficulty always exists. We know that between the animal and vegetable a great distinction exists in nature, yet we find difficulty almost insuperable in drawing the line where one ends and the other begins. So is it between material and moral effects. We are aware of the great distinction between the two, but to fix the exact line of separation is no easy task. Suffice it to say, that in neither case is there any doubt of the truth of the two distinctions, however difficult it may be to define the exact limits of either. It is, lastly, observable, that this first modification of the great general law that excites men to act, in some way or other, into an impulse ending in the division of communities, is strictly parallel to those great modifications of the law of gravitation which God has employed to bring about the great divisions of the material substances of which the globe is composed. As these include and help to govern the more minute modifications of matter which make up the endless variety of natural substances and products, so will these great moral divisions be found to include the more minute moral modifications of motive which make up the moral world as we know it to exist. To the immediate results of this first division we now turn.

CHAPTER V.

ON THE DIVISION OF MANKIND INTO NATIONS, AND THE IMMEDIATE EFFECTS OF THAT DIVISION.—THE FIRST IDEA OF PROPERTY.—TREATY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW.—DIPLOMACY.—STRATEGY.—COLONISATION.—HISTORY AND EPIC POETRY.

It seems to be highly probable, that from the division of the human race into nations arose the first idea of property. The earlier occupations of men seem to have been hunting and grazing. Amongst the most rude and uncivilised tribes we find the pursuit of wild animals to be the common means of sustenance. Amongst nations a little more advanced, or else inhabiting realms where game does not abound, the next resource is grazing. Now, these occupations, it is evident, may be pursued without any question of individual property in land arising for a long time. Amongst the Indians of America the hunting-grounds are known and marked as belonging to each tribe; but beyond this they have no idea of property in land, and little of any other kind of property. Even their weapons and implements seem frequently to be used in common. Amongst the wilder pastoral tribes of

Asia and elsewhere, who are in some degree nomadic in their life and habits, the same want of any idea of property in land occurs. When the pasturage becomes bare, the herd or flock is driven farther, the tents again pitched, and a temporary settlement again made. This is done within certain limits, and these limits mark the landed property of the horde, pulk, sept, or tribe, as the case may be. Setting aside the internal evidence of the truth of this representation, all tradition and all record so completely agree in describing thus the earlier stages of human society, that there seems little room for doubt or scepticism on the subject. Thus, then, it seems highly probable that the first idea of property must have sprung out of the grand division of the human race into nations or tribes, and that the idea of national property must of necessity have preceded that of individual property as far as land was concerned. Indeed, for obvious reasons, no man could have thought of enclosing small parcels of land until the state of tillage was arrived at, which is a far advanced state of society; and until land was parcelled out, no one could have dreamed of claiming a parcel as his proper possession. There is evidence enough to show that, down to times which are comparatively modern, even in England, the pastures were common long after the rest was enclosed. They were common to the holders of land under each manor, but no further. If the barony was large, there were

perhaps two or three of these common pastures ; if it were small, one sufficed. This lasted until the feudal system was gradually broken up under the Plantagenets; and out of these pastures arose the townships and township common-lands, of which some yet remain near the great towns. The villeins, when they escaped from their thraldom, claimed the pastures, built cottages upon them, and enjoyed them "in common :" hence the words "township" and "township-common." Upon the whole, therefore, it should seem that such evidence as we have all tends one way, that tendency being to establish the fact that "national property" preceded individual property ; that the national lands were originally common, and enjoyed in common by the whole nation, sept, clan, or tribe ; and that the necessity of a more minute division only arose gradually when tillage was invented, and when, with tillage, some of the arts began to spring up and be practised as a calling by individuals. In such communities as now live by *fishing*, in all countries, rude or civilised, we see this simple mode of life practised in a great degree to this day. The sea is their national property. They cannot divide it minutely like land, and therefore they enjoy it, as land was at first enjoyed, nationally. Each nation claims the fisheries of its own coasts; and some claim certain "fishing banks" in the main ocean, on the ground of prior discovery and resort. The fishermen, in general, are the artificers of their own

boats, lines, nets, and implements. They fish in common within certain limits, and thus afford a marine parallel to the primitive hunting and grazing systems, as they still exist in some regions on *terra firma*. The process stops here, because the ocean cannot be divided and cultivated like the soil. If it could, we should arrive at individual property in the sea as in the soil, and the same inequalities would take place as this marine civilisation advanced. The new divisions and modes of cultivating this novel domain would give rise to various mechanical crafts and trades. Part of the men, who before fished in common, would come to live by means of these crafts, and abandon by degrees their common right to others. Thus would arise the difference between the sea-landholder (if such term be allowable) and the sea-mechanic; and the whole would be mapped out, and roads left for passengers, as we see the soil is amongst all civilised nations at this day. This is, of course, a mere illustration; but it correctly exhibits the process by which property comes to be recognised. It is first in common, or national—next individual.

Having thus ascertained the moral process by which property first came to have a name—that is to say, from the necessary desire of each tribe or nation to preserve to itself the tract of ground from which its subsistence was drawn—we arrive at another step. Having got to the first step of a national domain, men

are naturally led to think of the best method of preserving it. It is liable to be encroached upon from without. This encroachment must be resisted, or the right and the enjoyment of the right cease together. Out of this wish to preserve, arise the motives which lead men to form a government. And here we arrive at a point the most important in the annals of our race. There can exist no doubt that the affairs of national government are, and must ever be, amongst the weightiest and deepest considerations with which the human mind has to grapple. So much of good or evil to a people must necessarily arise out of the nature of its government, that the science of government itself must always be of the first import amongst all other sciences. We are now to trace the moral motives which first induced men to cultivate and practise that science; and when we come to see how the first notion of any government at all probably arose, we may obtain a view of its framework, which may be of use to us in helping us to determine what modifications are possible, and what are not, in the construction of various possible forms, or modes of government, which may be brought under our view from time to time.

Until a community, living upon the common products of a tract of country in common, come to be molested from without, they could have little or no inducement for combined action, in the extended sense

of the word. Under this primitive form of society, the regulations must have been the simplest possible, and so evidently (as we shall afterwards come to demonstrate) dictated by the natural circumstances of such a community, that the violations must have been few, unimportant, and easily decided by common consent. When foreign aggression, however, once became known, a mighty alteration was immediately, by that act, set on foot; and a set of moral motives, until then unknown, necessarily introduced into men's minds. If the aggression were not resisted, the community had destruction staring them in the face—in a form perfectly novel, and from a quarter hitherto undreamed of. Here arises—and out of an absolute necessity of events—the great moral motive to organise a combined national action, in the shape of resistance to aggression; and thus begins the national government. Prior to this period, the tribe must have cohered, from a mere general sense of security, against common dangers—such as wild animals, storms, and sudden accidents of various kinds—and from the obvious conveniences and pleasures that draw man, in all cases, to be a gregarious animal. But here arises a new bond of union—the necessity of combined national resistance.

When men are once agreed on the propriety of combined action of any sort, no matter what its description may be, circumstances soon show them the

necessity of an executive head. Whether the plan of action be the work of one head or of many, they soon find out the propriety of having some one to direct the rest, whose orders may regulate the execution of the work in accordance with the design. This is the case with all combinations for all purposes. A house cannot be built without an architect, nor a ship without a master-carpenter. Just so a government cannot go on without a chief of some sort, who shall direct the executive, and, if necessary, form and advise it as well as direct it. Considering all the circumstances that have been detailed, there seems no great room for doubt that civil government, in point of fact, must have owed its first formation to the exigencies of defence; and that the accomplishments most required in the first head of a tribe or nation must have been personal courage, and skill in defensive warfare. We see this to be true, in point of fact, of all uncivilised nations at the present; and all reasoning seems to show that the first motive for obeying a chief must have been that of defence and resistance to aggression on territory. But successful resistance to territorial inroad, of course, and as a consequence, inevitably involves a treaty; and the execution of the stipulations of a treaty, however rude and simple, involves, again, a prolongation of authority, in order to cause it to be obeyed. To enable any head of a nation to regulate the simplest points relating to a frontier,

assistance must be necessary; and here we have the small germ of a government by a supreme head, with subordinate counsellors and agents, as we see such exist now amongst the most polished nations. From these treaties—committed to memory and faithfully transmitted—we derive the beginnings of national law; and thus from a few simple motives, arising irresistibly out of circumstances not to be avoided, but in their nature quite inevitable, we may deduce the whole science of diplomacy, of international law, and national property in territory, together with the beginnings of a regular government by means of a supreme head and subordinates, acting under regulations established by a general consent. From this source it is evident a new set of motives must arise, hitherto unknown to a primitive community, as well as a new set of duties. Up to this period, ambition could not have existed, either in idea or in name; but, with the establishment of the simplest authority, ambition immediately springs up in the soil now first created for it. In the breasts of the vast majority of mankind, the love of power—of all sorts or any sort—is to be found existing. Rather than not exercise authority, men will gladly do it even in cases where, on a first view, the office might seem revolting. The ordinary business of the magistrate necessarily brings him who fills the office into contact with the most degraded specimens of his species; yet we see men

eagerly seek such authority for the pure sake of its exercise. The benevolent purpose for which this motive is implanted in the human bosom is very apparent. Talent is thus excited to struggle for a position to which it is more or less requisite; and minds superior to the love of mere lucre are thus impelled to act for the community by a kind of force which, perhaps, alone could have been efficient for that purpose. In this simple change, as it appears to be, are hid in embryo all the complicated motives and means by which men aspire to be, and become, the servants of a state. We have here the seeds of future ministers, generals, diplomatists, civilians, and public officials of all kinds; and thus, from the mere collision of two tribes, are created and brought to life a host of new motives, influencing, for ever afterwards, vast bodies of mankind. Nor is it possible to contemplate this arrangement, and the scenes consequent upon it, without the highest admiration for the Almighty Framer and Architect. All this is with the free will and full assent of those who do it; yet, at the same time, we cannot but perceive how certainly and irresistibly the circumstances impart that impulse to the general will, upon which so many future consequences depend. The whole moral machinery becomes evident; and we see that society, so far from being left to chance, is moulded, from the very first, to the forms which it is intended that it shall wear.

There remains, however, to be noticed, another class of consequences flowing from this collision of nation with nation, of a nature equally important. From such collision probably arises the first clear notion of the duties of man as the citizen of a state. In those simple forms of society, which can alone exist before nations have come in contact with each other, these duties could hardly become apparent. The benefits of the social state would be felt with hardly any admixture of its exigencies; and whilst men were reaping the advantages of the gregarious state, they would scarcely be called to make a sacrifice for its preservation. To this primitive and happy state, only possible in a simple and isolated tribe, the contact of nation with nation puts an end. The state of hostility and rivalry begins, and men are called upon to sacrifice private for public advantages; to dedicate time, and risk life and limb for the benefit of the community; and to learn how paramount are the duties of the citizen over those of the mere individual. And it is to be observed that this lesson is taught most effectually, and felt most keenly, when civilisation is in its earlier stages. There are, then, fewer grades, and classes, and subdivisions amongst men. There are no "soldiers by profession," nor any class that can avoid being demanded to act as soldiers, unless the priesthood, which exists in all nations. Hence, in a national exigence, all men, in an early stage of society,

are called upon to defend the state—that is to say, the community or nation. The army is a *levée en masse* —a *landwehr*. All come to understand the use of such arms as they possess; all are called upon to contribute such personal property as exists available to the national defence; all are liable to risk life and limb in the national service. In a higher grade of social refinement, these great duties are taught much less emphatically, and become obscured amid the infinite subdivisions of society in its complex state. Defence of the community becomes gradually the profession of a few: upon them alone falls the glory of victory or the shame of defeat. The rest become mere payers of taxes by habit; and the minor duties of the citizen gradually come into the hands of mere mercenaries. The paid judge takes the place of the manorial earl; the paid magistrate supersedes, in the peace, the landed esquire; the general of division, or military lord-lieutenant, usurps the better part of the duties of the sheriff; the hired and liveried policeman succeeds the constable; the salaried commissioner takes the place of the priest and the parish overseer in the case of the poor. Hence, as civilisation becomes more and more complicated, the rights of property become more and more paramount; whilst the rights and duties of the citizen become less and less obvious, and less and less recognised. It is the duty of a good government to uphold both in their

purity and integrity; it is the vice of a bad one to promote the interest of the first at the expense of the last. It is evidently, however, from the collision of nations that our knowledge of these duties took rise and origin. From this epoch in the social history of man we may date the foundation of general civil law. From an event so simple as the rivalry of two savage tribes we may safely derive the germs of those ideas which, in their expanded shape, go to make up the works of our great civilians and international lawyers; which have, after the lapse of ages, become a code, and have immortalised the names of Grotius, Puffendorf, Montesquieu, Vattel, and the other sages of civil and international law. In all this we trace the certainty of the process of the development of civilised society. That direction which inevitable events of the simplest nature necessarily impart to men's minds and wills, is as surely preserved by after events. Refinement is only the march of mankind along certain roads, which are chalked out for them from the first, and from which they cannot deviate. The first impulse generates and regulates all the rest; and the refined man is only the filling up of that outline which is really drawn in the savage.

Thus we have seen that from the simple, but in its effects most wonderful, arrangement of mankind into distinct nations, have arisen our ideas of property, at first national—our ideas of government, at first mili-

tary—and our ideas of international and civil law, and the duties of citizens, defined probably earlier than most of the duties of the individual, as religion and common law now teach them. This we have now seen, it is hoped, with sufficient clearness; but there yet remain other fruits of this grand division to be noticed. It seems, on due reflection, equally evident, that to this arrangement we owe national literature, which is the first stage of letters. If we look at the literature of the earliest periods of the world as it now remains, we shall find universally that it has arisen out of national feelings of various sorts. That description of literature which arises out of the impulses of individuals endowed with powerful, original, and inquiring minds, which prompt their possessors to push their researches and flights into remote regions of science, philosophy, morals, or religious speculations, ever comes late. It arises out of an advanced state of civilisation; and that state follows, *longo intervallo*, the grand divisions of men into distinct nations, differing in usages, dialects, manners, physiognomy, and bodily development. Thus the Old Testament, whether we look at the strictly historical or prophetic portions, is entirely national, and derived from national feelings and national vicissitudes. The Scandinavian legends and mythology are of a like origin. The Gaelic traditionary fragments, whether of Wales, Scotland, or Ireland, are all fruits of national ideas

arising out of the struggles of the earlier histories of every people. The Spanish or Iberian-Celtic literature springs directly from the same root. The whole body of Iberian ballad and chronicle is the product of a long series of national conflicts either with the French or the Moors; and our own king Arthur, as painted in the legends of Britain, is the creation of national tradition and national feeling. The chronicles of China, whether fabulous or authentic, have the same origin. The literature of Greece, with Homer and Hesiod at the head, is national in its uprise; and all that we know of ancient Egyptian lore, whether mythological or historical, is similarly derived. The pictorial annals of the Mexican Incas are another case in point; nor, amidst all her endless divisions and unhappy vicissitudes, is the literature of Italy destitute of traces of the same stock. Thus, wherever we turn, we unearth vestiges of the same great truth, that the grand division of mankind into nations is the cradle of literature. The epic in poetry, and the chronicle in history, hence arose. They are the direct fruits of the feelings and ideas which this grand division alone could have engendered, and which could not possibly have existed without it. At a later period we come (as geologists, in the newer strata, find more complex formations) to more general history, to didactic and amatory poesy, and to the minuter lucubrations of the traveller, the man of science, and the statesman, or

the jurisconsult. To produce these, however, another division of the human family (arising out of the first) becomes requisite—that is to say, into RANKS. From this second great division arise, and only could arise, the minuter and more delicate disquisitions, distinctions, and inquiries of the lawyer, the moralist, the poet, the biographer, and the romancer and novelist. The impulses and excitements created by this second division are of a nature totally different from those greater and more universal impulses arising out of the antagonism of nations. It is the first grand landmark, as it were, of a distinct second and more advanced stage of society, and must be considered separately in all its wonderful effects; so minute, and yet so sure; so diversified, and yet so regular and beneficent, in plan and consequence.

Before, however, we enter upon the consideration of the second grand division of mankind into ranks, we must mark the wonderful analogy between the moral and physical plans of general government. We see the grand divisions of land and water, and heat and cold, give rise to distinct genera in the animal creation, and to distinct modes of general action in the material world. The agency of water is widely separated from the other agencies, in all its endless modifications and varieties. The marine vegetable vegetates under a category of circumstances totally removed from those of vegetation on land, or in fresh water. The marine

and river animals are distinctly apart from the terrene animal tribes. The chemical and other agencies at work are equally to be distinguished. Climate, in the physical world, has produced distinctions equally marked and traceable. The vegetable, the animal, and the man of the torrid and the frigid zones are totally dissimilar in constitution. The general agencies at work differ, and it is the province of natural history to note first, and record, these greater distinctions under which all the minor varieties of species, race, and family must be found and classified. Precisely such is the case, as we now begin to see, with the moral world. To the grand division of men into nations, with peculiar national feelings, usages, habits, and ideas, we may trace the rise and true origin of all our law and all our literature, save and except those portions which arise directly and necessarily out of religion. This great topic must also be considered apart and in its proper place, and its connection with the other portions of the plan of moral rule laid down by the great and omniscient Maker of all things traced and distinguished. But, of our profane literature, we here see the primal soil and first cradle. Here the seeds of law, of property, of civil government, of the moral obligations of the citizen, of diplomacy, and treaty, and international obligation, and of national poesy and history, are all first stimulated into life and growth. Under these great moral divisions are to be

sought and found the lesser divisions, even as in the natural material world. Minuter species accompany minuter divisions in both. As we descend, both physical and moral phenomena become more delicate and more limited. The minor agencies of climate and soil, and the minuter motives and consequences arising out of progressive moral progress, begin to be seen and recorded. Soils, plants, and animals become more and more subdivided; and even so do laws, usages, moral obligations, science, disquisition, and general literature. The more delicate features of society appear; and as they appear, harmonise with the greater features. The complex in physics and in morals succeeds to the simple and the grand. The finger of the Creator becomes, to our poor faculties, more and more difficult to trace. We see a plan, but its ultimate results, at every step, become more difficult to grasp, to fix, and to understand. As we advance, matter and form seem to elude our grasp; and in morals we become dim-sighted and blind, hardly recognising the power and authority of that great Being under whose *fiat* all we see only is because he has pronounced it good, and said "Be thou thus, and no otherwise than thus." As matter, traced by chemical science, dissolves into air, so does motive become lost in its very delicacy and minuteness. We cease to get a glimpse even at the springs of human conduct, and at last come blindly and arrogantly to attribute to

human volition phenomena the real causes of which are too evanescent and subtilised for our limited faculties.

This limitation of our faculties does not, however, in the least preclude our arrival at those great general conclusions, which it is the aim of this Essay to establish. We cannot see the ultimate and primal foundations of things, whether material or metaphysical. But we see that the great moving principle of EXCITEMENT is clearly and necessarily the product of this grand arrangement. As in the material world, the greater agencies of fire, water, chemical action, and vegetable action, exercise and carry on a slow but perpetual change; as we see the land devoured by the waters in some places, whilst in others we witness the formation of islands in the deepest oceans: so also, in the human world, we see nations rise and fall at the expense of each other. The strong ambition of able men erects kingdoms and empires. These are in time subverted by the aggressions of men still abler. And thus the rivalry of men, whether in war, or commerce, or discovery and colonisation, affords a perpetual national *stimulus*, by which society is urged on to changes, which the law of nature has rendered necessary to human existence. These changes are only to be produced by the greater mental agencies—just as the greater material mutations of the globe are produced by the igneous, aqueous, vegetable, chemical,

and other grand material agents. Men become great generals, great statesmen, and great diplomatists, in virtue of this law; and by their reaction upon each other, the great mutations of empires are brought about, and at length consummated. Patriotism grows into ambition, and into the irrepressible desire in nations for acquisition and aggrandisement. This produces at last war and conquest, as well as maritime discovery, commercial enterprise, colonisation, and the host of minor motives and effects which the cupidity of wealth, natural to all mankind, brings into being and action. Here is the grander field for the agency of this principle, which, however, as we shall see, pervades every part of society, and is the great agent for effects the most important to the moral government of men and nations. In the national divisions, however, we see the great causes which necessitate, as it were, the wills of men in certain directions, and give rise, finally, to some of the greatest distinctions which exist amongst mankind. From this arise the warrior, the politician, the civilian, the historian, and the epic poet; and, in the business of states, the greatest minds find a fame, which, elsewhere, they might have yearned for and sought in vain.

CHAPTER VI.

THE DIVISION OF NATIONS INTO DIFFERENT RANKS.—THE ORIGIN OF THE RECOGNITION OF PROPERTY BELONGING TO INDIVIDUALS.—THE LAWS OF PROPERTY—DISTINCTIONS—DISTINCTIONS OF WEALTH.—THE SCIENCE OF LAW, AS APPLIED TO PROPERTY—ITS ALIENATION, AND INHERITANCE.—THE VAST POWER OF WEALTH, AND ITS MORAL USES.—LITERATURE, AS ARISING OUT OF THE DIVISION INTO RANKS.

It is an indubitable and certain truth, that a nation was never known to exist, amongst whom was realised that state, which has been perpetually imagined but never seen—a state of perfect equality amongst men. Nay, not only is this quite indubitable, but we may go farther. We may not only safely assert that a state of equality never existed in any nation or people, but we may also safely add, that it never existed for any length of time amidst any tribe, however limited, or any collected society, however few in number. It is also to be observed, that wherever we recognise any approach towards this state, such approach is only to be seen amongst very small and very uncivilised tribes of people. The nearest approaches are amongst hordes of wanderers, such as the Tartar tribes, the Arabian

nomades, the pulks of Cossacks, the Pindarries of India, the North American Esquimaux, the nomadic septs of natives of Australia, and the miserable inhabitants of Terra del Fuego, and other desert or inhospitable climates, where man and his faculties are stunted and withered like the other productions of the soil. Still, a close observation has always proved, that even the most limited, barbarous, poor, and nomadic of families of men recognise, however faintly and almost involuntarily, some distinction of rank. Some one of superior intellect and energy directs the rest, and obtains, for his or her skill and courage, some privilege of which the rest are destitute. There is also ever to be found some traces, however faint, of religion. Some ideas of man's relation to some other world —or of the existence of other sentient beings, good or evil — or of a governing or disturbing principle, or power, or influence, however modified — are ever found to exist where men exist. Out of this springs the claim which, in more civilised society, gives rise to the priesthood. As skill in material matters—in hunting, fishing, breeding cattle, or cultivating, forms the chief; so skill in divination, in predicting evil or good, in propitiating evil influences, or gaining favour with benevolent influences, when claimed by subtle or clever minds, constitutes a priesthood; and out of these claims at once arises rank, with inequality of actual condition. The share of the chief is greater

than that of his fellows. The priest, the soothsayer, the diviner, or conjurer, is excused from hunting, fishing, herding, or the toils of cultivation, and left with leisure to pursue his more spiritual avocations, which are paid for out of the toil of the rest. As nations become large and civilised, the distinctions of rank, and various other forms of inequality of condition, rapidly arise and multiply themselves. The state becomes artificial; and out of the subdivisions of labour, inequality necessarily springs. The officer commands the soldier, and reaps an increased reward: the prime-minister directs the machinery of the state, and is also rewarded accordingly. Property becomes divided and subdivided with labour; for out of the division of labour it necessarily springs. If the architect is paid forty times as much as the day-labourer, he must soon become richer; and riches and the unequal distribution of property are synonymous terms. The spring of the whole is the natural inequality of courage, strength, and energy, bodily and mental, which the Creator has in his wisdom established, exhibited in an artificial and refined state of society. Great talent is the parent of great distinction, whether in government, literature, war, peace, or wealth. Hence, with inequality of talent comes inequality of rank; and this is especially apparent in the distribution of wealth. It is so, peculiarly and particularly, because all men, more or less, with a very

few exceptions, pursue the acquisition of wealth; whilst only a few pursue the more refined distinctions of high talent or genius, exerted differently. Hence the inequalities of material possessions are infinite; whilst those of mental rank are limited. We have millions of men richer than other millions; whilst civil or military, or literary or scientific distinctions, are sought and obtained only by a few, comparatively. In civilised nations, they all, however, exist, and must exist. There must ever be a very rich, a poor, and a middling class, in the division of wealth; because the talent of acquisition is perpetually and for ever at work. There must ever in civilised nations be statesmen, generals, admirals, judges, lawyers, ambassadors, diplomatists, historians, architects, chemists, mechanicians, mathematicians, astronomers, geologists; physicians, surgeons, painters, and musicians, because, without these, civilisation cannot be; and where it is, those skilled in politics, science, literature, and art, must ever command the very highest distinctions amongst mankind. The causes of all these divisions and subdivisions are necessary causes. They arise out of the natural constitution of the human mind, as God in his wisdom has made it. These things necessarily are, even as society necessarily is. The question to be considered is the moral effect of this inequality of ranks amongst men, and how the moral government of the world is continued by its means?

If we go into this question, we shall discover, I believe, by a due consideration of it, that this second great division of nations into various ranks of men answers a twofold purpose. It, first, affords the principal portion of that excitement in the shape of motive which is necessary to man; and, in the second place, by its influence it gives a steadiness to society which would otherwise be wanting, and is the best safeguard against rash and violent changes, and consequent anarchy. Let us take these two effects in the order in which they stand; and, first, as to the excitement in the shape of motive to action amongst men, of which this distribution of them into higher and lower ranks is a perennial spring.

If we look abroad amongst the human family, in all civilised or semi-civilised countries, we shall find the principal spring of action amongst men to be the hope and desire of what is called "bettering their condition." With most persons, this term is synonymous with the acquisition of wealth; but not with all. The great majority do, indeed, depend upon accumulated money or property of some kind, as the only means of raising them to a higher rank in society than is that which they occupy; but a few have other aspirations. Some men aim at political distinctions; others at the distinction afforded by military or naval success. Others, again, would rise to eminence as lawyers, divines, or physicians. Others still strive after scientific or lite-

rary fame, and seek honour in degrees and other learned and scientific testimonials and badges. Be this, however, as it may, it is perfectly clear that, without the tendency implanted in man to recognise different ranks in civil society and in states, this could not be. If those of the lower did not, either voluntarily or involuntarily, recognise and admit the claims of those above them, all this field of motive and excitement to exertion would be lost. But this is not the case in any one instance on record. There is no example of any nation of men refusing to see or to acknowledge the claims of statesmen, or soldiers, or sailors, or lawyers, or physicians, or scientific men, or authors, or mechanists, or artists, or engineers, or architects, of distinguished merit. Neither is there any country or region in which the possession of wealth does not give its owner a superiority over him to whom riches are denied. All these claims to rank and distinction have been, in all ages and countries, admitted and agreed to. Men often envy other men whose rank is superior to their own; but they never deny it, if it be founded in truth. Hence it happens that we see in all countries different ranks existing and recognised, with a constant struggle on the part of each individual, however placed, to raise himself to the rank above him. In this resides the great inducement and motive to individual action. It is a universal desire amongst mankind to obtain rank and

distinction amongst their fellow men. Hence it is that men toil to acquire wealth. It is not the mere possession of, or power to expend, money which men aim at; but the distinction that such possession confers: so that even avarice the most grovelling has with it and in it something of motive of a higher and better sort than is usually supposed. When to the acquisition of riches that of fame is also added, the motive is raised, and the man also. He who struggles to obtain influence by military, political, scientific, or literary renown, is superior to the mere maker of money. He whose energies are devoted to the pure love of fame,

"The last infirmity of noble minds,"

is greatest of all.

From one or other of these inducements to active exercise of their chiefest faculties, no man was, however, at any time free. Nor is it possible almost to conceive of a human being to exist without some such motive to action. Without this, the mind would recoil back upon itself and destroy itself. This it is that makes the idea of perpetual imprisonment so dreadful; for dreadful it is, though quite unassociated with any idea of want of food, warmth, or even ordinary amusement. It is in the want of exciting motive, and consequent want of hope and mental aim, that the terror resides. But in a society in which there

was no difference of rank, this want of motive would be equally felt, and men would quickly become the prey either of *ennui* or of vice, from the very want of a higher employment for their faculties. Hence it has always happened, that fantastical schemes of society—however select the individuals might be who fancied that that happiness was to be found in a perfect equality of condition—have, if founded upon this absurd notion, quietly but quickly gone to pieces, after disgusting those who embarked in them. Individuals have, indeed, arisen who, from possibly an over-vivid conception of the bliss of a future state, have become secluded recluses, shut out from the world and its business. It is, however, always to be suspected that much vanity is really at the bottom of such minds; and that a secret consciousness of the admiration of other men really follows such persons, and soothes them in their profession of anchorite. Certain it is, however, that no great body of mankind ever did, or ever could, live happily in the absence of all distinctions such as merit and wealth confer; and therefore we see such distinctions of rank existing in all societies by universal consent, and without any man denying their propriety, however he may envy their possessors.

The distinctions of rank arise, then, out of the constitution of our nature, and are necessary to civil society only because they are necessary to men's hap-

piness, as based upon the exercise of the faculties which God has given them. If mankind could be happy without the excitement of motive and aim ; if men could be really satisfied without the desire and ambition of wealth, distinction, or fame ; then would the institutions of rank be morally useless, because no moral benefit could or would flow from them. But no one denies that—save, perhaps, a few rare exceptions—man, as he is constituted, cannot be happy or satisfied without an aim. And this is peculiarly and curiously evident in the *ennui* which so often besets individuals whose high rank and station almost annihilates this spur to exertion. Thus, kings are generally seen to be less happy than other men. They are so, because their exalted position deprives them of many of the motives to exertion which excite other persons in humbler circumstances. The consequence is that weariness of life follows ; and intemperance, vice, or crime is resorted to as a relief from the melancholy of an aimless existence. And this is perhaps the true reason why debauchery is more general in the extremes of society than in the middle. He who is too high, and he who is too low for hope, is most liable to the lassitude of life ; and for this lassitude, dissipation is too often resorted to as a cure or a mitigation.

We here see, then, that the necessity of excitement is the real moving cause of this great secondary divi-

sion of mankind. Rank arises out of the struggle for wealth, power, or fame. But, out of this accord amongst men to recognise these as desirable objects, let us inquire how many and how various are the institutions that arise? In the first place, it is an obvious consequence of what has been here laid down, as to the universality of the desire amongst human beings to raise their condition of life, that the recognition of property, as belonging to the individual, is the certain fruit of this universal desire. This seems to follow as a matter of strict necessity. All men strive to become possessed of more than their fellows. We see that even amongst nations where the accumulations of individuals are imperfectly protected, this does not stop the struggle to accumulate. In Turkey, where the Jews are perpetually robbed, their accumulation still goes rapidly on. They trust to concealment, but never cease to hoard. Thus, then, under all circumstances, the desire of man to earn wealth above that of his fellow predominates. It does so, clearly, because wealth is the easiest road to distinction, as well as luxurious enjoyment. To obtain superiority by means of great talents or qualities can only be the lot of a very few. It is only here and there that we find men so gifted as to rise high above their fellow men as statesmen, men of science, artists, or cultivators of elegant and exalted literature. In the professions—such as law, physic, and divinity—

exalted distinction is almost equally difficult. But it is in the power of almost every man, by the unceasing exercise of the most homely faculties, to acquire money. Industry, economy, attention, and cunning are alone needed. These most men either possess, or think, or hope that they do. The necessary result of such persuasion is, that amongst human beings, when not quite uncivilised, the great majority toil to acquire a fortune ; and the pursuit of gain may be said to be universal amongst mankind ; for, though some are more avaricious than others, no man despises money, were it even for the sake of giving it away that he desires it.

This principle, then, being admitted—and it surely seems undeniable—the recognition of individual property follows at once logically ; for if (as is granted) all men desire property, all men must, of course and of necessity, desire such property to be recognised and protected. But, to protect and recognise property, there must be laws of property ; and hence, out of this second great division of nations into ranks, really has arisen the idea of individual property, and the complicated codes of laws which the recognition of such property and its effectual protection must require to be constructed. When, by the division of the whole body of society into nations, the first ideas of the rights and duties of the citizen arose, the laws for protection of the person against violence would follow.

But, to come at the first idea of individual property, its recognition and protection, and the enactment of a code of laws for these purposes, the division into ranks seems clearly to be demanded. Out of the principle of accumulation arises the necessity to recognise all the grades of wealth, and, with the wealth, the possession of such power as wealth invariably gives. It is impossible, in point of fact, to explain the universal consent amongst men to allow of these inequalities, except upon the evident principle that each individual hopes to benefit more by the established inequalities of property than he could by any opposite arrangement. Rank, then, has, if not altogether, yet for the most part, arisen out of the universal passion for accumulation; and the truth of this is evident in the fact that hardly any other sort of distinction is deemed by men generally to be sufficient and satisfactory, unless the possession of some wealth accompany it. The idea of nobility, as we have seen, probably arose out of the first division into nations. This is partly evident in the fact that, in all nations, titles of nobility are of a military origin. Thus Emperor is Imperator, Duke is Dux; and numerous other examples are familiar to those versed in philology and etymology. Let titles of honour, however, arise as they may, this much is certain, that amongst civilised nations wealth is necessary to cause them to be respected. Hence it has become a recognised axiom, that nobility must

always, if possible, be connected with territorial wealth; and hence it happens that one of the great motives of men to seek other distinctions resides in their knowledge that their possession includes access to, and companionship with, men of the greatest worldly possessions. This is unquestionably one of the valuable privileges of literature, as was well expressed by Voltaire, when at a supper given by one of the French princes of the blood, he exclaimed, looking round the table, "We are here all princes or poets!" Military and naval rank, nay, clerical rank, no doubt owe a part of their charm to the same principle. The most prominent offspring of the recognition of individual property is, however, the law of property itself, and the immense wealth, power, and distinction which it confers upon those who study and profess it. Of all the sciences, medicine not excepted, that of the law of property, and of inheritance, which depends upon property is the source of the most wealth and the highest distinctions. To the lawyer the highest offices of all states are open. Almost all great ministers have been more or less versed in the study of the law; and, in all civilised governments, professors of law must, as a matter of course, always form a part. If we could sum up the amount of wealth accumulated in a society by all connected with the law—from the highest legal functionary down to the attorney, notary, or scrivener—we should find it to be enormous.

Neither is there any question that the study of law has contributed perhaps more than that of any other science to sharpen and expand the human intellect, and to lead men's minds to expanded views of things, as well as to astute and correct reasoning upon most subjects of human knowledge. Solon, in ancient times, was a lawyer. So was Cicero. In modern times Bacon filled the highest legal office in his country. Montesquieu and Grotius are examples of the same tendency. Thus, out of the excitement of accumulation, have come the main and most efficient distinctions of rank in communities; and thus, out of the recognition of these accumulations, and out of the complexity of regulation arising out of possession, transfer, and inheritance, has the human mind received an impulse which it would not have otherwise obtained.

The impulse, however, which the invention and study of the laws of property have given to the human intellect, is not the only one which property has given to literature. Out of the distinction of ranks much of our minor and lighter literature has manifestly sprung. The epic and the history, and the finer specimens of biography, take rise, indeed, for the most part in the disputes of nations. Wars, revolutions, battles, and treaties, are their subjects. But out of the inequalities of riches, and the distinctions of ranks in a nation, the drama has been evolved; and the lighter specimens of biography may be mainly attributed to the same

source. To these distinctions the romance and the novel are mainly indebted for the interest they excite; and to them the utility and merit of the moral essay, satire, or didactic poem, are frequently, if not generally, to be attributed. These are the direct effects upon literature of this second great division of the human community. Let us now glance at its indirect effect. This may be included under the word "patronage." It requires no depth of reflection to see that, had there been no inequality of rank and riches, there could have been little patronage for literature, and less for art. Were it possible to suppose a society to exist with an equal division of possessions amongst those who compose it, the fine arts and the higher departments of literature must, under such a supposed *regime*, languish and die. Where no man had leisure or means to become deeply read, highly versed in or skilled in art, no man would give money for expensive books, or instruments, or pictures, or engravings. Literature, art, and science, would be levelled down to the *mediocre* standard of a society where no man was either rich or poor, ignorant or learned, accomplished or destitute of taste. Thus, to secure for us the highest exertions of human intellect, skill, and labour, inequality of condition seems to be necessary. Upon it our best and highest literature, science, and art, have in all nations relied for support; and upon it they must ever rely, for

mediocrity of means can only command a mediocrity of results.

Such are some of the moral results of this division of society into higher and lower; but the greatest and most important yet remains to be adverted to. The result now alluded to is the stability and fixity which the unequal distribution of wealth alone gives to political institutions, and the constitution of governments and states. All experience has shown that wealth is, in all nations, not in the savage state, almost synonymous with influence and power. Nor can it well be otherwise; because, besides its direct influence, which is immense, its indirect advantages are still more striking. It gives to its owners a sort of monopoly of leisure and of education. It influences the press; and, through the press, it moulds public opinion. Hence in all civilised states of which we have any records, we see that the governing power has never been for any length of time out of the hands or influence of the possessors of wealth and property. Even the Grecian democracies—where the people in a body made their own laws, or seemed, rather, to do so—could not neutralise the all-pervading influence of wealth. In Rome it was always paramount, even in the best days of the commonwealth. In the United States it is so at this hour, or nearly so. Nor will a deep and candid consideration of all the circumstances and all the consequences lead him who so reflects to

conclude this balance of power on the side of property to be an evil. The first impression is, that it is unjust; the last impression is, that it is necessary; though occasional evil, beyond all question, flows from it. Of its necessity, however, we become convinced by the consideration that, first of all, stability of institutions is requisite before good can possibly follow; and that without this preponderance, stability of governments or of constitutions would become impracticable. If we examine steadily and candidly the natural bent and tendency of the human mind, we shall find it always inclined to change. This arises directly out of the principle already laid down, viz., that human nature is never precisely satisfied with its own position, and has ever in view an *ideal better* to come, which ever renders it discontented with that which now is. Hence society is, in many particulars, in a constant flux and change, never remaining at a stay for any length of time. In matters of science, taste, and literature, this is no evil, but a good. In matters of government, however, a constant instability and incertitude would be the greatest of evils. It would be so, because upon the due regulation of every society depends the preservation of the things naturally dearest to every human being, and first in importance to almost all men—that is to say, life and property; and if the constitution of society could be altered from day to day, then would life and property

be uncertain from day to day. But this would be the case had every individual in a community equal power; because, in such a case, the motives, feelings, and tendencies of the majority would, in all likelihood, be in the direction of change. In such supposed case, the majority would fully and totally rule; and to the individuals composing that majority, in most cases, change and mutation would embody more of hope than fear. The result would, of course, be a constant mutability and incertitude. No institutions could be permanent; for the habit of political change begets a constant desire for more; and, under such circumstances, one revolution is only the precursor of another. This great truth is manifest in the history of all nations where the powers of the state have by any chance fallen for a time into the exclusive hands of the lower classes of society. In such cases, no system of government has ever been permanent. Even when a good system has been hit upon, the conflict of men's opinions, interests, and passions, has, in such instances, invariably prevented its permanence. Such a political state resembles the absurd notion invented by Epicurus of "the fortuitous concourse of atoms" (!) being the cause of the universe. Even when the atoms take by chance a beneficent direction, there exists no power to keep them there. Where a government is made to rest upon the mere abstract power of human opinion, or human passion, in a multitude where the

power to change or not is equally divided, such government cannot possibly be at a stay ; because human opinions as to the best forms of regulation for society are never agreed, but perpetually subject to the vicissitudes which a perennial crop of new schemes is sure to produce, wherever human ingenuity, or human perversity and eccentricity, have full swing, to act as well as to invent.

To this conflict of mere opinion, which, on such subjects, is as unstable as the winds, and as baseless as the mists—as history and the records of literature fully prove—the selfish and more unreasoning preponderance of property puts an end. To men whose possessions exceed the average—indeed, to all men having tangible wealth to almost any extent, however moderate—the idea of change is abhorrent. Such men reason only in one way. They calculate that the probable risks attendant upon great social changes are, with them, and in their peculiar case, more than commensurate with the probable benefits to arise out of a proposed mutation ; they therefore invariably oppose it. The motive here is unquestionably selfish in those who so act. Upon abstract grounds of justice it would, unquestionably, be often difficult to defend the alarm with which the rich view even moderate changes, undeniably just and expedient, and the obstinate pertinacity with which they resist such alterations ; but a deep and calm consideration will convince the inquiring mind that a great moral purpose is answered by

this partial preponderance of the wealthier minority; that end being the assurance of PERMANENCE to institutions, without which no institution can be of use, however excellent, or however just it may be in its own nature. And hence history and experience demonstrate that this principle of the preponderating influence of wealth is present in all governments and forms of advanced society of which we know anything. From the same sources we learn, that when, for a time, the vices or mistakes of those who hold the wealth of a country have, for a season, caused a successful revolt against their power, the only result is, a series of fast-following revolutionary mutations, destitute of much benefit, and the only gain, the removal of some great evil or palpable tyranny, unattended with much social progress or positive increase of the happiness of community in which this catastrophe takes place. The truth of these propositions is not only clearly evident in the history of the ancient Grecian and Roman republics, but, at this hour, in the position of France and the United States of North America. In France we have seen the mutations and terrible convulsions of half a century and upwards destroy one or two great and intolerable abuses, without really adding much of positive improvement to the virtue, morality, and happiness of French society. In the United States of America, under an immense federal republic, where the artificial distinctions of

rank are unanimously almost despised, and where they are totally disallowed, we behold wealth and property preserving in reality the same preponderance, though happily subjected to much more and better calculated checks on the part of the majority of the people than exist under the governments of Europe. The consequence has been that, during the last sixty years, the institutions and the state of society have been much more stable under the republican regulations of these United States than in France or in England; not because property has less proper preponderance in these States, but because the preponderance of wealth in Great Britain, Ireland, and France, being more absolute, has produced popular reaction, and violent, and revolutionary, and great changes, from which the better-poised institutions of the American commonwealth have been hitherto free; and the German and Italian states are now demonstrating the same truth. That wealth has the same preponderance in the national councils of the United States as in other civilised states, we have proof demonstrative in the fact that its power has, in one great instance, enabled it to uphold and perpetuate one great injustice of the most undeniable kind, in the institution of Negro slavery. In the abstract, Negro slavery, like all other species of slavery, is totally and hopelessly indispensable. It is certain that, if the majority of the inhabitants of the republic could carry

out in effect their real opinion as to the continuance or discontinuance of this system, so abhorrent to every principle upon which their own liberty is built, it would be gradually discontinued, and a substitute found. Yet the actual result is, that so great is the fear of all owners of property in these states of a collision on the slave question, that it cannot be entertained by the legislature; and those who oppose the existing state of Negro slavery are subjected to the imputations of sinister designs, and of being the tools of foreign nations, who wish to see disunion in these states.

Thus, then, it seems to be evident that the grand second division of nations into ranks—these ranks, in the great majority of cases, being founded on the unequal division of property—is really a great *moral lever*, the use of which is to secure to human institutions the first principle, *permanence*, upon which all the other uses of all institutions depend. It may be compared, in its action, to that which is called the "fly-wheel" of a steam-engine, which by its weight steadies all the rest of the machinery. We see that when, for a time, the power of this lever is suddenly removed from a society, a sort of moral anarchy is sure to follow—not arising out of any peculiar wickedness of the agents, but out of the naturally conflicting opinions of mankind, and the subtlety of the reasonings of the human intellect upon the complex problem of human society. At the same time,

however, that we see this, we perceive also that, if this preponderance of wealth be abused, that abuse is sure in the end to produce a reaction, which causes the temporary destruction of the regulating weight, and a violent revolutionary action, followed by a temporary dislocation of the whole social machinery. The conclusions which seem to follow, with perfect logical accuracy, from this view, are as follows: *First*, That the sole end and aim in the moral government of the world, to be obtained by the preponderance of wealth and rank, is permanence to institutions, and a due regulation of the action of opinion upon the political structure of all communities. *Second*, That this preponderance is perfectly efficient to this great end, and that it is only by pushing it to absurd and oppressive degrees of rigour that reaction is created, and temporary but anarchical suspension of the oppression is thus brought about, after which property regains a second time its proper influence. *Third*, That no social progress can ever be made by violent reaction from the bottom of society, though palpable evils may be thus removed, and the former balance restored. *Fourth*, That social progress is only to be accomplished step by step, and by imperceptible degrees, through the operation of public spirit and public intelligence on the part of the majority of a community. *Fifth*, That, therefore, revolutions in states, which arise internally, are really caused by those at the top, not at the bot-

tom of society, and are the result of the preponderance of wealth pushed to unreasonable and absurd extremes, and that all real danger to property really resides in the mistaken conduct of its owners. *Sixth*, That, from the same view, it also results as a conclusion, that all social and political amelioration springs out of the sober exercise of the national intellect, acting by unseen degrees upon the intellect of the preponderating minority of wealth ; and that this is the only means by which a rational freedom can accompany a virtuous progress of real civilisation, and that the histories of all nations uniformly demonstrate these truths.

Such are the results of the second grand division of nations into ranks and distinctions. Its action, in a moral point of view, is clearly twofold. It, first, affords, by means of the gradations of social rank and the unequal distribution of possessions, a constant pabulum to that EXCITEMENT TO ACTION, which is the vital principle of the moral world ; and, secondly, by the preponderance it gives to a minority adverse to change, it effectually removes that tendency to a constant mutability which an equality of power in individuals, perpetually acted upon by the subtlety of human ingenuity, would surely produce in the treatment of the great problem of human society, keeping that subtlety and that mutability constantly in check, though without the power to alter or destroy them. And here again we may trace the analogy between the government of

the material world and that of the moral world by the great Creator of both. In both, opposing forces are employed. In the material world, it is sufficiently evident that it has been only by the opposition of great conflicting powers that the lesser powers, such as those of crystallization, stratification, the direction of the metallic veins, and the localities of certain vegetative and animal life, have been made to act and to be in certain directions, and within rigid limits. For the position of strata and metallic veins, and the whole process of crystallization and chemical actions naturally going on in various directions, we can only refer to the opposing forces of water and volcanic action, excited in turns against each other, and jointly upon the solid crust of the earth. For the changes in vegetable and animal formation we can only refer to climate, as arising out of the action of the sun's rays, modified by the obliquity of earth's apparent course in its revolutions round that luminary. From these greater opposing forces the minor terrestrial phenomena have all sprung. Thus strata have arisen out of the subsidence of water, and the gradual formation of land brought about by partial elevations of the earth's solid surface. By violent volcanic action beneath the same surface, the metalliferous veins, and the pushing upwards of remote depositions of crystallized or carbonised stratifications, have been also manifestly brought about. By alterations of the earth's superficial crust by means of

water, by means of partial elevations, and by modifications of the power of the solar rays causing difference of climate, animal and vegetable life have been varied infinitely, and with them the complexion, habits, and constitution of man himself. In the moral world, we see here opposing forces producing similar and analogical results. We see here a striking analogy between the modes and means employed in the two sorts of government, moral and physical. For it is evident that, in the moral world, the valuable and gradual ameliorations which constitute that which is properly called "civilisation," are only produced by intellectual power working upwards, and by the introduction of various species of knowledge, as veins of valuable metal, gold, silver, iron, tin, lead, and copper, are projected by volcanic action, and forced into the fissures intended to be filled by them, by which means alone they become accessible. And it is also evident that it is by the same expansive intellectual powers from below that the stores of knowledge, accumulated through ages, are gradually raised upwards, as *strata* of coal, or lime, or iron-stone are, by the expanding power of volcanic action from beneath, gradually dissevering and causing to yield the superincumbent weight of the earth's crust, and thus affording opportunity for men to reap the benefit of the various chemical transformations and changes that have gone on beneath. This truth is indeed clear and manifest in

all we know of nations, that civilisation and mental culture has never arisen at the top, but from beneath, and that knowledge and mental improvement, whether applied to government, or to science proper, or to the fine arts, have had to struggle with power above, much more than ignorance beneath or round about them. The earlier chieftains and masters of society in all nations are rude and military in character, until the growth of literature, science, and refinement from below wins its way upwards by its own expansive force, and ameliorates those above as well as those around, substituting equal laws for arbitrary rule, and an enlarged humanity for the rude *regime* of military chieftainship. As the mass of the people are elevated from below by the gradual expanding might of growing refinement, ignorance and barbarism we see disappear and subside. This process is, however, only analagous to that by which we see islands, and even continents, have emerged gradually from the ocean, to become the seats of new creation, and of scenes totally unknown before, and to be subjected to the influence of agents which, but for this arrangement, could never have had the opportunity for action. Thus, in the arrangement of this division of society, we finally perceive the progress and management of the moral plans of the Creator of all things to be so similar to that of His material arrangement of the globe, as to be almost equally traceable by patient inquiry. In both we fall short—

far short—of a full comprehension of the entire mighty scheme in all its intricacies. But in both the outlines of design are so evident, as to strike with the deepest conviction his mind who most deeply inquires into both. In both we recognise a great ruling power and wisdom perpetually at work. We trace one chain of events, whether they be physical or moral, as only leading to and connected with another. The more we see, the more we are convinced that, in the moral as in the material world, nothing is left to chance or external interference. The agencies, that at first seem to be independent, are found to be connected with the rest. All is subjected to the Divine law, and to the subtle mechanism of Him from whom nothing is hidden, and who, though veiled Himself from our sight, really rules and directs all that we see or do, whether as moral agents, or in the exercise of those more physical powers, which are necessary to connect us with, and to continue us upon, that earth which we inhabit.

CHAPTER VII.

THE DIVISION OF RANKS INTO THE SUBDIVISION OF FAMILIES.—THE EFFECTS OF THIS SUBDIVISION ON SOCIETY, ON MORALS, ON GOVERNMENT, AND ON LITERATURE.—ITS ANALOGY WITH THE SUBDIVISIONS OF THE MATERIAL WORLD.—THE HARMONIOUS ACTION OF THE THREE DIVISIONS.

As it seems to be a truth, quite universal and quite undeniable, that there does not anywhere exist a nation, or even tribe, however few in number or uncivilised, amongst whom we are unable to trace some tendency towards a division into ranks, so it is equally true that we shall not meet with any community, however small, that is not again subdivided into families. This division seems to be universal over the whole inhabited globe ; nor does there exist any record of any people, at any period of the world, amongst whom it did not exist. Being thus universal, the division of mankind into families—being the third grand division—must spring from some pervading and powerful cause ; and we are now to inquire what is that cause ? The answer here appears to lie upon the surface. It is at once to be found in that which may be aptly termed the

"natural law of marriage," or, in other phrase, that tendency which has a home in every man's breast, impelling him to unite himself permanently with a companion of the other sex, and to cherish and educate such offspring as shall be the fruit of this union. It may be, and is true, that the influence of that passion, upon which the attachment between the sexes is founded, does not always at first lead to a permanent union. This is undoubtedly true; but it is equally true that, ultimately, with very rare exceptions, men attach themselves for life to one female, under whatsoever circumstances; and this may be said to be the natural law of marriage.

This is also equally as true of the inhabitants of countries where polygamy is allowed, as of countries where it is forbidden; and it is also equally as true of the people of countries where divorces are easily obtainable, as of those where legalised separations are difficult. Thus, in the Eastern countries, where a plurality of wives, and where concubinage is the custom, it still happens, in almost every case, that one chosen female becomes the favourite for life, and, of course, virtually *the* wife, though not legally so. And it was further observed, that in France, when, during the Revolution, the marriage-contract could be dissolved almost at pleasure, the numbers who availed themselves of the privilege (as it was called) were wonderfully few. So true is it that the union of a man with one

wife is that which the law of Providence and nature has really enacted, which religion commands in all Christian realms, and which common sense as certainly ratifies.

There is also another curious testimony observable of the extraordinary manner in which this natural law of wedlock is really regulated under the moral dispensation of Him who willed it. If we look abroad, and keenly and rigidly observe the characters and temperaments of such married persons as we have means accurately to judge of, we shall find that they have not been matched by any means upon a consideration of that similarity of temper which is vulgarly supposed to be the foundation of most voluntary unions, but just the contrary. Where there is nothing remarkable in the temperament, it may sometimes happen that a similarity is found; but where the temperament is marked, the reverse almost invariably takes place. In fact, persons of extreme temperaments, by the law of nature, are attracted by their opposites. Thus men of ardent and impetuous tempers almost invariably are found to prefer females of meek and patient disposition; and, *e conversô*, females of a spirited and ardent constitution generally attract men of placid and easy temperaments. In like manner, the active are commonly mated with the quiet, and the sanguine and fiery with the cool and dispassionate. The whole is, in truth, a system of compensation; for it is evident

that, by this arrangement, the permanence of the union is much more secure than by any calculation of similarity of disposition. Meekness on one side tempers irritability on the other. The sanguine is moderated by the dispassionate; the impetuous by the considerate; the hasty by the hesitating; and thus those extremes are avoided by which the permanence of cohabitation is oftenest broken up, and men's prospects clouded or means dissipated. And this is clearly so, because general permanence of union is that for which the law of our moral nature most especially provides; for from this comes, and naturally flows, the division into families, and the innumerable moral benefits which spring from this dispensation, and pervade the whole structure of society.

From the permanence which the law of nature, as well as of man, has given the conjugal union, arises the division of society into families—a division upon which depend many of the best and holiest feelings of our minds, and from which an amount of good, physical as well as moral, is derived, which renders it of the first importance to the wellbeing of society. The origin and manner of this division are equally manifest. Permanently united to a female, a man must, as a matter of course, be impelled to love and cherish the offspring of such a union. The affection felt for the mother naturally extends itself to the progeny; and constant intercourse as naturally

increases that attachment, as men love adopted children by force of habit. Thus arises a family; and the moral motives and ties which spring directly out of this are unquestionably of the highest moment to the happiness of all communities. In the first place, the providing for a family adds immensely to those motives for exertion without which, we have seen, mankind cannot be happy. He who dreads poverty for himself dreads it also for his offspring, and works with double ardour to minister to their present, and to accumulate for their future, comforts. Half of the value of possessions, in the eye of most men, resides in the view of transmitting them to lineal heirs. And much of the value of honorary distinctions is included in the same idea. Hence it is observed that the most active and successful men, in all callings and professions, have generally been married men; and that they have thus probably struggled for distinction, as well as wealth, for the sake of their lineal successors. Bacon, in fact, describes children as "*hostages* given to fortune." And this influence of kindred is, in some degree, reciprocal. The descendants of illustrious men are stimulated to honourable conduct by ancestral fame, and often reap, in the notice of the world—if their conduct be upright—some of the benefits of a kindred illustrious for talent or for virtue. Of this truth the experience of the past leaves no doubt. Nor can any one doubt, if any lineal descendants of

Shakspeare, Bacon, Milton, or Newton remained, as to the sort of notice they would receive from the world. The children of Burns have reaped some of the solid fruits of their father's genius; and other similar instances, in our own day, might be quoted.

There is another form of benefit resulting from this division of the community into distinct families, which we must not pass unnoticed. This is the effect produced by female influence upon the male character, and *vice versa*. Every man strives to appear amiable in the eyes of the woman to whom he is attached; and, after marriage, every right-thinking person is, in some degree, governed by the tastes and likings of his or her companion. That an admirable moral purpose is hereby arrived at cannot be doubted. Many men have been thus stimulated to acquire accomplishments which they would otherwise have neglected. Many have been thus reclaimed from vices to which they would otherwise have fallen victims. The lover is not seldom improved by his rival, and the thoughtless husband taught wisdom by his more considerate helpmate. On the other hand, the giddy young female is not unfrequently transformed by marriage into the prudent and thoughtful wife; and the follies of an artificial or mistaken education effaced entirely by the stern lessons of real and actual life and experience.

The most valuable result, however, of this third

division into families, resides, perhaps, in the immense amount of practical benevolence which is found, in all nations and countries, to spring from it. The real charities which spring from kindred are almost incalculable in amount. It is true that friendship between individuals, uncemented by the ties of blood or of marriage-relationship, has done much. Noble acts of benevolence, and to a great extent, are, beyond a doubt, perpetually arising from this source. This adversity has found, and will always acknowledge. It would be easy to quote instances over instances where sacrifices immense have been made by one friend to rescue another from the consequences of misfortune, or even culpable imprudence. It is an every-day circumstance to see men of ardent and susceptible feelings embarrass themselves to assist other men, under the impulse of friendship alone. This is a fact too common to be insisted upon. Still, however, it may be doubted whether the amount, great as it is, of beneficence exerted under these impulses, at all comes near the perennial quantity of those charities which spring directly out of the ties of kindred, and the relations of families to each other by intermarriage. In point of fact, the effects of this influence are perpetual. So common have they become, that beneficial interferences, by one relative in favour of another, have almost ceased to be regarded as a virtue, because they have become almost a usage. Public opinion has, at

length, come, in a manner, to enforce them ; and the rich who neglect their poorer relatives by blood or by marriage, derogate from themselves in the eyes of their fellows, and feel the reaction of public sentiment.

This fact is the strongest proof of what is here adduced. When the ties of blood have become so sanctified in the eyes of a community, they must be potent indeed. Moral law here transcends all legal enactment. The charity which in some countries—and in this amongst others—is exercised under direction and regulation of statute, dwindles in comparison with the amount of that which springs directly and voluntarily out of the ties of family and blood. Of this, few accurate and unprejudiced observers will doubt ; and, if this be true, it is easy to calculate of how immense a value to the human race is this great moral arrangement. It is true, on the other hand, that, in causing conflicting claims to property, it is occasionally the parent of discord and malevolence. But one is rare, whilst the other is common. None but those whom fate has isolated can go through life without experiencing, in a greater or less degree, some of the better and holier sympathies that take their spring in ties of family and kindred ; whilst the discords arising from conflicting interests are few and far between. Of the great value of the moral effect upon the human heart of this beautiful arrangement, no one need doubt. The greatest antagonist to the

vice of a narrow and callous selfishness is probably the relation of parent to child. He who can feel for nothing else comes to feel for his offspring; and it is remarkable, that the greatest misers on record have been childless men and women, and persons not only childless, but without brother or sister. This one fact speaks volumes. We, in truth, become only insensible of the enormous benefits arising out of the sympathies of family and of kindred, from the circumstance of their being so commonly and so perpetually passing before our eyes that we cease to calculate, or even to notice, them. They are interwoven with every movement of society, and form a part, as it were, of the element and atmosphere in the midst of which we live. It is observable that persons destitute of kindred or relatives either cling to their friends with a strength of affection almost equivalent—as men at last come to regard adopted children as their own —or else sink into a sullen and selfish isolation and solitariness that nearly becomes disease. The finer and better feelings of their nature become dried up. The spring of sympathy is closed. The well of affection ceases to yield its sweet waters. The mind becomes an arid desert; and, like the desert, becomes also a solitude cheerless and unvisited. A few of the coarsest and most animal wants and feelings come to rule alone; and man becomes little better than a bear in his den, a glutton in his hole, or a wolf in his lair—

content with the alternations of food and sunshine, sleep and solitude.

Such are some of the effects upon a community of this third and last division. Upon literature those influences are equally marked. From the division of human beings into families, biography, history, and heraldry, derive much of their material, and much of their interest. Where the government is monarchical —and at present nearly all governments are so—the results of family alliance and kindred become of the first national importance; and in countries where the hereditary aristocracy shares with the monarch a large portion of the ruling power—which must ever be the case, and which still obtains even under democratic forms of government—the results of family alliances and family descent acquire more importance still. History is, in fact, only the record in part of family claims and of the national transactions, and often international disputes which have thus taken rise. From claims of this kind many civil wars have originated; and wars between nations have had occasional origin in the same supposed rights of families. How far these disputes, and the conflicts for which they have given cause, are evils *per se*, we shall consider when we come to treat of war as one of the most extraordinary phenomena of the moral arrangement, as we see it to exist. In the mean time, it cannot be doubted that, out of the grand division of mankind into

families, much of national good as well as national evil has arisen; and that from its influences a large portion of the interest of historical narrative is to be traced. It is so, because hereditary succession, whether royal or aristocratical, is one of the means which property and rank employ to perpetuate that moral preponderance in nations which we have shown them necessarily to possess. A hereditary right, when once men's minds assent to it, is the easiest of proof; and therefore it is that aristocratic and wealthy ranks have always clung to the doctrine of hereditary right in rulers and dignitaries, and in the descent of all sorts of real or tangible property; because, when this principle is once admitted, proof becomes so easy that disputes can only occur rarely. When authority is put on a foundation of mere merit, dispute becomes perpetual, and, unless nicely regulated, a perennial mischief. Of this it is in vain to affect to doubt; and the argument would perhaps be irresistible, were it not true also, that the evils which result from the naked assertion of indefeasible hereditary rights are just as enormous. In the proper place we shall arrive at an explanation of the moral arrangement by which these opposite principles are balanced and neutralised. All that is necessary, at present, is to note the important effects for good *or* evil—for there is no reason to doubt of either—which the heirship of family descent necessarily has upon communities.

From this descent of power by heirship, much of the greater material of historical narrative is derived; and of the interest of history, a large portion hinges upon it. In proof of this, an appeal to the history of all countries that have a history is all that is necessary. The important point to be noted is the prevention of dispute, which the institution of the heirship of power through family descent unquestionably brings about. In communities only partially civilised, were the possession of power put upon any other basis, it is clear the effect would be ruinous and cruel. The claim of merit is so uncertain, that it can only be decided by an appeal to the judgment of the majority. But in cases of communities where the machinery for such an appeal to be peacefully made does not exist, civil dispute must be the immediate consequence. It is only amongst a people highly civilised, indeed, that any system of conferring power by election can usefully exist. Even the existence, by popular election, of a democratic branch in the legislature of any country, has only been partially arrived at in modern times. To put all power into the election of a majority, unrestricted in any way, is an experiment that has hardly yet been tried. The nation which shall achieve it may claim the first rank amongst civilised communities. Suffice it to say, in the interim, that until public enlightenment shall become infinitely more common than it now is, the descent of power by heir-

ship must remain as a partial ingredient, at least, in all settled governments. We can obtain no exception to this rule from the ancient republics. They were either so, like Sparta, in name only—or, like that of Athens for a time, mere mob-governments; under which the sway really resided in his hands who could best cajole the multitude.

If history, as we have seen, owes much of her interest to the division into families, so does biography, and their half-sister heraldry. We love to trace the families of illustrious men, because they shine with a splendour, not their own it is true, but yet a splendour; and from this principle comes a beneficial reaction. Who can read Plutarch without perceiving that many of his worthies were first prompted to be great by the *prestige* and incentive of some great ancestor? The reason is obvious. The same feeling which led a Roman to be proud to trace his descent from a family which had produced a Cato, a Gracchus, a Brutus, a Scipio, or Scaurus, must have led him to wish to imitate such men. The two impulses are in truth identical; nor can they be separated. He who never strives to imitate a great ancestor, is incapable of any strong sense of his glory. We see, indeed, men of ignoble minds and characters pleased with an illustrious descent—but why? Because they see, without caring for its origin, that it commands the respect of the multitude. That this is the true

reason for much of the pride of pedigree and heraldic honours is unquestionable enough; but of the better results of such honours, there is just as little question.

To the institution of families, history and biography, heraldry and the poetry of antiquity, necessarily owe much. Without it, Homer, Virgil, Sophocles, and Æschylus—Herodotus, Thucydides, and Livy—Plutarch, Nepos, and Tacitus, would have wanted interests and feelings on which to work. To the same source we must attribute most of the interest we feel in our more modern epics, in our minor poets, in our entire drama, and in our romancers, novelists, and even essayists. What would Dante, Ariosto, and Tasso—what would Shakspeare and Corneille—what would Boccaccio, Cervantes, Le Sage, Scuderi, and Crebillon—or Fielding, or Smollett, or Scott—or even Addison, Steele, or Johnson—have done without this division of mankind? Nothing. Milton seems alone an exception; and his extraordinary theme, alone, makes him so. It is not requisite to go over any very extended ground, either with respect to the literature of history or of the *belles lettres*, to make these assertions very clear. Even in the purest of the Greek republics, the influence of family, especially where wealth aided, was far from inconsiderable. In the entire of Roman history it is conspicuously so. The whole of the earlier annals of Rome are, in truth, the chronicle of the fruitless struggle of the people against the patrician

families, backed by the equestrian order—who formed a sort of middle rank—and the numerous clients and slaves of all descriptions who were dependent upon them. In this struggle the two noble brethren Tiberius and Caius Gracchus perished; and it was only by availing themselves of the hatred of the plebeians to the senate, and the patrician order generally, that Cæsar, tutored by the successes of Marius first, and then of Sylla, was enabled to subvert the hereditary power from the patrician families, and fix it in his own for a few generations. From that period the descent of the imperatorial or regal crown gradually became strictly limited to family and heirship throughout Europe, and the greater part of the then known and civilised world; and history, since the era of Cæsar, has at length become strictly a chronicle of the government of families, claiming to rule, and ruling mankind, in virtue of heirship. The reasons for this dispensation we have already touched upon; and such are the facts. If from history itself we turn to poetry, we find the feelings and consequences arising out of this division of mankind into families, the grand staple of the epic, dramatic, and lyric bard. The whole *Iliad* hinges upon the revenge of Menelaus for the adultery of Paris with his wife; of the *Odyssey*, much of the interest depends on the family circumstances of Ulysses; of the *Æneid*, the leading and grand topic is the foundation of Rome by Æneas and his family,

after the destruction of Ilium by the Greek confederates. In the action of the drama, whether tragic or comic, the feelings arising out of the division of the human race into families are mostly prominent. The *Œdipus* is a tale of incest; the dramatic tortures of Orestes by the furies arise out of the adultery of Clytemnestra, and her son's revenge of his father's wrongs and murder. Of Shakspeare, the grandest efforts in his tragic dramas are those connected with the ties and conflicts of families. *Lear*, *Othello*, *Hamlet*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Richard III.*, all derive their deepest effect from feelings drawn from this source. The dramas of the French, and German, and Italian dramatists, who have cultivated tragedy, turn as often on domestic as merely historic circumstances. In all, the two are mingled together. Shakspeare's *Julius Cæsar* is a play almost purely historical; yet how fine a portion of its interest is derived from the struggles between tenderness and patriotism of Portia, the wife of Brutus? The *Cabal* and *Love*, and the *Fiesco* of Schiller, also form another instance—the *Zaïre* of Voltaire, another—and *The Orphans* and *Venice Preserved* of Otway, another—how constantly the family and domestic mix themselves up and mingle with the more purely historical or national feelings. In fine, it is almost impossible to find a serious drama which does not, more or less, involve incidents or emotions springing out of the institution of families and kindred. But if tragedy is a proof of this, how much

more so is not comedy? The almost entire comic drama is essentially founded upon domestic events and circumstances. Upon the opposition of families to those relations with other families which intermarriages bring about, the whole action of comedy is nearly founded. Youthful love is brought into perpetual collisions with the prejudices, interests, or passions of parents; and to the interest arising from these collisions the minor events, feelings, and characters of the comedy are subservient. Marital or uxorious jealousy forms another portion of the staple of the comic muse. The jealous husband and the suspicious wife, whether with or without reason, help to add to the amusement of the spectators; whilst again, the doating dupe of an unfaithful spouse, blind alone to that which all the rest of the world sees, adds a new zest to the family complications of the laughing scene. Farce, which is only a minor but more exaggerated form of comedy, deals in the same incidents and the same catastrophes; and the periodical essay derives its principal interest and utility from moral considerations arising out of the same division of mankind. Of this truth a cursory survey of the Tatlers, Spectators, Guardians, and Connoisseurs, will afford full conviction; nor is it necessary to quote examples to prove how almost completely our interest in the novel and the romance arises from the circumstances, and considerations, and feelings which, in real life, spring from the division of society into families.

The whole of amatory poetry, in whatsoever shape it may be—epic, didactic, narrative, or lyrical—is indebted for its interest to feelings which only take rise from the same great division. In short, to this division literature owes more, probably, than to the greater partitions into "nations" and "ranks;" although their several relations are so much and so often interwoven, that it is difficult, nay, sometimes impossible, to separate them.

On this last grand partition of mankind into "families" it may also be remarked, that it presents the same analogies to the arrangements of the material world that we have seen afforded by the other machinery of our moral government. In the physical world, just as in the moral, we find lesser divisions taking place under the greater. In the vegetable creation this is especially evident. All vegetables are subdivided into classes, which, by the universal consent of naturalists, have been called "families;" and, by the union of two of these, a new variety is created. Amongst the lower animals a similar classification is observed; and, to a limited extent, by the union of two of the same species, a third, or "hybrid" family is produced. In the material world the same analogies are not wanting. Thus the metals are subdivided into perfect and semi-metals; and we also find that, by the union of two or more, a third, having new properties, is the result. In the acids, the same subdivision into mineral and

vegetable occurs; and here, by the union of two, as in the case of "aqua regia," a third, having new properties, follows. In the earths and alkalies, the same sort of subdivision is very manifest; and, in the instance of the neutral salts, resulting from the chemical union of an acid with an alkali, we perceive the same curious modifications of joint properties result. Thus muriate and sulphate of soda, though akin in most particulars, vary in others; whilst muriate or sulphate of potash, preserving still a certain affinity, vary still further. Between certain earths and alkalies we can trace the same connecting family link, as apparent in a third class of substances, having some properties common to both. Thus lime and magnesia share some of the properties both of earths and of alkalies, and are manifestly a distinct family allied to both. The neutral salts also arising out of their union with acids, have also properties similar to those of the more perfect salts, which result from the combination of acid and true alkaline substances; and as it is by means of these minor and more minute subdivisions that the more minute processes of the material creation are carried on, so, in the moral world, the subdivision into families acts in a similar manner. Thus rank invariably strengthens itself by intermarriage with persons whose family is of similar rank; and in the conduct of government, and the formation of cabinets and administrations, we see the same principle at work.

And further, as in the material arrangement of the world we see grand mutations accomplished by the joint action of certain substances having certain affinities—as, for instance, volcanic fire is sometimes occasioned by the presence of carbon and sulphur in contact with water, as in the case of pyrites—so moral revolutions in society and government are often the result mainly of family junctions, as in the instances of the expulsion of the Tarquins; the elevation of Cromwell to the protectorate; the second expulsion of the Stuarts in 1688; and the erection of the kingdom of Portugal under the family of Braganza.

The result of the whole is, that this last subdivision of mankind into families is just as evidently the necessary means of a great moral purpose as are the other greater divisions into nations and ranks. We see its necessity and complete adaptation to the successful attainment of the great end in view—that is to say, the excitement of mankind to a constant action in a certain direction, by means of desires and aims common to all, and acted upon by all, as circumstance and situation allow. Thus we see that without the grand division into nations, the necessity of government and chieftainship could not arise. Without the division into ranks, we perceive that no settled government could exist. Lastly, by the subdivision into families, we see the second division strengthened and the whole upheld—at the same time that the strongest motive for exer-

tion on the part of individuals is thus supplied. The whole three divisions thus work harmoniously together to produce the result of society, as we see it exist in the world in different stages of progress. With the arrangements of the material world it has a wonderful and close analogy; and this analogy will be found to hold good in the occasional apparent interruptions to the regular course of moral progress in society that from time to time take place. In the moral as in the physical creation, we shall see these apparent interruptions producing great and striking results, which are really necessary to the progress of the whole; and to these we shall now turn.

CHAPTER VIII.

ON THE OCCASIONAL EXCESSES OF POWER, ARISING OUT OF THE DIVISIONS OF HUMAN SOCIETY.—ON TYRANNY.—ON WAR.—ON THE BENEFICIAL RESULTS WHICH ACCOMPANY SUCH EXCESSES. —ON THE MORAL RESULTS OF THE MILITARY SPIRIT IN NATIONS.

It is hoped that the seven preceding chapters have demonstrated, with sufficient force and clearness, the moral causes which have made society that which it is. It is hoped that the reader now manifestly sees that, taking together the constitution of his own mind and the circumstances in which he is placed by his great Creator, man is necessarily, and by the certain and irresistible power of moral motive, impelled, or rather induced, forward in that direction which we see him invariably take; and that these great moral motives or laws (call them as we will) act with the same certainty with which the physical laws of attraction, chemical affinity, electricity, crystallization, &c. are found to act. This, it is hoped, the reader must see to be undoubtedly the truth; the only difference between the two worlds, moral and physical, being,

that in one the power is material, as in the attraction of gravitation—in the other mental and spiritual, as in the influence of moral motive inducing men to seek certain things and avoid others. These grand truths it is trusted the reader now clearly apprehends and admits. We are, therefore, (this being so,) now at liberty to take one step further in the progress of this argument, and to show what is the design and what are the uses of certain apparent excesses in the action of these motives, which no doubt exist, and which are in their nature quite analogous to certain apparent excesses in the action of the material elements, which seem to have been, and to be, of constant occurrence in the earth's history and progress.

Reason and its exercise—the act of reasoning—and the regulation of his acts by this process, are the peculiar attributes of man. To the ultimate guidance of reason, though, questionless, under certain and strict limits, man alone is left. The lower animals act by instinct; and between this and reason, as it exists in man, a very plain line of demarcation exists. The peculiarity of instinct is, that it acts with certainty and universality, and within clear, ascertainable, and narrow limits. All animals of the same species have the same instincts, both in quality and measure, and hence they all act, instinctively, exactly alike. All birds of the same family always build one sort of nest, and at one season of the year. They pair at

the same time—seek their food by the same methods —and bring up their offspring similarly. It is true, there is reason to suppose that some animals sometimes seem to act from logical conclusions ; but this is generally in matters not of primal necessity. In all that concerns preservation, the procreation of their species, and provision for their young, the lower animals are regulated by certain instincts; and no variety of result, as to these points, appears. But in man the reverse of this is the case. We have, no doubt, shown demonstrably, that men's reason and will are, in certain grand and important points, determined certainly and constantly in one direction ; but in various individuals the strength of the determination is various in its degree of intensity. All men, for instance, love gain ; but all men are not equally avaricious. All men love their wives and children more or less ; but in different persons the degree of conjugal and paternal affection differs exceedingly. This evidently arises in part from men's reasoning powers being of very different degrees of strength. Thus weak men are over-indulgent ; narrow men are over-greedy of mere gain ; imaginative men are violent and excessive in their affections and appetites ; whilst intellectual men moderate the stronger impulses of the will by means of counteracting considerations, and place upon wealth, beauty, and offspring, their real value and no more. Thus, then, from this variety in the reasoning powers

of men—from this inequality of intellect, certain inequalities of action must necessarily arise. Men, in matters of minor importance, viewing the same things differently, act differently somewhat, even under circumstances that are alike ; and of this truth all history and all experience make us aware.

It, accordingly, comes to pass, as might be with certainty expected from the foregoing considerations and premises, that mankind, when in possession of certain powers, use them with various degrees of sense and justice. This takes place, as the experience of the past has fully demonstrated, whether power be in the hands of one man or many. Hence, in despotic states, we see no rulers either good or bad alike : Titus differs from Vespasian, and Antoninus from Marcus Aurelius. In the same fashion, Nero out-herods Caligula ; and Heliogabalus out-gluttonises even Vitellius. Where power is lodged in many hands, the manner of its exercise is equally capricious. Thus the Roman senates sometimes acted patriotically and sometimes corruptly ; and the Venetian council of ten and senators displayed the same inequalities in the exercise of their functions. The English House of Commons has manifested the like versatility of proper and improper motive ; and the old French parliaments exhibited similar changeableness of motive and of deed. In nations, an equal discordancy in feeling, disposition, and action, is just as observable.

Thus the British nation hunted Byng to death, and protected Keppell—exalted Lord Clive, and prosecuted Warren Hastings. Upon the whole, therefore, it may be most safely assumed, upon the broadest basis of past experience, that power placed in the hands of man, whether it be wielded by a dictator, a king, an emperor, a president, a senate, a council, a parliament, or a whole nation, will ever be unequally exercised—will be used sometimes for justice, sometimes for oppression, sometimes for ambition, sometimes for right, sometimes for defence, sometimes for conquest. And from this grand peculiarity of man to abuse his powers—in spite of reason, which forbids, but is often too weak to prevent it—arise two grand interruptions to the peace and happiness of nations and of individuals—tyrannies and wars. In all ages, and amongst all nations of which there remains any record, we find wars and tyrannies to have existed. They are of perpetual, constant, and perennial occurrence. History is, for the most part, and too much, made up of them. We cannot doubt, therefore, that they must constitute a portion of the scheme of human society, had we no other reason for this opinion than their existence in all times, of which we have annals, and amongst all nations of whose story we know anything. That which has existed universally, and continues to exist, may be safely attributed to systematic design, although, on a first view, its nature

and tendency may be opposed to our preconceived ideas of what is right and what is benevolent. When we know the Creator to be omniscient, and all-wise, and all-good, our course is not to deny His providence, but humbly to search into His ways; and this course let us now take with regard to the two grand interruptions now in question—tyranny of rulers, and international violence and conflict.

If we carefully and considerately inquire into all the tendencies and results of what appear to us as evils unmitigated, whether such be moral or physical, we shall generally discover that they ultimately involve much that is good. What is the case with most is probably the case with all. It remains, then, to consider what are the whole tendencies and results of tyranny of rule, and what are the whole tendencies and results of international collisions.

It is the great law of Providence that man—no doubt for his own ultimate happiness and perfection—shall be excited and impelled, nay, compelled, to perpetual endeavour. Action of some kind, mental or bodily, or both, is his element. Our Creator has not deemed it fit to bestow blessings upon us gratuitously. Had he done so in this our present state, we have seen they would have ceased to be blessings. It is the excitement of the endeavour which constitutes the benefit. The sultan who was cured of his imaginary diseases by having medicines enclosed in a wooden ball,

which he was to keep in motion with a mallet, is a very pretty Eastern illustration of this great truth. If man is to be blessed, he must struggle and work for the blessing. Nothing was ever more true than the French proverb, "Aide toi, et la ciel toi aidera;" or than the English one, "Put your shoulder to the wheel." Man, in short, must earn his own benefits of every sort; and the first great effect of this constant tendency to excess, in its exercise amongst those who possess power over a society, is, that it puts upon the individuals composing that society the necessity of a perpetual watchfulness, and the constant recurrence to their duties as citizens of a state. It has been the error of many men whose intentions were really good, and the constant device of others whose intentions are sinister and corrupt, to represent political excitement amongst a people as an evil. So far from being so, it is, when of a proper sort, not only of the first necessity, but of the greatest benefit. No man ever felt and acted upon his sense of duty as the citizen of a state, without great moral benefit to himself, unless his mode of estimating those duties has been erroneous in the extreme. This follows as a consequence, because the duties of men to the state are less obvious, and of a more abstract character, than are their duties to each other. The duties of man as a citizen have also been left to be wrought out, and defined, and demonstrated, by the efforts of his own reason; whilst his duties

towards his neighbour have been in all ages authoritatively taught him, with more or less of purity, in the form and by the aid and ministration of religion. Hence our duties to our country, though perhaps first in the order of time, and in importance equal to our duties towards each other, are in all cases less understood by mankind; and being less understood, are, as a consequence, less exercised than are our more ordinary moral duties. This is evidently the case, because, to appreciate their rights as citizens, men must be highly civilised, and their modes of thinking both exalted and enlarged, to an extent not easily attainable by a whole people. When a nation, therefore, has arrived at a full appreciation of its duties as citizens in a state or civil society, a high degree of mental culture is necessarily involved; and the moral energy which must accompany the apprehension and exercise of duties and rights of a highly abstract nature is necessarily involved also. Men must, then, have learned two sorts of justice. They must not only have learned that justice towards their neighbour which religion authoritatively teaches, and morality explains and enforces, but that justice towards the community which is embodied in the code of the duties and rights of citizenship, which religion has, by a wise dispensation, left to man's reason and the progress of moral science to demonstrate and enforce. Public as well as private morality is necessary to the

happiness of every people; and in the exercise of public as well as private duty, much of that happiness resides. No plainer lesson is taught by history than this, that private morality alone is insufficient to secure the wellbeing of a people. To preserve for any length of time that private virtue, public virtue in addition is also necessary. And the reason of this is plain and demonstrable. Be a people ever so moral, if they suffer themselves to be enslaved by a minority in whom power is more completely invested, their morals must, in time, be destroyed by the acts and examples of that very minority. The prostration of the multitude must ever give impunity to the passions and vices of the few who monopolise power. But these vices and those unbridled passions descend, by a contagious example, until the community becomes totally corrupted and demoralised, and the state is destroyed by its own demoralisation, or by external force, which it has become unable to resist. This was the fate of all the great empires of antiquity of which record remains. Thus fell the Assyrian, thus the Persian, and thus the western and eastern empires of Rome. In more modern times we may readily find examples of catastrophes not very dissimilar, although the progress of knowledge and the more diffused ideas as to their rights of citizenship amongst nations, has caused reaction to come sooner and more frequently from within than was usual in ancient times. The Turkish

empire is now, however, following the exact course of the decadence of that eastern Roman empire on the ruins of which it rose. Despotism and luxury united have at length destroyed public spirit, and the Ottoman empire is yielding to the blows of Russia, exactly as that of the Palæologi fell before the assaults of Mahomet II. and his warlike predecessors. From all this we arrive at one conclusion, viz., that the study and exercise of public virtue is necessary to sustain a state ;—that, without it, private virtue, morality, and religion even, are insufficient for that great end ;—that, hence, men must learn, that to struggle for the mere protection of life and property by law is not all ;—and that, besides the private virtuous acquisition and virtuous distribution of wealth, something more is required of them. That something is public virtue, and the constant enforcement of the rights of the citizen with those of the individual. Nothing is more certain than that religion to a high degree, private morality, the respect for the rights of property, hospitality, and peaceableness, may exist in a nation ; and yet, from the deficiency of public virtue and spirit, the mass may be crushed down, until religion and morality become of no avail, until misery alters everything, and life and property become insecure, amidst a community naturally kind, religious in feeling, moral in habits, but not combined in action by any due apprehension or appreciation of their duties and rights as

citizens of a state. Man, then, has two sets of duties to understand and to perform—public duty and private duty. Neither can long exist separately. An all-wise Creator has decreed that, for man to be happy, both must be cultivated, and both carried out in action. If not, tyranny intervenes, and the morality of private life is quickly destroyed by the consequences of the neglect or desertion of the morality of the citizen.

Thus, then, we perceive the reason why the histories of the world hitherto give us relations of constant periods of oppression and decay amongst nations, varied and alternated by short but brilliant examples of virtuous government, and by examples also of violent reactions from within against those oppressions; which reactions, being sudden and spasmodic, have ever failed of the results really expected and intended, and left the community little happier or better than before. The reason of these phenomena in the moral government of the world we now begin to see; but before proceeding further in this direction, we must take into consideration some of the more recondite and beneficial consequences of these constant interruptions of the welfare of nations, by the sufferance of tyranny and oppression on the part of those who naturally have power, by those whose duty it is to resist it.

It cannot be too often nor too deeply impressed upon our minds, that there is no evil unaccompanied by some countervailing good; and that, for aught we

know to the contrary, all evil may ultimately bring about, by some unseen agencies, an amount of benefit fully, or more than fully, equivalent to any suffering which may have been caused by it. On a first view, the evils of the tyranny of one portion of our species over another seems very great; and so do those that arise from the ravages of the wars caused by the unbridled passions of those who direct the destinies of nations. Nor is it easy to see, at first, any room for benefits to the species to arise from the suffering which springs from these sources. On a deeper consideration, however, as it appears to the author, this difficulty vanishes; and amongst the results of tyrannies and wars we shall find many and great benefits to the human race, which at first we never even suspected to exist. It seems now to be very generally admitted amongst those who have studied the question of population, that it only increases under certain circumstances connected with food and general living. If the food be generous, and the mode of life easy and somewhat luxurious, the species does not increase. Plethora is the bar to fecundity.* If the food, on the contrary, be poor and meagre, chiefly vegetable—if its quantity be stinted and insufficient, and the mode of life toilsome—then a rapid

* "Steriliora cuncta pinguia," says Pliny, (lib. ii. cap. 37,) "et in maribus et in feminis."—(Plethora ever induces sterility, whether in male or in female.)

growth of the people is induced. For with all animals—and in the vegetable world also—if once the species is endangered, in that *ratio* fecundity is increased. Depletion is the stimulant to prolificness; and from this great principle we come to the evidence of a great fact, which is capable of very strong historical proof; that is to say, that, had it not been for the oppressions of tyranny, and the devastations and privations that accompany wars, the world could not have been peopled. Had mankind never felt exaction and the fiscal tyranny of avaricious or ambitious rulers —had they never been exposed to starvation and hardship by the ravage, rapine, wanton destruction, and cruelty of hostile invaders, they must have enjoyed the fruits of their industry and skill in plenty and in peace—rare accidental circumstances of failures of crops, or loss from tempests, or diseases vegetable or animal, alone forming the exceptions. But these latter privations are so rare that by their means population would have gained little. To create numbers and populous countries, as we see them to exist, and know them to have existed for ages, tyranny and hardship, and war and its ravage, were necessary. Under these circumstances the lights of history show us that nations have increased. In peace, and under mild sway, the same lights exhibit them as stationary, or even declining in numbers and strength, though abounding in riches. We find traces, not to be

mistaken, of this great and important truth in the annals of most nations. The first record is in holy writ. In Exodus, we find that, when Israel was in the Egyptian bondage, and purposely afflicted by the Pharaohs with "heavy burthens," in the hope of decreasing their numbers, by this mistaken cruelty the taskmasters deceived themselves: "The more they afflicted them with their burthens, the more they multiplied and grew:" and the end was their deliverance from their bondage by the very means taken to insure it! Coming a little nearer to modern times, we shall find, taking the Roman writers and Plutarch for our guides, that the ancient territory of Rome, that Iberia or Spain, and that Greece, were much more populous in the earlier era of the Roman and Grecian republics than they were after all three became subjected to the Roman emperors. This was because, after that time, luxury and sloth took the place of republican plainness, perpetual agitation, and frequent and ravaging wars. Coming nearer still to our own epoch, we find Rousseau and others asserting that the French people increased rapidly during the atrocities of the civil wars of the League; and that afterwards, when luxury followed peace, the numbers declined. Taking England itself as an example, we may find abundant evidence to prove that England, at the period of the Norman Conquest, was much more populous than at the commencement of the sixteenth century; and that,

from the year A.D. 1480 to 1640, the population went on declining, in the midst of plenty and almost perfect domestic and foreign peace. Taking Ireland as an instance, this truth is still more strongly developed. Since the time of its conquest by Henry II., Ireland has been treated as a conquered nation. As a certain consequence of this false and cruel policy, rebellions innumerable have followed. These have brought on constant confiscations and massacres, until the whole race has been more than once all but extirpated. Yet what is the ultimate result?—That at this moment Ireland is the most populous realm in all this globe, excepting only Bengal, China, and the Japanese Islands; and that, besides being so, she has half-peopled the United States, and has added much to the population of Great Britain. That the great spread of population has been from these last-named countries in ancient times seems strongly demonstrated by history. Manners, aided by the Brahminical religion, have, in the vast regions of Hindostan, China, Chinese-Tartary, Cochin-China, and the Japanese Islands, for many ages made animal food a rarity. In these countries, rice and other vegetable aliments are the staple food of the inhabitants. The consequence has been so vast a population that the tribes formerly inhabiting the countries west of the Indus, and of the great wall of China, have been driven still farther west by the gradual expansion of the Chinese, Hindoos,

Chinese-Tartars, and other tribes originally seated in these regions. Hence came the continued irruptions of the more wandering and pastoral tribes upon the Roman frontier, which at that period reached the Danube. The Goths came first; then the Vandals, Ostrogoths, and other nations of a more decidedly Eastern origin. Last came the hideous Huns, under Attila—men unquestionably of the tribe now called Calmuck Tartars, and inhabitants originally of the tracts which lie in the immediate vicinity of what is now China. That this immense outpouring of a redundant people had its origin partly in a poverty of food prescribed by religion and custom, seems not questionable. But this has only been part of the cause. The ravages of the Tartars and the more warlike of the tribes of India, as well as the tyranny of the native princes, must have no doubt assisted in the work; and in these combined causes we see the spring and source of that marvellous irruption of people which ended in the repeopling of Europe with new races, and the all but disappearance of the ancient people, whatsoever they might be, who, before this vast torrent overwhelmed them, had occupied Europe and part of Asia. Nor is it difficult to see (however paradoxical at first the assertion may appear) the process by which war stimulates the growth of a people. The theatre of war—even of civilised warfare—is always a scene of privation and

suffering. It is difficult to find food for the armies drawn together; and hence the country, to a vast extent, is stripped of its regular resources. The cattle are seized and slaughtered, and corn taken; and to this loss must be added the destruction of property caused by the passions of the soldiery. All this tends to produce famine and privation over wide tracts of country; and how strongly inadequate food, joined to other hardship, stimulates the prolificness of the human race, the instances are innumerable. Political oppression, whether in the shape of government extortion, or the exaction and neglect of landlords, produces the same effects, by impoverishing masses of people, and reducing them to a poor and insufficient scale of diet. No people is more prolific than the wretched population of Ireland, who exist on an insufficient diet of potatoes. The Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland, as lately described by Sir John M'Neill, present the same phenomena; as do all countries, where the food is meagre and chiefly vegetable, in a greater or less degree.*

Thus, then, from tyranny, or excess in the exercise of that power which the owners of property ever wield, and from those ravages caused by the ambition

* Those readers who wish to inquire further into this curious and important subject, the author can only refer to his previous work—*The True Law of Population*—a new and enlarged edition of which is now in course of preparation. See also *British Quarterly Review*, No. IV., November 1845.

or greediness of nations, or of their rulers, the ultimate purposes of Providence in peopling the world are pushed forward and advanced: nor is it clear that these purposes could be advanced in any other manner. There, however, arise out of wars other indirect effects, which, in the present state of the world and of the nations that inhabit it, are requisite and necessary to the wellbeing of those who suffer, in the first instance, from the effects of hostilities. Were mankind arrived at a state approaching to perfection, these consequences might be superfluous; but whatever may be the ultimate scheme of Providence as to the progress of mankind towards perfect civilisation, it is questioned by no one that we are as yet far from that consummation. Man, as he appears at present, seems to be the only blot upon creation, so little does he often seem to know his true interests, and so imperfect, in consequence, is the social state in which he lives. Nations, therefore, have in all time had two dangers constantly threatening them—the despotism of their rulers, and the aggressions of neighbours. To defend themselves against these, (as has been well observed by Mr Alison in his *History of Europe*,) the preservation of the military spirit is necessary at all times, and its loss is fatal. This fact all experience seems to teach. The annals of the past teem with examples. When the military spirit dies in a nation, the empire comes to depend upon mercenaries; and

these first become the rulers, and at last the betrayers of their country, from their own final demoralisation. It was in this way that the Roman empire, the greatest on record, went to pieces. After the total demoralisation of the senate and the people, the government under the Cæsars became finally military. But the legions and the Prætorian guards soon divided the rule between them. As the empire became extended and consolidated, the Roman legionaries also became sunk in luxury, and their ranks at length were recruited from the very barbarians whom it was their duty to have resisted. As this went on, the whole mass became totally enervated and prostrate. Rome, once the terror of the world, was sacked by horde after horde of invaders, and finally trodden down helpless in the dust. In the Eastern Empire, the same process led to the like conclusion. The effeminate emperors were reduced at last, by cession after cession of province and territory, to purchase from their Ottoman enemies the breathing-time of a short truce. The military spirit had totally left them, and their manhood was destroyed. When at last their empire was reduced within the compass of a few miles round the triple wall of Constantinople, which was, even at that dark hour, defended mostly by mercenaries, Mahomet II., finding little now remained to give, took the rest, and with one blow of his iron mace dashed to pieces the remaining frag-

ment of the once splendid empire of the Romans in the East.

Such are ever the consequences of the loss of the military spirit by any nation, great or small. The story of all nations establishes this truth. The Turks themselves, at this moment, exhibit a counterpart of the nerveless Greeks whom they subjugated four centuries ago. The British inhabitants of these islands exhibited the same spectacle when forsaken by the Romans, who first emasculated them by conquest, and then left them to defend themselves. The result was the establishment of the Anglo-Saxon rule and institutions, and the almost extinction of the unhappy Celts, whom the Romans had left. Modern times present us with similar examples. Spain, the strongest and once the proudest country in the world, by the decay of national spirit has come to be the prey and prize of foreigners, who intrigue who shall rule her; the Dutch, after their heroic assertion of their independence both against Spain and France, have dwindled into a mere appendage to Prussia, as Flanders or Belgium has to France, and, as a military people, have actually become the laughing-stock of Europe; Italy, until yesterday, was in the same state, prostrate before Austria and France, and incapable of a manly or rational effort for the recovery of her rank amongst nations: and this must ever be the case, until the strong shall become philosophical enough to

spare the weak; until the grasping shall be too meek to rob the helpless; and until the ambitious shall be too high-minded to think of domination, or to run after the mighty shadow of a universal empire.

To many minds it is very certain that this assertion of the necessity of war, and of the certainty that military conflict, no less than earthquakes and inundations, forms part and parcel of the system of the government of the world, will and must appear revolting; but if such minds will inquire calmly and narrowly into this matter, they will at length come to see that, when fairly considered, and subjected to the scrutiny of rigid reasoning, war is much less of an evil than it appears, even in its direct and immediate results, and has also direct benefits that are overlooked. The grand error committed by those who, from a principle, no doubt, of humanity, argue against war is, that they assume at once, and as if it were a self-evident truth, that death in the abstract is an evil, and that therefore any system that involves the infliction of death must be bad also in the abstract, and also an evil *per se*. If we admit the premises, this conclusion unquestionably follows; but how can any reasoner possibly admit such premises? So far from death, in the abstract, being an evil, we must admit it to be a benefit, inasmuch as it is the appointed end of all men, without any exception, and clearly as much a part of the Divine scheme of creation as birth

is. Birth is the beginning of human existence: death is the conclusion here of that existence. Both are equally appointed by a benevolent Creator, and equally necessary; and the last happens to men, under all circumstances, at different periods of life, and by means infinitely varied; so that nothing is so true as that "in the midst of life we are in death;" so precarious is the tenure of human breath at all times, and in all places. To object to war, therefore, that it involves death, is to object to it for a reason which more or less applies to all conceivable or possible pursuits in which men can or do engage. The only difference between going to war and going to sea is, that in war the chances of losing life, or causing another to lose it, seem to be somewhat more in the one than in the other. In both pursuits it is almost certain that premature loss of life is to be the result; yet men go themselves to sea, and send others there, without compunction, and properly so. There is no *malice prepense* in the case. He who sends his son to sea, hopes he may escape; and he who educates his son for the military life, hopes the same. Neither does the soldier bear any malice individually against the enemies whom he is to encounter. All he contemplates is some national necessity for inflicting on others that to which they are liable in any case—a premature death by violence. It is, no doubt, difficult to view the voluntary infliction of death on

another as not an evil to him who is subjected to it. It is only so, however, because the natural instinctive horror of death, which the Creator, for obvious purposes, has implanted in all men, mixes itself in all our contemplations of this subject. All men instinctively shrink from death, if it threatens themselves; and the principle of sympathy causes us to view with a similar shrinking the infliction of death upon another. It needs no great stretch of logic, however, to show that this terror of death is merely intended to impel men to preserve their lives, and that it is not of the slightest weight in evidencing that death is any real evil in the abstract. How can it, in fact, be possibly demonstrated that the appointed end of life is an evil, or that its occurrence at one time rather than at another is bad, when, in the course of Providence, we daily and continually see men die, and die at all ages, and so prematurely, according to vulgar apprehension, that only a few arrive at old age, whilst the majority are removed during childhood, adolescence, or in what is termed the prime of life and strength, by the various casualties of accident or disease? All, then, that those do who become warriors, or embrace a military life, is to presuppose a state of affairs in which they may have to inflict a sudden death on others, or to be subjected to it themselves, for a great general purpose. But this men contemplate more or less on various other occasions. Physicians and surgeons must per-

petually face death by infectious disease, and risk inflicting it, and in a most painful way, on others. The clergy run similar risks in their own persons. In all executions for crimes under the law, the infliction of death is contemplated—and in all these cases properly, because the purpose is generally beneficial, and because it is a matter of the highest doubt whether any injury is really done, in any of these cases, to those whose death is involved. The great probability, in truth, seems to be, that in all cases of violent and cruel deaths, the injury is to the survivors—if injury there be—and not to the sufferer. Murderers injure society by keeping society in constant fear, resulting from the uncertainty of life being vastly added to were such deeds not punished; and therefore murderers are justly subjected to death. But in these cases the injury is really to the survivors, as well as the benefit. We can only predicate of those who die, that they have come to that end which, in some way or other, is allotted to all. He who inflicts death or agony wantonly and malignantly, injures his own mind, doubtless; but it is a question how far he can injure his victim. Nero in his cruelties brutified his own soul; but those whom he slew were, in some way, appointed to die; and the stone or the gout might have inflicted worse pangs than ever did the tyrant in his ferocity. Upon the whole, therefore, the peculiar dislike with which some men look on warfare—which

is only a necessary part of an imperfect state of being —arises from the imagination being strongly excited in such cases. The same is true of those who shrink from executions under the law. Our natural sympathies are in all cases against death. We all would, in all cases, save dying persons, had we the power; and hence, *prima facie*, war and capital punishment are revolting to all minds not well accustomed to contemplate them; and so are all surgical operations. If, however, we apply to the whole subject the test of reasoning, we shall at once perceive that much of what we apprehend is imaginary; that our natural instincts being, in these cases, opposed to what is done, constitutes really no argument against them; and that their entire necessity is as much a part of our progress from imperfection towards perfection, as are the various casualties, by flood or fire, which beset our path, and endanger our existence through life.

It has been asserted, by far too hastily, that the effects upon the mind, resulting from the practice of war, are injurious. Of this no proof has ever been adduced, and reason seems to lead us to a different conclusion. It is true enough that the military life is often the resort of the profligate, the lazy, the stupid, and the vain portions of the community. The profligate and lazy imagine that there they can avoid labour; the vain and stupid deem that by this means they may obtain a sort of eminence in dress and station, which

otherwise their qualities could never command. But these are fallacies and delusions; and of what value are the fallacies or follies of the foolish or the bad? The real question is—Whether men in general are, by military training and a military life, rendered worse than they would have been under other circumstances? This, however, all experience seems to negative. The essence of the military art is this—it is the perfection of combination, as applied to human force and courage, put in motion to some general end. Now, in this there is much to improve and to raise the character of a man; and, in the very act of warfare, there is not much of an opposite nature to deteriorate it. It is quite certain that military discipline has reduced to order and a reasonable subordination spirits that could never have been reduced to regularity by any more ordinary means; and it is equally certain that the military spirit, by inducing men to see great risks run for objects either really or ostensibly national, and inducing them so to risk themselves from a principle of abstract duty, tends to elevate them from mere selfishness, and the narrow consideration of individual interests as the whole of man's business in life. That these are the tendencies of the military education and practice it would be difficult to deny; nor is there any good cause for supposing that loss of life, consequent on the exercise of the soldier's profession, really hardens his heart or brutalises his passions. That

occasional scenes of rapine and brutality occur in warfare is certain. They, however, are few and far between. Discipline represses them, and the better spirits of an army condemn and shun them. The result, on the whole, is, that soldiers are in general more orderly, more cool, and fully as humane as other men, under circumstances that try men's tempers. The disciplined soldier is ever less disposed to use his weapons than the undrilled volunteer. The cruelties in war are rarely committed by those who fight. They are generally the effect of the passions of others let loose by some vicissitude in the contest, and are repressed and not encouraged by the troops and their generals whose successes may have caused them. In fact, we have no more warrant, either in reason or experience, for concluding that the soldier is dehumanised by being the cause of the loss of life by others, than we have to conclude that a surgeon, or a judge, or a juryman is so. All the four act on abstract motives the reverse of cruel; and, in society, all will be found to be as humane as their neighbours, and frequently of stronger minds, from the habit of controlling their feelings for the sake of some real or supposed abstract and general good.

That liberty and general happiness can only be preserved to a nation by the preservation of the military spirit, all history demonstrates. When defence is left to the mere mercenary troops of a community, these

troops become the tools of the ruling power, or else the masters. Hence all nations who have let slip the possession of arms, and the knowledge of military exercises and combinations, have become enslaved, first by their own rulers, and ultimately by foreigners. Thus the very dissensions, which the grand division of mankind into nations produces, are necessary to the creation of that spirit which, in each nation, preserves the lower from the unjust domination of the higher orders in a state; whilst out of those excesses of power, when they do occur, proceeds that increase of population which (as New England was settled by those who fled from the tyranny of the English Church, permitted by the Stuarts) goes to form new nations in other realms, and to produce younger and happier communities out of the very vices of the old and the effete. So sure is this truth, that, in the cultivation of the military spirit and art lies the happiness of nations in our present imperfect state, that it is observable, wherever it exists, even despotisms become harmless, as in Prussia; and where it is absent, even mild governments dwindle into imbecile and powerless tyrannies, as in Italy, and in some degree in Spain, nearly up to this day. The end is the interference of foreign powers, and all the results that flow from subjugation, according to the conduct of the victor, his humanity, and his policy.

Nor are we without analogies drawn from the

arrangements of the material world to illustrate this portion of the subject. If we look at the surface of different countries, and at the mineral wealth of others, we shall find that many of the most valuable productions, both of the surface and of the mines, have been primarily, in their original formation and occurrence, caused by elementary excesses, as we must now term them, during the earlier periods of the globe. Thus, at this day, the fruitfulness of Egypt is caused by the inundations of the Nile, and that of a large district of India by those of the Ganges and other great rivers. It is also certain that some of the fertile plains, both of the old and new world, are of alluvial origin, and owe their fertility to having been formerly drowned in water. That this is true of the plains of Poland no geologist doubts; and that such was the origin of the vast plain of the Texas in North, and the Pampas of South America, there is as little question. In all these cases, exuberance of vegetation and fertility of soil have arisen out of former submersion; and where the amphibious monsters of former and distant epochs once dived, waded, or swam, are now roaming and grazing immense and countless herds of cattle, or wide tracts of Indian corn are waving in the wind. From similar causes have arisen most of the mineral riches now available to man. To the violence of volcanic action we owe most of the metalliferous veins, whether of iron, gold, silver, lead, copper, or tin; and to the same origin we

must attribute the presence of most of the semi-metals in the places where they are found. To the decomposing and depositing action of still-water we must refer some of our other most valuable mineral products. There can be little or no doubt that the strata which now contain beds of coal, or of rock-salt, were for ages covered either by fresh-water lakes or by the ocean; and that coal especially is the product merely of wood carried down by rivers from age to age, and deposited in these lakes, to be again covered with other formations, the results of other changes, until the whole, in lapse of time, became dry land, the habitation of man, and the source of his comfort and his wealth.

Thus, out of inundation on one hand, or volcanic violence on the other, have been produced and deposited for the use of man some of the most valuable products of the earth which he inhabits. And by a process very nearly analogical have new nations and governments, new laws, improved national institutions, and the vindication and development of the rights of men as citizens, arisen out of wars and tyrannies, the fruits of the vices, the ambition, and crimes of the powerful.

In the next chapter we shall arrive at the consideration of the different moral checks to which the excesses of power, in the hands of a distinct class, have given rise. They are various; but, varied as they are, they constitute in reality only the necessary moral reaction and systematic resistance to which all excess of power

or tyranny of any kind must give rise. Whether the aggression be that of the holders of property against the poorer ranks, or of one ambitious and grasping nation against another less rapacious and less encroaching, the moral result is the same. A systematic mode of resistance and defence necessarily springs up, taking the shape sometimes of law, sometimes of treaty, sometimes of acknowledgment of rights, and sometimes of moral axioms. In whatsoever form it appears, however, it is one and the same thing—resistance to an excess of power in the shape of a moral check, legal, international, or religious ; and to these various phases of this systematic reaction we shall now turn.

CHAPTER IX.

THE CHECKS TO THE EXCESS OF POWER.—MORAL TEACHING.—INTERNATIONAL LAW.—CIVIL LAW.—THE LAWS FOR PROTECTION OF LIFE AND OF PERSON.—THE LIMITATION OF PROPERTY.—THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY.—TRADE, COMMERCE, THE ARTS AND SCIENCES.

ALTHOUGH it has been demonstrated, it is hoped, in the course of the foregoing argument, that, "rough-hew" our purposes as we may, there is a Divinity that ultimately "shapes" them, yet must not this impulsion or inducement of men's motives and actions irresistibly in certain directions, be confounded with that instinct which regulates the whole existence almost of the lower animals. Bees seem to live under a sort of commonwealth; but it is altogether an instinctive and mechanical one. The actions of birds, and the economy of the brute creation generally, are regulated in the same certain way. Reason has no share in their economy. It is always the same; it neither deteriorates nor improves. It is, in short, the result of a certain impulse—not the effect of a gradual and varying ratiocination. In the moral polity of mankind, reason, under certain limita-

tions, is allowed to modify the whole. It is true that, in certain given cases, men's wills are impelled or led in one certain direction, for the wisest purposes; but after this, reason steps in and rules. If excess takes place, the intellect of man invents and establishes moral checks against immoral excess, when such occurs. There is a perpetual moral antagonism between power and justice. It is the tendency of power to exceed. It is the province of religious and moral culture to check and regulate the action of power. From morality and religion thus employed springs all protective law, whether under the division of moral law, civil law, or the law of nations, or rather international law. The origin and results of these antagonist principles it is now the time to discuss in their proper order. Let us commence with moral teaching, and its results.

It must be evident to those who have reflected upon the necessary results of the division of mankind into various ranks—these ranks being proximately caused by inequality of property, and inequality of education and natural talents—that the balance of power has been, in all civilised countries, and must continue to be, on the side of the higher classes of mankind in every case. The soil of all civilised nations ultimately comes to be in the hands of a minority. The monied capital is also invariably in the hands of a minority. Where territorial and monied property are, there must the

means of education be. The reasons for all this, which inhere in the natural constitution of man, we have already seen. But besides this preponderance which property inevitably bestows upon its possessors, the minority have another advantage in their easier power of combination. They have leisure and means to act together, which the majority or poorer part of a population must ever want; they therefore always act in combination. The majority rarely ever do so; certainly never for any length of time. Thus, in the hands of the minority, in all countries, are placed the real elements of physical power; and the utmost the poor and scattered majority can hope to do is, to divide that power with them, or by some violent and spasmodic effort to subvert it for a short time, speedily by the law of nature to be again subjected to it. It is from this necessity that the moral checks have arisen. The monopolisers of the soil and capital of a country, were there no checks of any kind, might, by means of their wealth and union, exercise a power entirely despotic over the greatest portion of the remaining population. They might cause them to perish of hunger and cold, or such part of them as they willed so to perish. Were there no barrier between the passions and appetites of the landlords and capitalists of a country, and the working-classes of that country, nothing but some violent reaction could save, even for a season, those who depend on

labour alone, from oppression the most dreadful. Of this truth Ireland affords a partial but sad instance at this hour; and various other countries might be pointed out, in which the same fact is manifested with more or less of prominence. It has been a question often asked, *how* happens it that, whilst the union of the Scottish and English crowns has produced much happiness, the junction with Ireland has been followed by almost unmixed misery to the latter country? It is to be feared the answer is to be found in the different conduct of the ruling classes to those subjected to their power. In Scotland, although the aged and the poor have not been cared for as in England, yet the force of public opinion has prevented that utter and cruel neglect of them which for centuries characterised Ireland. In Scotland, also, the estates remained in the hands of their original possessors; in Ireland they were nearly all confiscated. In Scotland the national religion is established; in Ireland the establishment is abhorrent to the majority, whose faith, on the other hand, the ruling minority have tried vainly to suppress or discourage by penal enactments. From these collisions necessarily has arisen the grand mischief of a want of public opinion in Ireland, and of any strong religious or moral check upon the excesses of power. The owners of the land in Ireland also, have, at all times, by combining, been too strong for the British government, which has always been powerless really, to a

great degree, in that country. Hence Ireland has become a prey to the neglect of her landlords, who are mostly English noblemen; whilst the violent religious animosities between the upper and lower classes have destroyed public opinion, and the religious and moral checks embodied therein. Thus, that ill-fated country, delivered over to rack-renting middlemen and Orangemen on the one hand, and to the full influence of superstition in its most malevolent and worst form on the other, has, between them, been so reduced, both in temporal circumstances and mental independence, as to present a spectacle that sometimes astonishes the world; whilst Scotland, for centuries at war with her neighbour, England, now peacefully amalgamates with her once hated rival; enjoying the same equality of privileges, and upholding the same settled and balanced government. To alter this extreme position of society the moral checks are intended. Morality has taught men, with more or less of success, that it is not for the real happiness of any one to suffer stronger nations to oppress weaker nations; nor rich men to drive poor men to greater poverty and desperation; nor for men who have the power to inflict injury or pain, to inflict it, merely because they have the power. This is the foundation of all moral teaching. It is summed up in the admirable sentence of—"Do unto others as you would they should do unto you." This is the whole foundation of morality

condensed into one sublime sentence. But the necessity for this moral teaching has not less clearly arisen from the constitution of society itself. It is there, because it is the only barrier between those who are strong and those who are weak. Without it, anarchy and tyranny would alternate continually, and for ever, and without remedy. Morality, as enforced by religion, however, steps between. Men are taught to control their passions, and use, only for their own good and that of others, the powers, for good or for evil, which God may have placed in their hands. This is only to be made evident, of course, by a detailed investigation into the rise and progress of civil and international law. To this investigation let us now apply ourselves.

The definition of civil law agreed on by all who have written upon it is, that it is merely a code which has arisen out of the necessities of our common nature. It is, therefore, founded on the common sense of mankind, and is merely a national morality reduced to a system, and established in the form of laws. This, as far as I know, is not, as a general proposition, denied by any of the civilians. In this, Puffendorf, Grotius, Montesquieu, Locke, Paley, Vattel, Martens, and various others, whom I do not enumerate, all accord; and of the truth of this definition the rules of the general civil law of all civilised nations (for such, only, possess any written code of general civil law) afford ample testimony and proof. In all civilised nations,

the foundation of all civil law will be found to consist in a general limitation of the absolute rights of property. No individual, no portion of individuals, of any civilised community, has any absolute property. This is the foundation of civil law; because it arises necessarily out of the constitution of society, as we have traced that constitution, that the first step in modification of the extreme power which property gives its possessors, is to limit their power over that property, and to prevent its being absolute. Hence, in all civilised countries, property is only held mediately by individuals. It is in all civilised countries subject to the "dominion" of the king or the nation; which dominion is established for general purposes, and for the general good. Thus, in England, all land is held of the King; in the United States it is held of the President, acting for and in behalf of the nation. The "usufruct" is in the landlord, but the "dominion" is in the head of the executive government. And why is this? In order that it may be subjected to such taxes, imposts, rates, and tolls, as may be deemed necessary for the wellbeing of the community, or for the defence of that community. In this dominion we see the origin of poor-laws, provision-laws, and laws for founding public hospitals and charities of every sort and description. They are merely, in essence, a limitation of that absolute power which, otherwise, the possessors of property would have over those whose

property is labour only. Poor-laws, and provision-laws, and public hospitals, and refuges, and asylums for destitute persons, are only means to prevent persons without real or personal possessions being left to perish of hunger or cold by the neglect or cruelty of the holders of such property. Where such laws are established, the landlord may indeed dispossess his tenant, but he cannot doom him to starvation. That dominion which is the first feature of civil law steps in, and, by means of a provision for the poor, derived from rates laid upon property, rescues him. Thus, the first step is the moral limitation, by means of a law, of the extreme power of those who possess that property of a country which is tangible. To the poor is given an ultimate but invaluable *lien* upon it. They become part owners in the last resort; and the "usufruct" that remains to the owner is only that which is left after the claims of the poor and destitute have been satisfied. Such is the first step of civil law; that step being a limitation, in favour of the community, of the absolute and extreme power of the possessors of the territory and money of a country.

The mere preservation of the destitute is only a small part, however, of that protection which those whose only means of living are their labour must ever need. The teachers of morality, with Christ at their head, have no doubt taught us that charity, or the relief of all in need, is the first of virtues; and rightly

have they taught us this, because all the rest are based upon it. What room for the exercise of *virtue* can there possibly be until we have secured this grand point—that none shall be suffered to die, in the first instance, of hunger or cold? This once secure, there is time, and there is room, for the display of other virtues, and the performance of other duties. Moral teachers and doctors of civil law have, therefore, here agreed, and placed charity, or the legal protection of those who depend on labour, in the front rank of morality, and in the front rank of the civil code. This being done, however, it was time to proceed further; for much more than this sort of protection is wanted by all civilised communities to insure peace, safety, and happiness. Life is to be sure first to be protected, but after life comes the person. If a man be not protected in his personal liberties, his life is of little value; for, of what value is life to the slave? and what is he who possesses no personal protection but a slave to all stronger than he? Hence, as soon as mankind have been convinced of the propriety of submitting, for the sake of the happiness of all, rich as well as poor, to a system of laws binding on all, we find that, next to the preservation of life, "the rights of persons" have been declared and vindicated. And this order arises naturally out of the position of society which has been already described and adverted to. For if, after the power of the holders of property

over the lives of others had been checked, no check had been applied to the power of such over the persons of others, violent reaction and temporary anarchy must, in that case, have also necessarily followed. If he who is so bound to preserve their lives could do what he pleased with the persons of those whom he succoured, such succour would be little of a boon. Without protection to persons, all wickedness short of deliberate murder or deprivation of life, may, of course, be perpetrated. In all civilised codes, therefore, laws protecting the person are only second to laws protecting the life. Hence, mutilation, maiming, rape, violent assault, arbitrary imprisonment, and duress of every kind, are highly punishable under the codes of all advanced communities; and, in all nations where persons in power have been suffered to violate these rights systematically, reaction has ever followed. Of this truth, all history teems with examples. It would be endless to enumerate them. The Old Testament abounds with them; and the annals of other nations in this only corroborate those of the Jews. The great French Revolution is the most recent example—and one of the most striking — how surely privileged despotism, on the part of the higher ranks, is followed by reaction at last on the part of those thus oppressed.

Life and person being secured as far as might be by law, much still remains, and has always remained, to be done in advanced communities to secure harmony

and happiness amongst the members of such communities. There still remains to be checked the excess of that overpowering and pervading desire for the acquisition of wealth, which we have seen is implanted for the best of purposes in all breasts; but which, being one of the most common, and at the same time strongest, excitements to which the mind of man is subject, must be, and is, constantly liable to run to excess. The desire of gain is, in fact, one of the few passions that never can be satisfied. It dies only with the man, and together with him can only be extinguished. Hence this passion is in perpetual operation in all living individuals, and is more liable to run to excess because it is always restless, and never satisfied. Hence it happens that the possessors of property are in as much danger from each other as from the poor, and that men are as liable to be plundered by their wealthy as by their destitute neighbours. And thus it comes to pass that the checks in shape of law, necessary to the protection of the goods and chattels of individuals, are far more complicated and multifarious than those relating to the rights and immunities of life and of person. Out of the desire evinced by men to lay hold of the goods and properties of others by force or fraud, have arisen, not only much of the criminal law—embracing the statutes against highway robbery, burglary, theft, larceny, and forgery, and fraud in all their varieties—

but also the whole law of property, embracing the regulation of titles, conveyances, mortgages, inheritance, liens, reservations, rent-charges, and descents; and also the regulations necessary to the validity of all written instruments and securities, such, in the first instance, as wills, settlements, and conveyances, and next such as bonds, deeds of sale, bills of exchange, promissory notes, and receipts for money paid. Of this complicated code—partly criminal and partly civil—the essence really is to check the excesses of that acquisitiveness, or eager pursuit of gain or accumulation, without which society would not go on at all, but which is more liable to be carried to an injurious extent than any other of the excitements which stimulate men to action. Hence, immediately after charity and benevolence, moral teachers place honesty and the respect for property as the next in importance. To violate life, person, or property is, according to the lawyer, the moralist, and the divine, to come within the category of "infamous crime" or "felony." Beyond this, though there are many excesses which the moralist and divine justly class as heinous, with regard to the individuals who commit them—such as adultery, drunkenness, slander, envy, falsehood, pride, &c.—yet, as regards society, these crimes are placed by common consent in the fourth degree; and this because they do not strike at the foundations of the social system, and, though serious, are not deadly sins against the

community. To check these aberrations is, therefore, principally left to the divine and to the moralist. With their teaching here the law interferes lightly and seldom; and, generally, only when a pecuniary damage can be proved to have been sustained, and its amount determined.

Such are the checks, legal and moral, to which the inevitable excesses of the powerful by rank and by wealth give rise. They are the fruits of the reason which the Creator has given to man, to enable him, by means of moral teaching, to induce the powerful to see the necessity of, and to submit to, checks upon his own power; which power would, without such check, be destructive ultimately to himself as well as to others. The checks of civil law are, however, framed with the aim and design only to protect the weak of a nation against the strong, the simple against the astute, and the timid against the overbearing and rapacious members of a community. Beyond this, there remains much for the moralist, much for the divine, and much for the lawyer and politician to do. The excesses we have considered are those of individuals against others of the same nation. There remain to be treated the aggressions of nations against each other, which spring from similar causes, and are to be met by countervailing checks of a sort not very dissimilar.

We have hitherto, as is observed above, treated

only of the checks to those excesses which arise from the unbridled wills and short-sighted and selfish policy of those having power over a nation towards their poorer and weaker brethren. But, beyond this, we now have to consider of another kind of excess—that of one powerful nation guilty of aggression towards another deemed to be less powerful. Nations, we have already seen, are like individuals. The consciousness of power in individuals too often leads to the selfish and tyrannous use of that power; it is the same with nations—moral checks, however, in the last case, being much more difficult to be discovered. The reason of this is obvious. In all nations, some code of law, or custom, or prescription exists, to which, in case of individual aggression or lapse, appeal can be made. In even the rudest country, some decision can be arrived at—some judicature, however rude, be appealed to—some judge be found who shall decide between parties upon some ground of usage or law. Consequently there is, in all individual disputes or feuds, of all descriptions and in all regions, a third party strong enough to vindicate the law or custom, (be it what it may,) and so end the division. Betwixt nation and nation there is, however, no such third party to whom or to which appeal can be made. This is the first difficulty. The second is, that in the disputes of nations, any decision upon *a priori* grounds, whether of reason or usage, is morally

impossible. Claims of territory, for instance, are often incapable of being decided by reason, and equally so by usage. Prior discovery is so vague a matter, that, excepting in cases of small islands, the doubts and difficulties are insurmountable. Columbus discovered America, but did that give Spain a right to that quarter of the globe? If it did not, then how much of the new world does the discovery by Spain entitle her to claim? These are questions no man can decide. Equally impossible is it to determine whether the occupation of one coast of a country entitles the occupier to *claim through* to the opposite coast within the same parallels. Does the occupation of Canada give England a claim to the west coast of America northward beyond the forty-ninth parallel of latitude? Does the occupation of all the eastern coast of North America, as far south as the Gulf of Florida, enable the United States to claim all the western region lying between the *twentieth* and *forty-ninth* parallels of north latitude? These questions cannot be decided by any reasoning; nor can any general regulations be laid down by means of which such questions may be solved. Every case has merits of its own, and eludes reasoning from analogy or similitude of circumstance. Hence, in many of the disputes between nation and nation, there is neither usage nor law to which to appeal, nor umpire nor judge to decide between the disputants. It is a

litigation for which no court can be found; and if the parties themselves cannot peaceably decide it, no other human power can do so. From this has arisen that portion of civil law which is called "the law of nations;" and from the frequency of these disputes, and the wars arising out of them, has arisen that other portion of civil law which treats of the rights and duties of citizens towards, and with regard to, the state. These portions of civil law are of a much more difficult and abstract nature than is that parcel of it which defines the duties of men to each other; and it is all the more so, because it has pleased God not to have made either the law of nations, or the rights and duties of citizens with regard to and towards the state, any direct portion of religious revelation or instruction. It has been left to man's reason, unaided, to work out and solve these difficult problems; and when the origin of these portions of civil jurisprudence is investigated, they will be found to be the conclusions of human reason providing checks for the excesses of the rulers of nations towards other nations, or towards their own subjects; these excesses taking the shape of unjustifiable foreign wars, or domestic despotism in shape of law. Let us proceed with this investigation; and in doing so, let us, as most convenient for the argument, take the last-named first.

It may seem strange, on a first view, to venture to

affirm that the beneficent Creator should, as it were, purposely, and as part of a grand plan and scheme of moral government, have left the causes likely to provoke national warfare environed with so many difficulties as to their settlement, that in all ages national hostilities have been common, constant, and unavoidable events. This, on a first view, must and does seem somewhat strange; but when we consider the many benefits that, beyond question, arise out of the state of warfare, this wonder will subside. Some of these, especially that relative to population, we have already considered. We have seen that the spread of the race of mankind over the globe has been mainly helped forward by that prolific stimulus which any hardship, whether arising out of domestic oppression or the ravages of war, always produces. But out of the state of war another benefit has arisen to mankind, which may be now not improperly brought under view. If we consider the enormous power which the possession of the real property of a country must and does give the possessors, we must perceive that, to make men part with such a power as this, the strongest possible motives must be required. Morality, especially as enforced by religion, has no doubt vast influence upon the actions of men; but, as has been before observed, the Christian religion has not directly interfered to teach men their duties as citizens of a state; and to demonstrate these duties to the ordinary

apprehension of mankind is a more difficult and abstruse process than is the teaching of the ordinary moral duties of life, with most of which the sympathies of our common nature are associated. Thus, for instance, there is no great difficulty in convincing men's reason as to the excellence of charity amongst men. All admit it. But to teach that exalted love of country which convinces powerful men that they must greatly limit that power in favour of those whose position renders them subject to its sway, is one of the grandest triumphs of human reason, and one, of course, of the last. All the feelings incident to powerful men are enlisted against such a conclusion; and there is surely great reason to doubt whether ever unassisted moral ratiocination would have been equal to such a task. An auxiliary, however, was at hand; and this auxiliary was the necessity of common defence against the aggressions of hostile and neighbouring nations. Out of this necessity it seems very clear that the recognition of the rights of citizenship must have mainly risen. In all cases of national aggressions, the defence of those who have property must mainly rest upon those who have it not. The poor are the soldiers who protect the rich. It is, beyond a doubt, their duty to do this; for the first duty of every man is unquestionably to defend his country. This must be admitted; because, if it be denied, then everything else is given up in that denial; for if a community

perishes or is enslaved, all perishes together. Still, however, this duty is clearly a conditional one. There must be rights coupled with such a duty, else the ground upon which we set out is cut from under us; for a man who has no rights has really no country. To be part of "a community," a man must hold and enjoy rights "in common" with others. But to a man without rights, there can, of course, be no community; and if there be no community in his case, he cannot be called upon in duty to defend that which is not. This is a *reductio ad absurdum*, from which escape is impossible. The word "country," or "community," then, presupposes rights in common; these rights being equal laws, and protection for life and person. Thus, then, the rights of citizenship are compelled by the necessity of common defence to be the condition of the citizen's allegiance; of which allegiance the obligation to risk life, and limb, and goods, in the common defence, is the principal feature. Under this beneficent necessity, we see the powerful impelled to make conditions with those who, under other circumstances, would be subjects of their power. These conditions have, of course, in all ages of the world, varied with the state of civilisation and knowledge in each country. In the earlier ages, and amidst imperfect knowledge, they are scanty and rude. As knowledge deepens and extends, they become more stringent and extensive, until at last they come to comprehend the

whole political and civil rights of the citizen of a free state—a voice in making the laws—admission to all offices of state—and everything which tends to preserve those who are at the bottom of society from undue pressure on the part of those who are at the top.

Thus, then, from this check, which arises out of the very constitution of our nature, to the possible excesses of the powerful, we really derive all that portion of the law which, in civilised communities, recognises and regulates the rights and duties of the citizens. From this arise the militia laws, the laws of conscription, the levy of the *posse comitatus*, the custom of impressment, the law of *landwehr*, and of the *levée en masse*—in short, the entire of that code which, in Europe, and in other quarters of the globe, creates an armed body of men for national defence. From this arises the right of the franchise, where it exists; the right of publicly meeting to discuss political questions; the right of petitioning the sovereign; the rights of the press; the laws of libel; the law of *habeas corpus*; the right of jury trial, and of two witnesses to convict of the overt act of treason; with various other laws, which cannot, in this place, be properly enumerated. That these laws are amongst the most important of all ever enacted by the consent of mankind, is quite undeniable. It is manifest, however, that they have been caused principally, if not entirely, by the reac-

tion which the tendency to aggression between nation and nation has produced; and that without it, or the apprehension of it, there is hardly a possibility of conceiving that these laws could have existed. Nor is this truth at all invalidated by the fact that protection for person, to a very high extent, and also for property, as well as for some of the rights of citizens, existed under the feudal system, as established in Europe for centuries. They did so because the feudal system was, in its essence, a system of mutual and national defence; and, in order to bind to it in fealty all who were necessary to its efficiency and integrity, the *virtual* exercise of many—indeed of most—of these privileges was necessary. As the harsher features of that system were gradually mitigated, the present municipal codes of Europe and America gradually took their place; both arising out of one necessity—that of defence against national aggression, and the vindication of national rights and immunities against foreigners.

It is not only, however, in the necessity of defence that we find the origin of the various municipal codes which exist in the world, and which are to be discovered, in a more or less perfect state, amongst all but the rudest people. Another code of law, not less important, has taken rise from the same source; and one which has called into exercise some of the most splendid intellects amongst human beings. This code

is that of "international law," commonly so called. The "law of nations" may be properly defined to be a code of unwritten or common law existing amongst civilised nations; which unwritten code has arisen plainly out of the state of war, its exigencies and circumstances. By means of this code, the authority of which rests solely upon the common sense of mankind, many of the evils of the belligerent state are mitigated, and many prevented. Under the law of nations are included the provisions of the rights of belligerents, the rights of neutrals, and all treaty rights, as well as those territorial rights, or rights of occupancy of any place, or exercise of any pursuit that depend upon priority. By means of this code, the lives and properties of those not actually employed in warfare are, for the most part, protected; by means of this code, persons engaged in hostilities, submitting on conditions, have a right to the fulfilment of such conditions; by means of this code, the property and lives of persons belonging to neutral countries are protected in the midst of hostilities; and, by means of this code, the claims to new countries, to the navigation of rivers, to the enjoyment of fisheries, &c., are settled, as far as things so uncertain can be determined by any code whatsoever, which has no ruling power to enforce its provisions. Out of this, of course, arise many of those pursuits, offices, and distinctions, which are most cultivated and sought after by mankind. In order to

enforce it, diplomatists, ambassadors, and civilians must be employed; and in their hands rest the most important offices, in some respects, of a state. It may, indeed, be said that, were there no war, no diplomacy or national law could be necessary; but this is a fallacy. Whether hostilities be presupposed or not, questions of international importance must be settled; and many of them would have arisen had men never dreamed of such a state as that of warfare. The rights of discovery—the rights of fishery—the rights of navigation, both of inland seas and of rivers —must be decided, whether we presuppose warfare as a possible state or not. But it often happens that the evidence on both sides is so dubious that no satisfactory decision can be come to. In such case, it seems impossible for the mind to conceive any other possible decision than that of war. In many cases, no nation can submit to an arbitration by a third: first, because it is impossible to find an impartial third; next, because so vital and so dubious at once are the points in question, that, to one party or the other, any decision must appear to be too unjust and partial to be submitted to. In such cases, all that war does, is to decide that which cannot be decided in any other way, but which must yet be determined in some way; in all other cases the law of nations is efficient. In preserving a balance of power—in securing weaker nations against the ambition of stronger—in mitigat-

ing the excesses of belligerents—and in the vindication of admitted frontier and boundary rights, it is of force immense; if it fails, it only does so because, for wise purposes, almost all human expedients are short of their ends, and require to be amended by other expedients. Its benefits are not, however, therefore the less certain; and from the very limitation of those benefits we find others spring, which, but for such providential limitation, mankind might not have been enabled to enjoy.

There is another check to the excess of power in the minority, which may be not improperly mentioned in this place, although it does not come under the category of moral teaching. This check, and an effectual one it no doubt has proved, is commerce. In the simpler states of society, men are much more independent of each other than they are in a complex state of society. The individual, in a simple state, has few wants, and fewer luxuries. He can, mostly, by his own skill and energy, satisfy and obtain both. Hence he is a more isolated being than is the refined man, with multiform wants and innumerable luxuries—to satisfy or arrive at which he must have the assistance of others; and thus it comes to pass that, in all highly-civilised nations, trade necessarily forms a middle class, which stands as an intermediate bulwark between the unprotected poor and the wealthy and noble. The process by which this is effected is not difficult to be

traced. The savage chief is the artificer of his own wigwam, of his own weapons of warfare, and of his own hunting and fishing implements and tackle; he carves his own calumet; and his squaw manufactures his fur clothing, his cap of feathers, his wampum belt, his mocassins, and helps to build his canoe, and make his paddles and nets;—consequently, the chief of a savage tribe is independent of those around him. He needs to patronise no handicraftsman, no architect, no boat-builder, no artist. He needs neither butcher, baker, tailor, mason, nor weaver. He cares not for trade or tradesmen, arts or artists, for he knows them not, and needs them not. Hence, he truly rules his tribe; for he needs not the aid of one of them, either for necessaries or luxuries. The rude feudal baron was little better. He knew no trade but war, and no luxury but plain hospitality and the chace; hence he, too, was independent of crafts and craftsmen. Refinement, however, makes men necessary to each other; and, so far, is a check upon rude tyranny. As luxury grows, trade, commerce, crafts, and the arts and sciences, become necessary to the comforts of the powerful and the great. Hence a middle, and considerably independent, class is created. Crafts become incorporated into free companies of free-burgesses, having certain privileges. Free cities, ports, and entrepôts are created. Foreign commerce is added to home trade, and the mercantile community

is added to that of craftsmen, artists, and men of science. Literature goes hand in hand with all these; and, from the whole, a powerful body is formed, which the great are forced to respect—partly because they fear them, and partly because they are necessary to them. Between nations, commerce exercises the same effect. As they become necessary to each other, by the production of different commodities, amity becomes of more value, and warfare more distasteful. Hence commercial nations have often lost the military spirit so far as to become the prey of the warlike. Tyre was destroyed. So, at last, was Carthage. Venice fell without a struggle, after centuries of glory; and Holland became a trading kingdom after setting out as a warlike republic. Such are the ill consequences of all extremes. Commerce ought to soften the military spirit, but not extinguish it; and trade and the arts make men friends, without emasculating them into slaves.

Such are the various moral checks to the excesses of power in the higher divisions of rank amongst mankind. Excepting the last treated of, they all resolve themselves into moral teaching, and are the check of reason and of conscience, against the excesses of unbridled passion encouraged by power and opportunity. Between the government of the material and of the moral world, by means of this arrangement, there also exist strong analogies. The whole of the material

world presents a system of checks. Great elemental actions are commenced, but they are stopped or diminished by others which are constantly opposed to them. Thus we see constant and continual decomposition neutralised by recomposition. Sand or earth becomes stone; and stone again sand or earth alternately. Upon some coasts the ocean encroaches upon the land; but this is recompensed elsewhere by the land gaining upon the sea. Volcanic action appears to have gone on almost everywhere; but it has been nearly everywhere, after a time, arrested in its course, and the volcano has become extinguished. The sun is perpetually drawing up water, in the shape of vapour and mist, from the earth's surface; but this process is checked by condensation, and the consequent descent of rain and dew. Amongst mineral substances and gaseous fluids, the same decomposition and recomposition perpetually exists. Carbon is set free in the shape of carbonic acid gas, and absorbed again by substances to which it has affinity—again to be freed and be reabsorbed. Water is decomposed into its component fluids, oxygen and hydrogen gas—again to be recomposed into the liquid water. The metals are thrown out, pure from nature's crucible, in various parts of the globe, to be again oxydised, or compounded in a metallic ore. It is needless, though it would be easy, to multiply examples. In the moral world the process is analogous. Power and passion,

instead of being triumphant, are checked at all points. The necessity of defence from others who are strong and rich, limits the exercise of the self-will of strength and wealth. Property stoops to limitations. The person of the weak is safe from the hand of the strong; and the poor man's cottage in time becomes his castle. Morality is taught by necessity to the most opulent and powerful; and morality becomes law. The *lex communis*, or unwritten common law, comes first. That again is digested into "a code." Commerce extends refinement, which in its turn again extends commerce; and the result of the whole is a further softening of manners, and another victory for morality, courtesy, and forbearance. In the material world the check is by one substance acting upon another, and being again acted upon; in the moral world, the check is by reason acting upon the will. One is impulsive or chemical; the other moral and logical action. The analogy between the two, however, runs throughout, and may be traced throughout the whole. Both are equally certain and necessary in their efficiency and results; but one is a physical necessity, whilst the other is a moral certainty. In both, the finger of the divine Governor of all is equally apparent—one to the visible eye, and the other to the intelligent mind, of him who contemplates both.

CHAPTER X.

CHECKS TO THE EXCESS OF POWER CONTINUED.—THE CHECK OF RELIGION, TRUE OR FALSE.—THE CHECK OF SUPERSTITION, PROPERLY SO CALLED.

THERE is, we believe, no well-authenticated instance of any tribe or community of people, however barbarous, having been discovered, who were totally destitute of all traces of religion. In some tribes, as amongst the Hottentots, these traces are exceedingly faint; in others, as amongst the Australian aborigines, they are hardly discernible: still, considering the want of acquaintance with their language and habits by those who visit them, we have hardly a right to conclude even these wretched tribes to be destitute of all religious or superstitious notions. Amongst the Polar Esquimaux, notions of a religious tendency, though dreadfully rude, undoubtedly exist. Amongst the native New Zealanders, superstition is deeply implanted; and amongst the inhabitants of the Polynesian groups, religious observances are everywhere found. Yet these are the wildest and

most primitive tribes of which we have knowledge. Amongst the wildest Africans and Asiatics, superstitious or religious observances universally exist; and all the Indians of America—from Patagonia and Terra del Fuego, to Coppermine River and the shores of the Northern Polar Basin—acknowledge and practise them. The obvious question is, Why is this? The answer is, Because religion is necessary to man; because religion is part of the scheme of the Almighty Creator, who, however dimly, reveals Himself even to the lowest of His human creatures, and establishes some intercourse with them.

Religion, then, in some shape or mode, is universal amongst nations; and in all its forms, from the rudest Pagan superstitions up to Christianity, there is one peculiarity to be observed, and that is, that religion, however gross may be the superstition, is always allied, more or less, to morality of some kind. Amongst the most savage nations we find rudiments of a belief that there is a higher power which discourages wickedness, and must be propitiated by its opposite. A morality, however defective, is ever allied to religion, however defective. So strong is this principle, that even those who dissent from the faith of the country of which they are natives, hardly ever are induced to set at nought the morality taught by the very faith which they disbelieve. The educated Deist acknowledges the morality of the Gospel; nor does even the

Atheist renounce it ; and, in point of fact, those who are styled "infidels" in religion, in any country, may be rather described as men who, from peculiarities of thinking or of character, choose to invent a religion of their own, than as men void of religion : for so necessary is religion to human comfort and happiness, that it is difficult to believe that there ever existed any human being who was totally and completely devoid of it. Even the Atheist, (if there be such a thing,) who founds morality upon some accidental "fitness of things," by that very act acknowledges the difference between virtue and vice ; and allows that one is to be shunned and the other embraced. Neither does he deny that the same chance which placed him here may also place him in some future state of existence. Even the Atheist, then, cannot be said to be devoid of all religion and all morality ; whilst, in all others, the existence of both, in some form or modification, is undoubted. Religion, then, is a universal principle, and it as universally exists in company with some moral code which it teaches and enforces—the morality being the basis, the religion the sanction.

It may possibly be objected here, that these propositions imply that all forms of religion are more or less established by Providence; and it must be owned that they do imply thus much. When carefully and calmly examined, however, there is not much at which to hesitate in such an assertion. We see that, under all

circumstances in which man is placed, it is his doom only to arrive by slow steps at the truth. This is the law of his being. He sets out uncivilised, he becomes civilised; and in religion, as upon every other subject of human knowledge, a man must have advanced far in civilisation before he can even understand the terms by the use of which exalted religion can alone be taught. We cannot teach abstruse science to a savage. Neither can we teach a perfect religion to a savage. He must be civilised in order to apprehend the terms in which the first principles of either are to be conveyed. Thus, then, it seems to result that the rude forms of religion or superstition, which we see existing amongst barbarous and semi-barbarous nations, are such alone as they are capable of understanding. They are the rude preparations for a purer faith; and we see accordingly, if we read aright the history of the world, that as men have become less barbarous, so has their religion. It is probable that the grossest and rudest of the heathen mythologies supplanted some religious system still more rude and imperfect. It is certain that the religion of Mahomet took the place of creeds much more impure and less refined; and thus man gradually becomes fit for the reception of a perfect system of faith and morality, which, without such schooling, he never could have understood. The evidences of Christianity, as taught by modern divines, would have been totally unintelligible to the most intellectual Druid,

and they are all but unintelligible even to the most learned Bonze or Brahmin. The mind, in fact, must be civilised up to a certain point before it can understand them, and when that point is reached it embraces them. No man who has arrived at the point of civilisation which enables him to appreciate the religion of Christ, ever doubted its superiority to all other forms of faith. It is no answer to this to say that men have doubted the Divine origin of Christianity. There is nothing that men of subtle minds have not doubted; but no sane man ever preferred the religion of Buddha, or Brahma, or Fo, or Confucius, or Mahomet, to that of Christ, being sufficiently intelligent to appreciate them all. Even the intellectual and learned infidel is thus far a Christian, that he acknowledges the superiority of Christian morality, and also acknowledges that, as an institution, it was intended by Providence to answer the purposes which are answered by it. He objects alone to its finality—an objection more metaphysical than practical. He insists that there is yet room for the supposition that a more perfect religion than that of Christ may possibly be in reserve for a later age. He does not pretend, however, to know anything more perfect, and acquiesces in all the moral commands of its Founder. Nay, he even goes beyond this, for he acknowledges that the evidences of its truth are strong enough to answer the purpose intended—that is to say, the conviction of all who need it. Thus, then, even

the Deist admits that Christianity is practically true, and that by its precepts his own practice is modified. Under other and false forms of faith the same scepticism takes place, with the same or nearly similar results. The secret Deist in Turkey obeys the rule of Mahomet for the most part in his practice, and acknowledges that faith to be necessary for others, which for himself he rejects. Thus, then, in all states of society, religion is practically dominant. The few dissentients move really, in action, with the stream; and whilst they reject the spiritual, admit the practical forms of faith.

This being admitted, it seems to follow that religion must everywhere act as a check on the excesses of power, because the rudest religions are based upon some notions, however crude, of morality and virtue. Whether the notions entertained be worthy the title of "religious" or "superstitious," we may predicate this of them all, that they embody some glimmerings, however faint, of a future state of being, of the existence of a power or powers superior to man, and of his possible responsibility, in some state of life to come, to those powers. In the wild superstitions of the New Zealanders, the Otaheitans, and all the Polynesian tribes, we may trace something of the agency of spiritual powers, of punishment for crime and impiety, and of some future condition of existence. Amongst the most stupid and benighted of the human race seem

to be the nomadic natives of Australia; yet even amongst these a closer intercourse has traced some faint vestiges of a religion, and some rude outlines of the form of a deity, indistinct indeed and cloudy, but still discoverable. There exists, in fact, no nation devoid of awe of the supernatural; and this fear of unseen agency is the germ of religion in its deadest state, and before it has begun to vegetate into the organised plant, which it afterwards becomes. If we ascend a little higher, we arrive at once at some system, however wild, of religion and morality. The mythologists of Greece and of Rome, the worshippers of Odin, the votaries of Buddha, Fo, Brahma, and Confucius, all teach with more or less of purity, as it may happen, some notions of supreme power, of future existence, and human responsibility. They draw, however erroneously in some points, the line of distinction between vice and virtue, and essay to set up landmarks between rectitude and crime. They offer rewards to the good, and threaten the wicked with retribution. Some of these ancient faiths are lost in obscurity, and the remains of others are misconstrued. Under the apparent gross mythology of ancient Egypt, and the older Thebes, it seems probable, nay certain, that a purer *esoteric* doctrine, now lost, was really hidden. Nor are there wanting probabilities that the ancient Druidical worship was a system of Theism pure, not very dissimilar from that of Zoroaster and of ancient

Judea. It is certain that the Romans, tolerant in all else, and towards all other systems of faith, persecuted both to the uttermost. This probably arose from the incompatibility of these systems of a purer Theism with the grosser mythologies then in vogue. The fate of the Guebres or Tsabaists of Persia is an instance of the same sort. That they must all have acted more or less as a check on unbridled powers, seems quite certain. Amongst the most ancient traditions of Celtic usages are to be found traces of laws which afterwards became common in Europe. Charity and hospitality were enjoined by them, and the claims of the poor thus early vindicated, against the selfishness of wealth or the hardheartedness of power.

But there is another process by which religion acts as a check to power, to which we must now advert, and this is by the necessary political power of a priesthood. In almost all nations, whether rude or civilised, a close inquiry will convince us that the natural tendency of a priesthood is to be antagonistic of the governing power. Religion naturally constitutes an *imperium in imperio*. The priesthood, by means of their spiritual influence, divide the government of the people with the other ruling powers. Hence, in most nations, as far as history is to be relied upon, the priesthood have generally been supported by popular opinion against the monarch, and the aim of all kings and all ministers has been consequently to enslave

religion. The causes of this are obvious. Self-preservation must teach the ministers of all forms of faith to lean towards the people, who are the grand supports of their privileges. Their power resides in public opinion, and this necessarily tends to induce them to lean to those whose united sentiments go to form that opinion. On the other hand, the monarch and the aristocracy, brooking no interloper in the possession of power, must ever secretly be inclined to subvert the free influence of a hierarchy. Of this we see traces in the history of all countries. The Bonzes of China and the Brahmins of India exemplify it. The history of the Jews, as given in the Old Testament, abounds with instances of this principle. The history of Saul and Samuel is one. Under the Mohammedan dispensation, the same natural tendency of a division of government between the spiritual and the temporal powers is apparent. "The Ulema" must be consulted on all questions of peace or war, and on all occurrences of doubtful or critical policy. In the Ulema resides the spiritual power of the empire, and to them is intrusted the task of expounding and laying down from the Koran the law as delivered by the Arabian prophet. By this even the sultan is bound; and hence it is a mistake to suppose either that the Turkish government is a pure despotism, as is generally and vulgarly thought, or that the law resides in the breast of the Sultan. Of the same construction was the

government of ancient Russia. The patriarch and his clergy were consulted on all questions of peace and war, and on all great occasions of state policy. In Russia, however, as also in France and in Germany, the state at length succeeded in mastering the church; and when this has been the case, the people have ever been more or less oppressed.

If we cursorily examine, first, the earlier history of the Christian religion, as given in the records of the Catholic Church, and, next, the more modern annals of France and of Great Britain, we shall find copious and most demonstrative exemplifications of the truth of this great principle scattered throughout almost every age. Of the immense influence which the Christian hierarchy soon began to obtain, under the Roman emperors, the history of the resistance made by St Ambrose, then Bishop of Milan, to the Emperor Theodosius II., is a pregnant instance. The interdict laid upon the tyrant Andronicus by Synesius, the Bishop of Ptolemais, and its amazing success, is another example. The annals of the later Roman empire abound with proofs of the potency of this influence, and the medieval histories both of France and of England exhibit varied evidence of the force of this check upon the power of princes. The efforts of St Dunstan to assert the supremacy of the Church are familiar to all who know even the outlines of our Saxon annals. The life of Charles Martel, King of France,

instances some of the results of the same power; but perhaps the finest instance of all is the noble struggle made by St Thomas à Becket, not only for the Church, but for the infant liberties of his Anglo-Saxon countrymen, against the tyrannical aims of that able but ambitious and rapacious despot, Henry II. There needs to be little doubt in the mind of any one conversant with the *minutiæ* of Becket's history and correspondence, together with that of John of Salisbury, and others of his friends and adherents, that Becket's motives and acts were more political than religious. From the age of the energetic and able St Dunstan, down to the Norman Conquest, the Church had been rapidly growing in strength and wealth. The success of the audacious William the Bastard checked this dominancy, but did not destroy it. The Pope had declared in favour of William's claims, and against the title of Harold II., and hence William and his immediate successors on the throne of England refrained from active measures against the influence of the Anglican Church, now a most potential body. At last Henry II., alarmed by the popular influence which the Church possessed, and detesting those Anglo-Saxon usages of freedom which the Church was rapidly reviving, resolved, by means of an aristocratic convention at Clarendon, and the constitutions then presented and agreed upon, to destroy both the privileges of the clergy and the Anglo-Saxon usages, which now

depended upon each other for preservation. Nothing prevented this but his mistaken estimate of the character of his great and extraordinary favourite Becket, now chancellor of the kingdom, but whom he compelled the clergy of Canterbury to elect for their archbishop, in furtherance of his black design. Becket, who was an Anglo-Saxon by the father's side, and a learned lawyer, resisted, as archbishop, those designs of Henry, to which, as chancellor, he (if acquainted with them) offered no opposition. As chancellor he would have been powerless to resist; as archbishop he proved omnipotent; and after a long struggle, the result of which is known to all readers of history, he sealed with his blood, not only the supremacy of the Church, but of the free Anglo-Saxon institutions of his country. Thus, by means of the counterpoise of religion and a hierarchy, were the liberties of England really won and established. The wringing of Magna Charta from John was only a counterpart of the struggle of Becket—with the exception that the Church and the Primate Langton were supported by the very barons who opposed Becket. As a further proof of the truth of this principle, it is to be observed that it was not until the Anglican and the Gallican Churches were modified and changed—one by Philip le Bel, and the other by Henry VIII.—that despotism could make head either in England or in France. One act paved the way for Richelieu and Louis XIV.; the other

for Wolsey, and for the arbitrary sway of the Tudors and Stuarts. In France, Louis XIV., aided by the Gallican ecclesiastics, now his tools, crushed the French Protestants, because they endangered the cause of despotism. In England, Charles I., aided by the English hierarchy, now the allies of the monarchy, essayed to crush the Puritans and Covenanters, and perished in the struggle. By means of the same principle, we may also observe that Spain, where the Church has always kept much of its independence, has by this means preserved, under a monarchy despotic since the Emperor Charles V., much of its ancient free usages. The "Fueros" of the Basque provinces have never been violated with impunity by a Spanish monarch; and Spain, by this means, aided by the Church, has been one of the least taxed, though one of the richest countries of Europe in natural productions. Thus, then, if we take history for our guide, there cannot exist any doubt that one of the most efficient checks to the unrestrained power of the aristocratic classes, in all countries, is to be found in the countervailing influence of religion and her ministers, provided these be independent of the State and the higher classes of laymen. In this country, the Anglican Church, as by law established, has been for some centuries the ally and copartner of the State; but the history of England is not without proofs that, in this office, the Dissenters, together with the Scot-

tish Presbyterians, have occupied her place. The resistance to Charles I. was mainly their work; and, from that time to this, their influence over the succeeding governments that have ruled this country may be perpetually traced — that influence being, generally speaking, in favour of the people at large. In Ireland, the Catholic priesthood are exercising the same power, and in a similar position. They are supported by the lower classes of their countrymen almost solely; yet, with these humble means, they have wrung at last from the conquerors of their country and the bitter enemies of their faith, freedom, and toleration for that faith, and possibly may, if reason guides them, ultimately relieve their country from many of the sinister influences which a long-enduring and certainly bitter captivity has cast over it. So important is the political part performed by religion and its ministers, as long as both are free to act, in a community. But there are also other influences of this kind, which it would be improper to class under the head of religion, but of which a work like the present must necessarily treat. They are better classed under the category of "superstitions."

It is a remarkable fact that, if we cannot find a people, however rude and uncultivated their minds, destitute of all and every trace of religion properly so called, we shall find it equally difficult to point out any tribe of human beings amongst whom some trace

or other of superstition is not to be found. There is not, in fact, probably any such people. The African negroes, of the lowest grade of intellect, have their Fetish, their Obi, and their Mumbo Jumbo! The New Zealanders, and all the aborigines of the Polynesian groups, have superstitions peculiar to themselves. Even the stupid nomades of Australia exhibit traces of observances akin to superstition; and the Esquimaux have their rude conjurers and soothsayers, who are consulted before sealing or whaling expeditions, and who read in the clouds the destiny of slaughtered phocæ, musk-oxen, seals, and the other game of those desolate regions which they alone care to tread. As we come further down and examine the annals of nations more civilised, and belonging to a more modern era, we shall still find, in company with the different forms of religion professed by each, innumerable shapes of superstition. These consist of beliefs and observances of a minor sort—most of them either immediately or remotely relating to preternatural and supernatural influences, not clashing with religion, but rather aiding and assisting its effects upon the mind. Of the innumerable minor creeds of this sort, scattered throughout the mighty mass of mankind, it may perhaps be safely asserted that there is not one totally unconnected with the idea of higher influences, and the dim ministration and interference of spiritual beings in the concerns of mankind. Of the idea of

ghosts or spectres, meaning by these terms the apparition of persons now known to be dead, hardly any nation is entirely destitute. It is indeed probable that amongst all the races of mankind this notion, more or less cloudily, exists. Want of the means of communication prevents our tracing it amongst some savages; but it is still a question whether it does not exist. Of divination, or the art of knowing future events by means of signs and preternatural communications, most nations have something. Of charms and witchcraft—controlling human action by spiritual or diabolic interference—few nations do not exhibit traces. The influence of the stars, and judicial astrology, is a scholastic, though baseless and imaginative, science. In inexplicable presentiments and warnings, arising, they know not how, in the breasts of men, few men of any creed totally disbelieve. So universally diffused are those feelings which we call superstitions, and so intimately interwoven in the very nature of man.

It is impossible to think that these feelings are implanted in human bosoms without an end and aim. The question then is, What is this aim?—what is that end? It is not easy to doubt that the real and true intention of these implanted tendencies is to secure in the human mind, in one form or other, some conception, hint, idea, or notion—however vague, or however definite—of a connection between this world

and another, and of the existence of other intellectual agents and agencies, only partially apprehended by us. To the perpetuation of this belief all these ideas most unquestionably tend. Nor is this their sole result. They also tend, though less strongly and directly, to impress upon the mind the probability of future retribution for evils and crimes, and of rewards for virtues and for good deeds. Thus, the belief in spectres and apparitions, though it never has been, and most probably never will be, demonstrated to be well founded, cannot be removed from the minds of men. The evidence never amounts to certainty, but it is such as cannot be disproved by any process of logical reasoning. The same may be said of warnings and of presentiments of future events, of predictions and divinations, of signs and auguries of deaths happening in distant places—many of the attestations of which incredulity itself can hardly deny, but which yet few reflecting persons fully believe. In fact, it has most likely never been intended that these things should be fully believed by enlightened and comprehensive minds. The evidence is just strong enough to produce the result aimed at, and no more. That aim is to implant in men's minds a dim persuasion of the existence of agencies of a preternatural or spiritual kind, but of which nothing more certain is permitted to be revealed. We have a misty vision of retribution for crime, and reward for virtue, which is not permitted to go further, nor to

arrive at certainty. Nor are there reasons of force wanting to justify such an arrangement. If futurity were too sure, too definite, and too visible, the present would be neglected. The pursuits of this state of being would dwindle, and dwarf, and lose their power of excitement, if brought too close to the certainty of a future and perhaps much more exalted condition of existence. He whose mind's eye already too closely gazed upon a sure eternity would despise the speck of our brief and limited mundane being. The comparison of the future would be too strong for the present. That which is, would be extinguished in the too clear contemplation of that which shall be. The future would drown the immediate, and expectation supersede and neutralise action. This was therefore to be avoided. And hence all those notions of a future being and a future retribution, drawn from superstition, (so called,) are shadowy, dim, and unsubstantial —though strong. The spectre of the victim haunts the murderer. The spirits of the wicked wander, in wretchedness, over the scenes of past criminality. The friend is warned of another friend's death, at the moment, though seas or great distances intervene. Splendid destinies are foretold, and disbelieved until fulfilled. Misfortunes are shadowed on the mind, and diregarded until present to us. In all these, belief is either confined to the individual, or is dim, or is partial, or is unsatisfactory; but yet, in the aggre-

gate, such things form the creed of mankind—laughed at by many, questioned by most, yet hardly rejected *in toto* by any. Dimly, however, as these notions are apprehended, and unfounded as they are in any demonstrative evidence, it can hardly be denied that they tend to check and keep in awe the excesses of lawless power. We have seen

"A godless Regent tremble at a star!"

Louis XI. was coerced by dreams and divinations. Napoleon was haunted by notions of fortunate and unfortunate days. Cromwell acknowledged dim visions of a coming greatness, and shadowy indications of a mighty destiny. To this list it would be easy to add were it necessary; but no man doubts that superstition has curbed those whom morality and religion were impotent to restrain. So extraordinary and so mingled are our spiritual influences, and so various are the modes by which they affect mankind.

To the subtle but potent and perpetual influences of religion and of superstition (properly so called) upon the moral actions and moral feelings of men, we shall find influences analogous in the arrangement of the material globe. It is manifest that, of all the affections implanted in the human mind, the religious principle is the most subtle. Of the grosser and more selfish passions we at once recognise the presence, as we recognise the use and intent; but of the extent

of the influence of religion over human conduct we have only an imperfect knowledge. No man fully knows it. Few persons are even partially aware of it. This is the case, because many men even try to hide from themselves the extent to which they are acted upon by religious motives, and few men avow the entire of their religious scruples and doubts. Of the influence of superstition (properly so denominated) upon the actions of men, we know still less. The belief, where it exists, is often disavowed. Where that belief or impression influences the conduct, disavowal is more frequent still. Of these truths it would be easy to quote numerous instances; but such quotations are needless. The facts are not disputed by any. Thus, then, it may be concluded, that of all the motives to human action, religion and superstition are the most subtle and least cognisable. In the physical, or rather material, world, we discover agents very analogous. Who can inform us of the amount of material action caused by light and by the electrical, galvanic, and magnetic fluids? Yet there is every reason to suppose that many of the most ordinary atmospheric phenomena, and also of the phenomena of vegetation, are really produced by the mysterious agency of light and electricity; and that the magnetic fluid exercises important functions in the changes of the material globe, there is no reason to doubt. Future discoverers in philosophy may trace the influence of

these mysterious agents in processes where their presence is not now suspected. Enough is known to enable us to pronounce that this is highly probable. In the mean time, like religion and superstition in the moral world, these agencies must rank amongst those of whose presence we are certain, but of the power and extent of whose influence we are still for the most part uncertain ; and to these agencies in the material world are the secret workings of religion and of superstition to be best compared. We guess at, rather than know, the limits of their agency ; and are perpetually astonished by discovering its potency and universality to be far more than we had previously deemed it. Thus, even in this recondite matter, the analogy between the moral and material arrangement appears to be strong, and, to a certain limit, clear and manifest. The details elude our observation, but of the leading and general facts we cannot entertain a shadow of doubt.

Such are the analogies between the more subtle agents of the material globe and the influences of religion upon the moral acts of man. One more still remains, however, to be noticed ; and that is, the connection which religious feeling has, from time to time, exhibited with war and bloodshed. That religion—without the Christian religion being any exception—has been, in various ages of the world, a frequent and fertile source of dissension and of bloodshed between

nations, cannot, I believe, be denied. In admitting this, however, there is nothing to dread on the part of the defenders of Christianity. Whatever may be the case with other creeds and other superstitions, the doctrines of Christ certainly do not countenance their own propagation by the sword. With the laws of nations, and the rights and duties of the citizen, they do not interfere. Christ left to man's reason the task of constructing his own forms of government, and of discovering, and defining, and enforcing, the subjects' duties, and rights. "His *kingdom* was not of *this* world," which he left to govern itself. His mission was to man, the individual; and between man and man his mission is one of peace and goodwill on earth. But the best things, in this world, are liable to be abused; and the abuse of a good is, not unfrequently, the worst of evils. Religious war is the abuse, not the fruit of religion; and the employment of force to propagate Christianity, or even to defend it, is a mortal perversion of the very doctrine thus mistakenly advocated. He even who undertakes to defend Christianity against attack by penal statutes or ordinances, like "Bassanio" in Shakspeare, "loses the ring in defending it." Christianity is, therefore, no more answerable for the religious wars that have prevailed, than it is for any other kind of war. It permits war; nor does it specially arrest even those that arise out of the perversions of its own

spirit. In this there is nothing for the moralist particularly to lament. Religious wars stand upon the same ground that other wars occupy. All wars arise either out of the mistakes or overweening desires of nations; and mistaken zeal and error of judgment are the sources of those of religion. Nor need Christians be alarmed if it be affirmed, which perhaps it may be, and with truth, that the most religious nations have been the most quarrelsome! In Europe, the nations where Christianity has possessed greatest sway are, perhaps, Spain, Ireland, and Scotland, together with the Italian states. These countries are inhabited principally by the remains of those ancient Celtic tribes which occupied Europe before the commencement of that great and long wave of population which originated in the densely-peopled countries of eastern and north-eastern Asia, and which finally inundated Europe. From this inundation of a new race the strongest countries, as to natural defences, and the most insular, escaped the best. Hence the peninsulas of Spain and of Italy, and the kingdoms of Wales, Ireland, and Scotland, probably possess more of the primitive Celtic blood than any other country. They are pre-eminently religious, but, at the same time, more prone to division into small and often hostile states and clans than are the other existing European races. But this is a provision which ought not to excite surprise. The Celtic tribes are, by constitution

and temperament, evidently more imaginative, more passionate, more irritable, more the creatures of impulse, than are the Teutonic or Gothic people. Such a race need restraint more than do men of a natural temperament more reasoning and sedate. Religious feeling is therefore united to this temperament of man in the proportion in which it is required. Hence the "perfervida ingenia Scotorum," the "impacati Iberi," and the untameable "kernes" of Ireland, have ever mixed a bigoted attachment to their faith with perpetual political dissension. The Greeks have exhibited somewhat of the same peculiarity, and so have the Swiss and other Alpine tribes. But amongst these, Celtic blood perhaps still predominates, and hence this seeming contradiction.

In this connection between violence and religious feeling, there are not wanting analogies with material phenomena. If the divine and spiritual principle of sincere religion has occasionally produced fruit so strange and unexpected as hostility and bloodshed, persecution and hatred, so have the subtler material elements — however pervading may be their salutary effects — produced accompanying evils, which can neither be evaded nor denied. One of the subtlest of our atmospheric elements is electricity. Of the great part it plays in promoting vegetation, in the formation of rain and dew, and in the regulation of climate and temperature, there can be little doubt.

Yet it is probable that this recondite but salutary and beneficent agent is, in its changes and mutations, one of the causes of those mysterious visitations of pestilence and famine that, from time to time, in all recorded ages, have, at certain periods, afflicted the world. The same may probably be true of magnetism and of galvanism, if these be not indeed modifications only of electricity. Thus, then, in both worlds, material and moral, evils may accompany, and do accompany, the most refined and spiritualised, as well as the grossest and most tangible agencies. Electricity becomes the source of disease and death; religious zeal, of persecution, cruelty, and aggression. The best of motives and agents are not good unmixed, as the worst are not altogether bad; and as that electric fluid, which is present in the rain and dew that refreshes all nature, is the moving power likewise in the thunderstorm, the tornado, the pompero, and the hurricane—breathes pestilence in the sirocco, and storm in the monsoon;—so have the mild teachings even of Christianity their possible tendencies to an opposite influence, and from the Sermon on the Mount the perversity of human passion has elaborated a Sicilian Vespers and a St Bartholomew!

CHAPTER XI.

PROOFS OF THE FOREGOING DRAWN FROM HISTORY AND EXPERIENCE.

If the foregoing reasoning be just and true, the general result seems to be, that the moral, like the physical world, is governed by fixed laws. Society takes certain shapes and modifications from causes inherent in our moral nature and constitution. It divides itself, from a moral necessity, but one which arises from the free exertion of man's will, into classes and ranks. It is dissociated, as it were, into distinct nations, speaking various tongues—using various habits—having various customs, laws, manners, and forms of faith. These distinct nations again subdivide themselves into ranks and classes. The rich become an aristocracy; the poorer, a democracy. Power follows the subdivision of wealth; and the task of ruling falls into the hands of the few. Again, these classes are subdivided into families, who act together by the tie of blood-relationship. Some raise themselves by exertion, prudence, and good fortune, and pass into the higher ranks,

which are continually recruited from the lower; whilst indolence and luxury perpetually diminish the natural heirs of wealth, or send them again down into the walks of poorer and more democratic society; but, within these limits, the influences of religion, morality, and reason, have perfect sway. Equality of rights becomes acknowledged; the immunities of the citizen are recognised; and his duties are laid down together with his immunities, and are acquiesced in, one for the sake of the other. Law becomes established; religion opposes itself to the unbridled passions of the powerful, and, together with morality and law, form a check to uncontrolled power. Trade, commerce, science, and the arts intervene, and make men and nations more necessary to each other. As these increase, war becomes diminished, and, when it occurs, becomes humanised. Emulations, both between nations and individuals, under this beautiful distribution, become more varied and more refined. Ambition, whether national or personal, which at first is confined to the acquisition of power and wealth, is modified by benevolence; and men and nations strive to excel in knowledge, science, arts, philosophy, and moral and religious culture, as well as in power and in territorial possessions. And thus, step by step, civilisation, by a sure and necessary process, springs out of a primitive anarchy; and man, from a simple, rises into a complex, state of being. The savage, in

process of time, becomes the sage; and the rude and naked denizens of the woods, in time, are a community of nations, having polished languages, manners, religion, and laws—founders of cities, made glorious by their fanes for the cultivation of religion, jurisprudence, philosophy, science, and art—colonists of distant lands—spreaders of the light of truth and of reason—discoverers, lawgivers, and propagators of all that is valuable in this brief state of mixed existence. Such appear to be the necessary steps, and such the process, by which, under a long and gradual progression, nations arise, and leave their primitive state of rude simplicity and ignorance, for a long, and perhaps never-finished, quest after refinement and improvement. Of this wonderful distribution the whole may be resolved into the necessity for excitement. It is the nature of intellectual and reasoning man not to rest. Extension of the reasoning faculty seems, as a natural law, to involve in itself the craving for change; and this desire of change seems to be implanted, and to exist, in the precise *ratio* of the extent of the reasoning powers. In proportion as thought sinks down to that lower modification which we call "instinct"—and as that, again, descends into mere sensation—and that, again, to mere vegetable irritability—mutation, and the aptitude and desire for it, seem to diminish, and fixity and immobility to increase. Thus, we see the most expanded minds are the great explorers in the

realms of moral and of physical science; whilst ordinary minds are more easily content with that which is, and seek less for that which may be. Leaving man, we find the higher orders of animals with a higher range of motives and instincts leading them to change. They migrate in search of changes in food and in climate, and have various preferences which the lower animal lacks, and is unconscious of; and this holds equally with aquatic, with land, and with amphibious tribes. Descending lower in the scale, where the animal approaches the vegetable, we find the aptitude for, and love of, motion gradually cease. Shell-fish remain fixed to the spot; and the snail and the worm hardly change their locality. At last the animal merges in the vegetable, and becomes rooted to the spot. Below the well-known functions of plants, which prove them capable of that sensation which we call irritability, we cannot trace the diminution of the faculty; but it is the reverse of certain that it stops there; and should it be traced further, it is probable that the same law of nature may be found to accompany it.

Having thus recapitulated, in brief, the great divisions of the foregoing reasoning, we now naturally turn to the inquiry of how far experience corroborates its truth, and what lights the history of mankind may throw upon that which, thus far, is theoretical only, and waits the demonstration of facts, as far as our past knowledge may afford them? If we take the great

divisions of the foregoing theory in the order in which they occur, we shall first inquire into the history of the grand division of mankind into nations. Of the necessity of this division, and of its constant occurrence, all extant history is really one proof. The most ancient annals give us no reason to suppose that the human race ever existed in numbers thus undivided; but if we examine universal history, as it is termed, we shall perhaps find grounds for supposing that, at first, these primitive divisions were the smallest. The most ancient records of which, in Europe, we have any full knowledge, are those of the Jews. What light do these Scriptures throw upon this subject? They paint the Israelites as a people, not very numerous when in their times of highest prosperity, living in the midst of various other tribes, separated from them by religion and customs, though speaking a similar language—that is to say, a dialect of the same root—and not more numerous than themselves. We find them subdued and enslaved, first, by the monarchs of the ancient Egyptian empire. This, after a lapse of time, is followed by the Babylonish captivity. This, again, after another interval, is followed by a term of slavery under the Iranean or Persian empire; and, lastly, they become a distant province of the empire of Rome. The process here has probably been, that the wealthy portion of them alone were stripped and sold into slavery, whilst the

tillers of the soil and shepherds were left to be ruled by the Egyptian, Babylonian, and Persian satraps. During all these vicissitudes they have, however, certainly preserved most of the peculiarities of their race; nor is their state probably very different now from that in which it was under the Persian and Roman dominations. The restorations of the Jews as a people, after their conquest by Persia and Rome, were incomplete. Multitudes seem never to have returned to the land of their fathers as a resting-place; but they have never amalgamated with any other people, and to this hour they are an isolated tribe,—so strong, in this singular people, is the principle of national separation. Of the composition of those ancient empires, of which their history gives us a mere glimpse, we know little from other sources. Of the old Egyptian population nothing is known. It seems certain the kings of Egypt ruled a very extensive tract of country, extending far beyond the territories of modern Egypt; but of the tribes that composed it we are ignorant. There does not appear, however, to be a shadow of a reason for supposing that any of the great monarchies, prior to that of Rome, could have differed in their material from that of the Roman empire. They probably consisted, as all the more modern empires have consisted, of various nations, bound, for a space, by force of arms, under one dominion, but never really amalgamating. That such was the composition of the Roman empire

we know; and we may, with tolerable safety, conclude the same of its predecessors in the career of conquest. From the history of Rome and the formation of its empire we learn, however, one further important truth, and this is, that the parts of which it was built were smaller than those into which its dominions are at the present day divided. Italy itself was composed of minute tribes. The Roman territory at first extended only a few miles round the walls of the primitive town; and it was only by the gradual reduction of these tribes, through a long series of years, that it at length embraced the Italian peninsula. At the period of the first Punic war, the Roman territory only comprised the present Papal dominions, Tuscany, and a part of the modern kingdom of Naples; yet this, beyond all question, was composed of various distinct tribes, conquered and gradually amalgamated into one people. Gaul, or modern France, we learn from the *Commentaries* of Cæsar, was similarly subdivided into distinct septs, often at war with each other. Spain was in a similar state, until reduced at length by the Roman power into one great province. From Cæsar and Tacitus we gather that the island of Britain was similarly peopled; and from the latter we see that the immense tract known as modern Germany was subdivided into numerous nations, all differing from and independent of each other, inhabiting not only modern Germany, but Belgium and Holland, and the countries

beyond the Danube, which became the ultimate boundary of the Western Empire. All these nations, as well as Egypt and Greece, and other large portions both of Africa and Asia, were ultimately reduced under the Roman dominion; but they never amalgamated, and on the dissolution of the empire again became the seats of various tribes, which the enormous growth of the population of China and Hindostan pushed westward, through so many centuries, until change of climate and manners set bounds to that enormous fecundity of these races. The briefer empire founded by Philip the Macedonian, and completed by the still more marvellous son of that extraordinary man, spreading over ancient Greece, and then marching rapidly eastward through the vast dominions of ancient Persia to the banks of the Indus, was similarly composed. As a consequence, it was even of shorter duration than the fabrics of the more modern Asiatic conquerors, and on the death of Alexander fell at once to pieces, resolving into its original elements.

Since the dissolution of the Roman empire, under the successive blows of the Goths, Vandals, Huns, and Ottomans, the utmost that civilisation has been enabled to effect, has been the remoulding of the scattered elements of empire into those forms which they now bear. Modern France, Spain, Germany, Italy, and England, have been formed out of the admixture of these aggressive hordes with the original Celtic races,

where any have been suffered to survive. Nor is the fusion of tribes and races even in modern Europe by any means perfect. France, the most civilised of all, contains races essentially differing in blood, in manners, and in dialect. Italy is subdivided in the same manner, but with more distinct differences of race. To use the strong expression of Metternich, she is even now "only a geographical expression." Tuscany, Lombardy, Naples, and Calabria, all differ from each other in their people as much as their topography, climate, and geological peculiarities. In Spain, the same demarcation of races is apparent. The Northern Basques differ from the inhabitants of Southern Spain in language, in blood, and in institutions; whilst from these, again, the Portuguese are equally distinct. The empire of Austria is composed of an assemblage of kingdoms inhabited by distinct races. Switzerland, Bavaria, and Saxony, exhibit marked distinctions; nor can any two nations be more opposed than those of Belgium and Holland, though between them nature has placed no great natural barriers, like those that divide France, Spain, and Italy. In Great Britain, the intermixture of nations is still imperfect. The Welchman is still distinct in language and temperament. Between the Scottish Celt and the English Anglo-Saxon there is still a wide and easily recognised difference; whilst the Irish Celt or Milesian is, again, in blood, lan-

guage, temperament, and religious feeling, at variance with all three: so difficult is it to overcome those natural, great, and primary divisions of mankind, which the Creator has, for the wisest purposes, ordained to exist; and so impotent are even the efforts of centuries to extinguish those causes of separation which arise out of necessary motives of mankind, when society is in its first stages of formation. To fuse any further the great European national divisions, statesmen and warriors have striven in vain. Charlemagne founded his empire, only to be resolved into its elements under his feeble successors; and the empire of Napoleon was constructed and dissolved within the short space of twenty years! The empires of the Asiatic conquerors, with the exception of that of the successors of Mahomet, have been of equally brief duration. The only relic of the empire of the Tartar, Gengis Khan, is to be found in the government of China by a Tartar dynasty. The empire of Mahmoud was, after his death, speedily divided into its pristine elements. That of Timour shared a similar fate. And the capitals of Jehan Guire, and of his grandson, Ameng-Zebe, are now nearly deserted; and the princes of their empire for the most part tributary to the British, whose mercantile government in India may be more lasting than those of the Asiatic conquerors. The Turkish empire of the Arabian Prophet and his followers has had greater permanence than

the rest; but the various tribes which constituted the once vast dominions of the Turkish sultans have never amalgamated into a nation. They are governed simply by the pachas or lieutenants of the Porte, who are often all but independent; and their contributions to the treasury of the empire are in the simple form of a tribute, collected by means of direct taxation, under a simple municipal system of villages or townships, each of which collects its share, apportioning the tax to the means of the individual. The languages, manners, dresses, customs, and even religion of the subjects of the Grand Turk, comprise, however, infinite varieties; and as Russia, the great enemy of Turkey, gradually wins her way to Constantinople, they will, perhaps, one by one, come under the dominion of the Cross instead of the Crescent, without change either in nationality of languages, customs, dress, or manners.

The general conclusion deducible from a view of universal history, as far as it is known to us, seems to be this, that though existing nations have, in most instances, been the product of an imperfect fusion of smaller tribes under one government, this fusion cannot be carried further. The united resources of modern military genius, and modern civilisation and science, seem to be as unequal to such an enterprise as were the conquerors of ages long gone past. The grand divisions of mankind seem to be indelible. Literature and science, by fixing language, and multiplying the

works of reference composed in the various tongues, strengthens instead of weakening this principle of demarcation. The new difference of national literature is superadded to that of mere spoken language, dress, and manners. The efforts of all the learned for centuries, throughout Europe, have failed to fix the modern Latin tongue as a medium of communication between scholars and philosophers, and as the medium through which the results of civilisation were to be conveyed. Men of genius now write universally in their native dialects; and, by so doing, immortalise the language, and add to the nationality of those who speak it. The tongues of Italy, France, England, Germany, and Spain, can never cease to be cultivated, embodying, as they do, the undying monuments of human genius, erected and built throughout the lapse of century after century. The languages of Greece and Rome ceased to be living and spoken dialects, only because they were destitute of the immense power of the press to fix them amongst mankind. The classics of Greece and Rome sank before the barbarians who subverted the Empire, because they had not the means of the press with which to multiply them. They were therefore buried under the rubbish of centuries of devastation and ruin, and only dug out in part after the revival of learning and the arts, and the spread of Christianity amongst the invaders of the soil to which they belonged. It is beyond the imagination of man,

however, to conceive the demolition, by similar means, of the principal existing dialects of Europe. They must ever remain; and in their permanence is to be found another security for the nationality of those by whom they are spoken, and who can alone derive, through their medium, that acquaintance with the achievements of human intellect, which constitutes that state of society called civilisation.*

The second great distribution of mankind into ranks is more the creature of civilisation than is the first. It is so because it is effected, for the most part, through the unequal distribution of wealth. Yet, amongst the most primitive tribes, we find marked traces of it, which multiply and grow stronger as life becomes more artificial, and composed of more complicated materials. Over the simplest tribe there is a chief, who ranks above the rest; and superstition early steps in, giving to medicine-man, charmer, diviner, or

* The author has purposely omitted to instance, as an example of the impossibility of any general fusion of tribes, castes, septs, clans, or nations, the extraordinary antipathy existing between the White, the Negro, and the Mulatto. Community of country and constant contact and contiguity fail to obliterate it. It is a fact which cannot be disputed, and perhaps cannot be explained. It seems to arise from a total want of sympathy between the two races, which naturally begets antipathy; for contact with any being with whom we have no sympathy is very painful. *How* the entire want of sympathy arises, is the difficulty to conceive. The author does not attempt to solve the problem; he only asserts the fact; which is admitted by all having experience of those countries where the three races are. The aversion is so strong, that in St Domingo, when the Negroes revolted, the half-castes assisted them; but even this did not save

physician, a *status* above that of his less accomplished fellows. As society progresses, so does the division of ranks. Men learn to make distinctions which they could not even apprehend whilst in a simpler state of existence. Wealth itself becomes a complex word, embodying under it many degrees and many modifications. The landowner, the capitalist, the merchant, and the manufacturer, become the representatives of wealth in different forms, and constitute distinct classes under one general head—that of possession. Science and literature, and the art of government, create, as they spread, other divisions. The lawyer, the physician, the linguist, the statesman, and the general, must and do exist under all forms of civilised government, and rival successfully those more rude distinctions which arise merely from extent of possessions. The result is, as a rapid examination will show, that rank is a necessary result of civilised society, arising as it

them from being butchered in turn, after the white inhabitants had been driven out or exterminated. It is true, that such of the coloured races as come to Europe experience little of this; but they are isolated individuals, and their isolation procures for them a sympathy which, in the mass, they cannot obtain. With regard to the extinction of Negro slavery, it is to be feared that the nations are not yet sufficiently in advance to effect it. It can only be done by general consent; and the experiments made seem to show that even the most civilised countries of the present day are destitute of the virtue requisite to enable them to co-operate in effecting this great change. By her own premature and crude attempts, England, it is to be feared, has ruined her own colonies, without conferring the slightest benefit on the Negro race. Regulation to a great extent might have been accomplished; but for the extinction of Negro slavery, the world, alas! is far from being ripe.

does, and being founded as it is, from and in the very nature of man, and the passions implanted in him. If we go back to the remotest state of civilisation of which we have accurate knowledge, the Jewish, we find in the institutions of Moses all the divisions of rank recognised, provided for, and carefully checked. No lawgiver ever took greater pains to neutralise the encroachments of wealth — to protect the poorer citizen—to render property sacred, but under defined limitations—to mitigate the terrible evils and corruptions of usury—to give honour to piety, virtue, and patriotism—and to establish a moral school, as well as a temple of religion, by means of an established priesthood, who taught the Law and the Prophets conjunctly. Amongst the Jewish people we find the distinctions of modern society for the most part recognised, and Moses and Nehemiah acting, in many respects, exactly as Solon and Lycurgus did after them, and as more modern lawgivers have been fain to do in these later times.

Turning to the histories of the Grecian and Roman republics, under which the state of society is minutely known, we find a similar distribution, with some few national modifications. Of the earlier Greeks and Romans, the government was more popular than that of the Jews. The people in these ancient republics directly interfered in the conduct of affairs, and not unfrequently acted as courts of justice. Hence popular

oratory, and the powerful sway of eloquence, became amongst them a ready means for the attainment of distinction in the state ; and, in the lives of Demosthenes, Demades, Æschines, Cicero, Cæsar, and others, we learn how successfully the orator could rival the statesman and the soldier, push aside the influence of wealth and family, and carry away the highest honours and emoluments of the State. In point of fact, a strict and impartial investigation would perhaps convince us that, in ancient times, wealth and territorial possession formed a less certain foundation for rank than now. The governments of antiquity were, in truth, more military than are those of modern time. The soldiers' duty did not form a distinct profession. Excepting the priesthood, all the citizens were liable to be called upon to serve ; and hence these governments were, in fact, more essentially military, and came, in some respects, nearer the feudal system of government of the middle ages than is generally supposed. Most of the great families had their foundation in the military supremacy of an ancestor ; and wealth was acquired in the same way when, as the simplicity of manners declined, wealth became of as much value to ambition as was military fame. There is not wanting, however, evidence amply sufficient to indicate the truth that wealth, under the republics, as well as monarchies of antiquity, exercised for its possessors that influence which naturally must accompany it whilst human

nature remains as it is. This does not appear so much upon the surface of history as beneath that surface. Like subterraneous forces, it makes itself only appear at the upper day and outer superficies by occasional phenomena. In history, we can only trace it from its effects, as the internal fires are manifested only now and then by a volcanic eruption, or the devastation of an earthquake. It is in the catastrophes which befall those who attempt forcibly to check its power that the power becomes most apparent. Its regular exercise is not recorded in history; its revenge and vindication of itself sometimes are. It is in the fate of Agis, king of Sparta, and of the Roman Gracchi, that we must look for proofs of the influence of a wealthy aristocracy, even under governments confessedly popular. Sometimes, however, we see, under these ancient and half military, half popular governments, riches assisting talent—as with Pericles, Alcibiades, and Seneca. Sometimes we see men, even then, exalted by it, as in the cases of Crassus, Lepidus, and the Emperor Didius. One circumstance, however, in all times of antiquity, has prevented that more minute division of ranks which we see under modern societies. This circumstance was the universality of slavery as an institution. In a savage state the drudgery of life is thrown always upon the female, purely because she is weakest. In a more advanced state, the prisoners of war are made

slaves, and made to do the drudgery of their masters. From this ancient system of slavery arose the villeinage of the feudal system, which still exists in Russia and various parts of the European continent. In India the low castes and ryots are a branch of the same tree; and in the West Indies, and in America, negro slavery is the last shoot from the same root. Slavery is, in fact, the necessary accompaniment of a certain semi-civilised state of society, in which man has arrived at the relish for luxury, without having the virtue to obtain them by his own labour, or by the sacrifice of a large portion of his means. The consequence of this was, that amongst all the people of antiquity, of whom we know anything, the household as well as field work was mostly performed by slaves, the progeny originally of prisoners of war. This system seems to have been quite universal; and it was not until Christianity had been planted for many centuries, that mankind could be brought even to apprehend the wickedness and absurdity of men pretending to have property in other men, whatever inferiority, natural or accidental, might exist between the master and the slave. It needs only a little reflection to perceive that, whilst this system obtained, those ranks which we call the lower could not exist. There could be no yeoman, no free labourer, no free artisan. Under the Romans, even learning, the transcription of books, and education, were carried on,

in fact, by slaves ; and medicine was practised by men not free. Of this Æsop and Plautus are examples, whilst Horace was only the son of a freed-man. In the countries of the East, at this hour, we have parallel phenomena, arising out of their imperfect religious systems and inferior civilisation. In all Asiatic countries, slaves occasionally rise to the highest offices of the state, as must be the case where there is no lower rank that is not military, and when the working population are serfs or villeins. In this circumstance alone resides the principal difference between ancient and modern civilised society. The domains of the noble were tilled by slaves ; his household servants were the same, and his very children were thus educated. The modern noble is served by free labourers for wages. In all else, the gradations were alike in both ancient and modern society. Wealth, valour, eloquence, and learning raised men ; their absence depressed them ;—and thus some came to be Patricians, some Equestrians, some Plebs. There existed no form of civilised community in which these ranks, under different denominations, were not found. In this the republic and the monarchy were alike ; and in each, as soon as man ceases to be savage, he becomes classified.

So much for ancient states of civilised society. If we examine the different communities of modern times, in the highest rank of polished countries, we shall

arrive at the same conclusions. There has not, in modern times, existed any nation or community, in which all the distinctions of rank that now exist may not be traced. Advanced civilisation has added to the number of the distinctions of rank, and not diminished them. In some cases the additions have been happy ; in others the reverse. When the free labourer took the place occupied by the feudal villein or serf, and the ancient slave, the change was for the better. True liberty and equal laws can never exist, until the majority who toil become intelligent enough to participate in the enactment of the code which they are to obey. In ancient times, when the work of countries was done by slaves and helots, the laws were made solely for the benefit of those who were free, and not for that of the whole. In more modern times, slavery, as an institution, has been exploded by a growing intelligence ; but the free labourers have hardly, in any country, attained the rank of perfect freemen. They have rarely, as a body, participated in the making of laws, and have hardly, perhaps, been intelligent enough to do so. Hence, in almost every modern state, we find the course of legislation leaning to the supposed interests of the wealthy few, to the injury of the poorer majority ; and thus it happens that the working class, in the most civilised European countries, have not yet completed their destiny, nor taken the station intended for them in the great family of the

human race. With civilisation have come attendant evils, which have pressed heavily upon them. One of these evils—and it is a mighty one—has been, the wonderful extent to which fiscal extortion, by means of indirect taxation, has been pushed. By this insidious and extraordinary enginery, the toiling classes, in countries the most advanced, are kept down and crushed. No longer slaves, they are deprived of the benefit of a master's care. Excluded from the legislature, they cannot shield themselves. From these causes, they have been the great sufferers under financial exaction and fiscal excess. It has deprived them of all means of sufficient education. It has, by the want it creates, multiplied their numbers to excess; and, by the evils so caused, overweighed the advantages which an advanced state of civilisation ought to have brought with it. It seems to be perfectly evident and unquestionable, that, in Great Britain first, from the consequences of indirect taxation carried too far, arose the manufacturing system; and from the two in combination has arisen, next, that spread of pauperism and morbid growth of an unhealthy population, so alarming to reflecting men. From and after the increase of indirect taxes, which the first American war involved, the difficulty of obtaining all the necessaries of life in sufficient abundance began to be visible amongst the industrious classes, and gave rise, at last, to that cotton, and woollen, and linen manufacture, by

means of machinery, which has now become a trade so gigantic. This process cheapened clothing, certainly; but it brought with it evils of its own. It threw numbers of adults out of employment, and caused the premature employment of infants of both sexes. Thus demoralisation and destitution were again caused by the very means taken to mitigate the original pressure; and thus, with the extension of indirect taxing, and manufacturing by machinery, "pauperism"—a state unknown to more primitive countries—has gone on, growing and increasing. From this cause the most civilised countries of Europe, and also of America, which are indirectly affected, begin to exhibit a new class, which in ancient nations were hardly known, that of "paupers" living on alms, or relief of an eleemosynary character afforded them by law. The existence of this deplorable class may be distinctly traced to the action of modern fiscal systems. In Turkey, and those semi-civilised Eastern countries where imposts are direct and moderate, pauperism, the growth of modern Europe, is totally unknown. In some periods of ancient history we may trace faint approaches to this state, especially at Rome. The "panem et Circenses" of the degenerate Roman populace, was a germ of pauperism; but for the ingenuity of more modern financiers and mechanists was it reserved to establish "pauperism" as a class, and to deprive man, at

last, of the means of living by his own labour, under the pretence of protecting him.

Modern society, then, as antique communities were, is divided into classes; but they are more numerous than of old. The free labourer and artisan are additions; and those classes which, in modern times, we call the "middle classes," are much more extensive and powerful generally than they formerly were. What might be the political influence of the merchants and traders of ancient Egypt, of Tyre, and of Carthage, we have no means to ascertain. Under the Roman empire it was small; and under the Grecian republics not great. The conclusion seems to be, that, in all modern States, we can trace distinctly the existence of all the classes enumerated in ancient times, and one or two more. In all modern countries we shall find an aristocracy resting on wealth; in all a governing head, generally taken from the rank of aristocracy, and raised by their influence; in all a middle class, sharing and dividing political power with the wealthier magnates, but more or less influenced by them; in all a toiling class, with no direct political power—struggling under the weight of those above them—destitute of combination—deprived of sufficient education—and verging ever towards the lowest class of all;—the pauper class. Neither is this arrangement, founded as it is in our very nature, really modified by any variety in the forms of government of which we

have any experience. These classes exist under a republic just as surely as under a monarchy; and under a mixed form of government just as fully as under the two extremes. Venice was a republic for many centuries; but, under the Venetian commonwealth, there were a doge, or executive head — a nobility—a middle class—an operative class—and a destitute class—as in the neighbouring monarchies or principalities; and in the hands of the richer ranks the powers of the state really resided. Under the great federal republic of the United States, the same arrangement is found to exist. There is an executive president, with his cabinet. There is no nobility with titles of designation; but there is a small and wealthy class, who exert great influence in the political action of the republic, and from whose ranks nearly the whole of the senate and house of representatives are taken. Below these are a class of small traders, and below these an operative class, all exercising a direct influence on the government, but with very different degrees of force and efficiency. So decisive is the influence of wealth even in this free community, that of ten presidents, only Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Van Buren, and Polk can be considered as democratic presidents, although the presidential election is by popular vote; nor is it known that any individual of the operative class ever sat in Congress, although want of wealth is no bar—the members being paid.

In the smaller republics, such as those of Holland, Ragusa, Genoa, &c., we find the same law prevailing. It exists in spite of forms of government, which rest on the volitions of men; whilst this is founded in the law of nature, which is the direct result of the will of God.

As it is with the division into ranks, so is it with that into families. There never was a nation, civilised or uncivilised, in which this law did not prevail; though there are several in which female chastity has been held to be of no value. So strong is the influence of this law, that, in cases of illegitimacy, where the parent has been precluded from the personal care of his offspring, they are most frequently adopted by the family or relatives of the mother; and in cases where wealthy persons are, as is often the case, destitute of progeny, we see them eagerly, in many instances, adopt even the children of utter strangers. In countries where wealth is diffused, and childless persons common, this last is no uncommon case; nor is it at all unusual, in North America, to see advertisements put into the journals, both by parties who wish to adopt the offspring of others, and by parents who are willing, on certain terms, thus to part with a child.

On the great matter of religious belief, we find a universal prevalence of this law, that all communities cherish more or less of religion. It has already been

shown, that no nation nor tribe can be proved to exist, or to have existed, amongst whom some notions of a superstitious nature did not obtain. The germs of religion are in fact developed, however imperfectly, in all societies of men, however ignorant; and the spread of knowledge, though it rapidly modifies and refines these crude beginnings, only changes them, but does not destroy. In point of fact, it is easy to see that, as civilisation grows, religious belief becomes a more and more complicated thing, and has a deeper hold upon the general mind than before. Amongst heathen nations, where civilisation had made great progress, we perceive a peculiar state of religious credulity take place. In the religion of Greece and of Rome, learning and philosophy soon established a double creed. There was an *exoteric* and an *esoteric* creed. The *exoteric* belief was professed by philosophers in common with the vulgar. The *esoteric* doctrines were often sublime and metaphysical, having their foundation in the belief in one great creative Cause, and asserting the existence of minor beings of a spiritual nature, created by, dependent upon, and subordinate to the great First Cause. Of such a nature were the religious notions of Plato and of Socrates, of Cicero and of Seneca. Epicurus and his followers of Greece and Rome attempted, no doubt, to construct a system of metaphysical Atheism in terms; but, when closely examined, we shall find the propositions of this philosophy, whether

laid down by the Greeks after Epicurus or by such Roman writers as Lucretius, to be an evasion rather than a denial of Theism. To call the First Cause "nature," or to suppose an inherent force existent in "atoms," is not Atheism. It is only an evasive and imperfect Theism, which, avoiding to personify the Deity, yet, in substance, acknowledges an abstract power, creative and active, from which all things flow. In fact, if the atomic theories of the followers of Epicurus be rigidly analysed, we shall find them, when logically followed out, to lead to the same abstractions, as to the nature of the external universe, that were so wonderfully systematised by Spinoza. By shallow understandings, the systems of Epicurus, Lucretius, and Spinoza are all deemed Atheistical. They are really the reverse. The only conclusion really to be drawn from them is the impossibility of imagining any existence separated from the immediate agency of God, or which is not a modification of the Divine essence, as subsisting in the creature. The philosophy of heathenism, therefore, even including the Epicurean systems, is really a Theistic philosophy. The heathen speculatists did not certainly personify the Deity, nor recognise his interference in mundane affairs, as the Jewish prophets and historians do; but it may be most assuredly shown that the religious theistic creeds of Socrates and Plato are in essence the same as that of Moses and the Prophets, though less

strongly held, and less boldly taught. The heathen philosophers, disbelieving idolatry, yet tolerated, and even encouraged it, as an innocent phantasy. The Jewish lawgivers and hierarchy denounced it as an impious, degrading, and demoralising superstition—abhorrent to God, destructive to man. Moses, taught more immediately from above, saw that which the best heathens failed to see—the pernicious effect of all symbolical worship, (which, in the hands of the vulgar, quickly degenerates into superstitions the most wicked and degrading,) and he authoritatively forbade it. The difference, still, is rather practical than theoretical; and the difference in results were really moral rather than religious. The most detestable effects of the heathen idolatries were their perpetual demoralisation of the ignorant who indulged in them. Their spiritual dogmata were too absurd to bear a moment's enlightened investigation; but the vices they pampered became a habit of debauchery and folly, under the guise of religion, destructive to all who indulged in it. Even heathen civilisation, then, did not destroy religion: it only modified it. Looking at the history of all nations, we learn the same truth. Amongst the Asiatics and other semi-civilised tribes, we find traces of the spiritualised Theism of Plato and of Socrates, mixed with the gross and revolting superstitions of the lower castes. Thus in the mysteries of the Brahminical religion, as taught in Hindostan;

in the creed of Buddha, as held in China, Cochin-China, and the Japanese Isles; in the system of Confucius, as taught in China; and, lastly, in that of Zerduscht or Zoroaster—we find maxims of pure and sublime Theism, and of a morality founded upon the benevolence of God as exhibited in creation, and as imperfectly imitated by his creatures, according to their scale of intelligence. In all these countries there is more or less of the *exoteric* and *esoteric* in religious belief and profession. The vulgar are contented with a grosser idolatry; the refined fly to a more intellectual spirituality: and in this, unquestionably, resided the secret of Mahomet's success in Western Asia, so much, in some degree, nearer our own times. The "Koran," built, as it partly is, upon the teaching of Christ, and of Moses and his successors, though mixed with much of the grosser notions of a less civilised state of society, was indubitably a great improvement upon the rude and debasing superstitions which it supplanted. Its morality in some points is very high. The idea of supreme power and justice there exhibited is simply sublime: nor are there wanting Christian divines who have supposed that, as a messenger to the descendants of Ishmael, Mahomet is an undoubted and inspired instrument of Divine Providence, to prepare them for that more perfect Christian faith which they are yet incapable of apprehending or valuing.

If we follow this investigation down to modern times, we shall find that, so far has the refinement of learning and science been from lessening religious belief, it has immensely extended, varied, and increased it. Up to the establishment of Christianity in Europe, and its spread, partially, throughout the globe, religion, with the sole exception of the Jewish Scriptures, formed no great feature in the literature of any people. The Shastres, the Vedas, and the Zendavesta—the maxims of Confucius and the divinity of Fo—were confined to a few of the initiated: they were to the vulgar sealed books. After the success of Christianity, however, in Europe, religion went hand in hand with literature and science. This no candid mind can deny. It is true that the metaphysical controversies which arose, and were through many centuries carried forward, with regard to the Holy Trinity, to the nature of Christ, and to various of the more abstruse doctrines of the successors of the Apostles, as handed down and taught by the Church, were conducted with an improper acrimony, and under feelings so mistaken as at length to lead to great cruelties, and vast and deplorable injustice. But it is also true that to the Church, and to her authorised teachers, we owe the revival of learning and of science; the cultivation of national refinement; the spread of morality, and consequent humanity and justice; and the appreciation of true and rational liberty, and the relations which

ought to subsist between man and man. Thus, and by these means, religion, for the first time, became a great ingredient in the general literature of mankind. First, the various controversies of a directly religious nature—such as the Arian, Manichæan, and other distinctly theological disputes—formed a large portion of the literature of many centuries, and tinctured not only the moral teaching, but the history, and even the poetry, of the times. And next, out of these controversies various others, partly of a philosophical nature, have arisen, which have also deeply imbued the literature of all succeeding ages, and must so continue to do. Thus has taken root the great controversy as to philosophical necessity and liberty as affecting motive; as to the lawfulness of slavery; as to the foundation of governments and of the rights of rulers; as to the extent and nature of the tradition and authority of the Church; as to the inviolability of Church property; and as to the lawfulness of war, and of resistance to the injuries of bad rulers or ambitious neighbours. In all this portion of our literature, religion has thus become mixed; and later times have again greatly modified and extended this description of writing, in which religious considerations become blended in almost all questions in which society takes a deep and general interest. "The Reformation" is the event to which this further extension is owing. In the lapse of ages, many of the elder controversies

had become exhausted. The Valentinians, the Paulicians, the Manichæans, the Montanists, the Sabellians, the Pelagians, the varied and multiform grades of Gnostics, the two divisions of Arians, and the metaphysical quarrel between the Eastern and Western Churches as to Christ's nature and procession, had become silent and exhausted. The Protestant Reformation, however, opened out a new, and, as it should seem, interminable series of new controversies, proceeding from the multiform religious sects to which that decisive overthrow gave rise and name. Calvin and Servetus soon differed with Luther and Melancthon; and from the greater divisions of doctrine and forms of Church government, an infinity of minor doctrinal modifications and varieties of sect have sprung, amongst whom disputation is endless, and amalgamation, or even agreement, impossible. In England, the Church established by law consists really of three or four parties, all opposing each other, and all endeavouring to discountenance each other by means of publications, to which there seems no assignable limit, either as to number or bulk. To these disputes, again, modern subtlety, and the audacity of modern speculation, have added many more. In France, in Germany, and in England, the truths of Christianity have been denied, or explained away, by various philosophical theorists, whose wish it has apparently been to establish on their ruins some system of

abstract Theism, and of morality, resting on the basis of "expediency," or the abstract "fitness of things," but not further sanctioned by expressed divine command or teaching. To these speculations we may refer a large portion of the writings of Voltaire, of Mirabaud, of Volney, of Caylus, of D'Alembert, of Diderot, and of La Place, in France; of Lord Herbert, of Toland, of Tindall, of Hume, of Chubb, of Collins, and others, in England; and of Paulus, Fichte, Hegel, and Strauss, in Germany. To these disputes metaphysical and physical science have, in these later times, added others. Thus Spinoza and Berkeley, Malebranche and Boscovich, Priestley and Hume, have, with more or less distinctness, denied the commonly received opinions as to the true nature of the external or material universe; and the researches of geology, under Cuvier, Humboldt, Buckland, and others, have gone to deny the Mosaic chronology, and to cast uncertainty upon that age of the world received as the true one for centuries.

Nor must it be supposed that, by even the most audacious of these speculations, the powers of the religious principle have really been diminished. A comprehensive historical view of the spread and progress of religious feeling demonstrates the contrary. In all times, subtle, peculiar, and daring minds, have speculated on the foundations and evidences of religious belief. In all times, such speculations have found or

made adherents; and one religious or philosophical sect has followed another, in endless modification of theory and of creed. But this is not to be called irreligion, in the abstract. It is merely subtlety and singularity of genius modifying that which is received into something that is new. Such speculative beliefs are short-lived, and are of a brief day and a most limited influence. The scepticism of Hume, and the subtle and etherealised theories of Berkeley and of Spinoza, have been famous in the world of science; but it would not now be easy to find twenty professed followers of either. Theories, in fact, of this abstract and mystical nature, are too refined by far for the vulgar intellect, and only act upon temperaments of a similar constitution. From Pyrrho down to Hume, an abstract system of scepticism has always existed; but it could never be entertained but by a few kindred minds. Bishop Berkeley was a learned, an acute, a profound, a pious, and a most accomplished and amiable being; but what other bishop have his writings ever influenced to deny the existence of a material universe as vulgarly believed? Not one. In reality, the most extraordinary of the theories that have been set on foot as to the abstract truths of religion, and the topics connected with theological belief and teaching, only prove the universality of the religious principle. Man cannot get rid of it. Subtle, daring, and acute men have struggled to modify faith

in every conceivable direction. What is the result? Nothing but this, that, however varied it may be, religious notions are ineradicable from society. Their shapes may be multiform, but their sway is universal; and the most ingenious sceptic does little more than substitute that which is mystical and startling for that which is common and customary—an unintelligible abstraction, pleasing to a few, for a broad doctrine admissible by many; whilst, by the very act of doing so, he turns men's minds to the contemplation of religion in the abstract, and, where he unsettles one intellect, perhaps confirms the simpler creed of thousands. The conclusion we must necessarily come to, then, is plainly this—that as civilisation and science have progressed, so have the multiplicity and extent of religious inquiry: that is all. Ancient theories have been supplanted by more modern subtleties and refinements; old distinctions have died, and new ones been born; ancient doubts have expired, or merged in our younger scepticisms; but religion is more universal than ever. There is more talked, thought, written, preached, printed, and read, of and concerning religious topics, in this century, than during any former century; and the perversity of human intellect can no more shut God, and his providence, and his futurity, and his scheme of final rewards and retributions, out of the world now, than it could the day after its divine Maker created it.

In fine, then, the testimony of history seems perfectly conclusive as to the reality of all that has been advanced. Men have modified their social condition in every conceivable way, and in every imaginable direction : they have set out ignorant, but simple and unsophisticated savages, and ended in founding empires ; they have begun without an alphabet, and ended in erecting the mighty monuments of science and literature ; they have set out worshipping stocks and stones, the clouds, the winds, the light, and the lightnings—they have gone on to the sublime doctrines of Christianity, and the lofty aspirations and views of philosophical Theism. In all this, their course has been marked out for them, and confined within rigid limits. Whilst the progress has been eternal, the leading phenomena have been the same. The primeval forms of society have been fixed by a sempiternal necessity, whilst the minor modifications have been opened to an infinite variety. Immutability has been, at one and the same time, a bridle and a stimulant for change ; and, whilst man is for ever in progress, the moral laws which regulate it are the same at *omega* as they were at *alpha*.

In this exquisitely beautiful and admirable arrangement are to be found analogies conformable to the grand regulations which govern the material world. The surface of the globe, and probably its interior, are governed by similar general laws. The great dis-

positions of matter and distinctions of climate are rigorously preserved. The earth is divided into land and water. The spherical form of the planet is preserved. The torrid, temperate, and frigid zones divide climature into three divisions all round it. In every case rocks and minerals are beneath, and soil and *debris* above. Yet, under these rigid divisions, an infinite variety of arrangement, scenery, temperature, vegetation, and animal life is found. The irregular is included beneath the regular; and an eternal change covered under a mighty plan, whose outlines are immutable.

CHAPTER XII.

CONCLUSIONS, NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE.—RECAPITULATION.

If all that has been laid down is founded, as the author believes it to be, in undeniable truth, there remains to be drawn from this complicated ratiocination a series of important conclusions, in the verity of which the welfare of society appears to be inextricably involved. If the foregoing reasoning be correct, then may we deduce from it, with absolute certainty, certain results, which, in reality, amount to rules of conduct of a nature not to be mistaken nor doubted. Upon the soundness of that which precedes them does their own soundness, of course, depend; but if the premises be sure, these deductions cannot be impugned; and they must remain in force, and imperative upon those to whom the guidance of society is committed, until that on which they rest shall be exploded or swept away. These deductions are both of a negative and of a positive character. They teach us what we cannot do, as well as what we can do; and, in the fate

which has attended all violations of them, we find the best and last evidence of their truth.

The first negative conclusion to which we naturally, and in the ordinary process of reasoning, arrive, seems to be, the futility of all dreams of universal empire, and the impossibility of effecting any fusion of nations into one homogeneous mass. To any such process it is clear there is a bar in the constitution of the human mind. Nations have been exterminated—as the Carthaginians were by the fear and vengeance of Rome—and as the Celtic nations were by the series of irruptions of an over-population, commencing in India, and pushing and destroying all before them westward—but never artificially changed. To do this, policy is totally impotent, and force equally so. In point of fact, all history and all experience convince us, that the only method of amalgamating tribes into a national federation is, to respect and acknowledge, and not to attack their points of difference. The truth of this conclusion the state of every large country proves. Even down to the division of a province, a department, or a county, there are minor differences of dialect, feeling, superstition, usage, and habit, any attempt to invade or repress which, would occasion immediate hostility. In the larger divisions of countries this becomes more marked. There exists a difference in language, literature, law, and religion, in every division of a great kingdom or empire. This is

universal. Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Scandinavia, Russia, the Netherlands, and England, equally exhibit this truth; nor could either force or policy obliterate these distinctions. Normandy will never become Béarn; Scotland cannot be England; Wales and Ireland must remain equally distinguished; Biscay and Andalusia, Castile and Catalonia, must ever be separated by certain forms of demarcation; Portugal must be equally so; Lombardy, Naples, Tuscany, and the other Italian states, will never amalgamate in customs, dialect, and character; whilst the threads that hold together the discordant masses of the Austrian, Russian, and Turkish empires, are liable to be severed by the first great national shock that shall befall these countries. Thus, then, nations may be destroyed, but they cannot be fused and mingled. Whilst a unit of the mass remains, he still preserves the peculiarities of his tribe; and the habits and feelings of nationality only expire when he dies.

With the same certainty we may assure ourselves that, under every possible phase of society, the distinctions of rank must, in some way, exist. No attempts to level down these distinctions has ever succeeded, or ever can succeed. They cannot do so, because this inequality springs directly from the mental constitution of mankind, and is, in fact, necessary to their happiness. To destroy it would (were that possible) be to destroy one of the great springs of

action; and, without excitement to exertion, man at once becomes miserable. Louis XIV., in his old age, worn out, disappointed, and without an aim, could not be more beyond the possibility of being made happy, even for an hour, than would men be were the possibility of altering their *status* and condition in life irrevocably cut off. Hence all attempts to introduce this sort of equality, even amongst small bodies of men, have been uniformly baffled by the speedy desertion of the members. This all history—all experience—demonstrate. It is to a partial feeling of this impossibility of altering their *status* that we must, in justice to them, attribute the addiction to sensual excess exhibited by many individuals of the lower classes of society. It was deemed advisable, certainly, to introduce a community of goods in the very infancy of Christianity; but as soon as the young plant struck root, the necessity ceased, and the plan was abandoned. The purpose proposed had, in fact, been secured. A body of preachers of the faith, devoted to its propagation, had been by this process trained and disciplined. They went forth to teach all nations; and, from that hour, Christians were under the same law of moral government that, in all times, has really regulated societies of men. Since that time, experience has shown that all communities attempted to be held together upon this principle have speedily dispersed. These attempts have generally arisen out of the natu-

ral desire of enthusiastic men to escape from their share of the evils that necessarily accompany imperfect states of society. Like all enthusiasts, they have rushed into the opposite extreme, in this their vain endeavour. To avoid the excess, they have attempted to destroy the principle. The result has been, that an attempt so unnatural, and so directly at war with the constitution of the human mind, has been persevered in only by a few. The single hermit has perhaps died in his faith—a contempt of the motives which urge on man to action. "Monachism," or select bodies of recluse persons living under a law of something approaching to internal equality, has also succeeded; but even here these societies, though exhibiting an approximation to an internal equality, have yet been ever acted upon by the inequalities surrounding them, and have been kept forcibly together by the bonds of creed and of religion. Such lay societies as have made the attempt have been abortive in duration and results; and this must ever be the case. There is, in truth, observable in the minds of the most ordinary thinkers, an instinctive scepticism (if such expression be allowable) as to all such schemes and proposals, however modified. Nothing is felt to be so Utopian as this sort of Utopia. No romance ever appeared so improbable—no paradox so startling. The cause of this involuntary scepticism is self-evident: the mind immediately revolts from that which is opposed to its very constitution. The enthusiast alone, whose soul is

more engaged in the contemplation of that which he thinks to escape than of that which he embraces, perseveres, and is disappointed.

The same want of success has attended all those institutions which encroach upon the dominion of those motives which, in the human mind, create the family ties and affections. In many nations, even when greatly civilised, the separation of husband and wife has been legally easy; but this has not been found greatly to add to the number of such separations. In France, for a short period, during which divorce might take place by mutual consent of the parties, divorces were not many. Neither is it possible to divest human nature, by any violence, from the tie of attachment to children. So strong is this passion of our nature, that we find men who are childless adopting the children of others. The secret of this resides in the strong necessity for sympathy which forms part of our constitution. No human being can bear with equanimity the consciousness of being alone in the world, an outcast from all sympathy. Few minds can endure the troubles which worldly vicissitudes entail upon us, without some trusted minds to whom to impart grief, and from whom to seek consolation. This assurance of sympathy a family alone can supply. Friendship may be a substitute, but it is a sadly imperfect one—and one, also, seldom found. Hence, to many men we see the death of a wife, or

the estrangement of a disobedient or vicious child, is a fatal blow. It is a loss of sympathy, in its own nature irremediable, which some temperaments cannot sustain. To attempt, therefore, as some have done, to cut away the ties of family, is to destroy, at one blow, the strongest excitement to action, and the surest source of sympathy. Can it be a matter for wonder that such schemes do not succeed? Strip a human being of family, rank, and country, and that being becomes divested of all motives to act, save those of the grossest selfishness. Such a being is necessarily unhappy, inasmuch as we find the greatest happiness to reside in our sympathy with others, and theirs with us, and in the excitement to those actions which produce them most surely. The prisoner of forty years begged, when the Bastille was razed, to be restored to his dungeon! Family, rank, and country had been to him annihilated. He had neither friends, compatriots, wife, nor children, nor relatives on earth, and all that was left him was his gaoler's sympathy, without which he was nothing! After all these considerations, it surely cannot need any great stretch of logic to prove the exceeding shallowness, not to say folly, of that so-called "philosophy" which would teach us to merge all sympathies in an abstract "citizenship," and love only the most worthy. For the worthy to obtain a general respect is an easy matter; but what is to become of the unworthy? It

is to the ties of blood and the relations of family that we must here look for help. The father alone will kill "the fatted calf" for the repentant prodigal; reclaim vice by bearing with it; and repair unworthiness by means of a superfluity of sympathy beyond mere desert, but in strict accordance with the claims of mercy and loving-kindness. Those natures which are vicious enough to resist the kinder discipline of parental and fraternal tuition and example, resist all other discipline for the most part. The criminal becomes that which he is, only because his sympathies are depraved; and the sympathy even of depravity is stronger than law. Legal punishment is only the cure for crime in the last resort. It is in general inefficient as to the individual, and only efficacious in the prevention of the effects upon others of bad example. A moral community was never yet made but under schooling of home; nor can any schoolmaster replace the father and mother, nor any example excite like that of brother or sister. "The boy" is truly "the father of the man," nor can any power but that which first bends the twig give direction to the tree for good or for evil. To strike at the ties of family is, therefore, not only to destroy the strongest source of virtuous action, but the best school of moral culture—to blight society in its spring—and, by perverting the earlier shoots, to deprave the after progress of the noble tree.

If the foregone conclusions be founded in truth, we may, with equal certainty, deduce one more, of the same negative character, from all that has been laid down. That fourth conclusion is the impossibility of extirpating or changing the religion of a people, either by force or fraud, or even reasoning, unless such reasoning be united with a great advance in general learning and intelligence. Amongst the ancients the attempt to alter national creeds by force seems seldom to have been made. The creed of polytheism was, in its own nature, accommodating, and readily adopted new gods into its family. One of the earliest instances of religious persecution is that of the Druids by the Romans. How far it succeeded is doubtful. The priests were destroyed, but it cannot be ascertained either what the faith was, or how long it remained in spite of the conquerors. If, as there seems some ground to suspect, it was a system of Theism, with symbols, like that of the ancient Persians, it might long continue, after its symbolical worship was abolished by the victors with whose accommodating creed it could not be made to agree. History, in fact, does not afford any instances of national religion changed by mere violence. The spread of Mahometanism, and the introduction by the Spaniards of Christianity into America, come perhaps nearest to it. It would be a hasty conclusion, however, to attribute either of these events to mere brutal compulsion. The first Maho-

metan converts must have been voluntary; their early military success must also have impressed many more with an idea of preternatural assistance. It must however, always be remembered that, with their religion, they introduced a refinement and a literature new to the tribes with whom they had to deal. There is no doubt that, even during the period of the Crusades, the Ottomans were upon the whole a more refined people than those who bore the Cross. Saladin was a finer gentleman than Cœur-de-Lion; nor was Mahomet II. inferior in accomplishment to the Constantine Palæologus whom he overturned. The Spaniards had the same advantage in Mexico and Peru. To these simple people their invaders and conquerors seemed little less than gods; and this feeling of utter inferiority must have compelled them, in a manner, to view the religion of such men with awe and a trembling reverence. All other modern attempts at a forcible proselytism have failed. Philip II. of Spain, and Louis XIV. of France, in vain assailed the novelties of Protestantism by force of arms; and the efforts to root out Popery from Ireland have been just as unsuccessful. Equally futile was the mad and sanguinary crusade against all religion by the French democratic leaders of 1793. In the capital, the corruption of the Gallican clergy, and of the upper classes, had long sown the seeds of irreligion and licentiousness; but, in the distant provinces,

where the *curés* had done their duty, neither the guillotine nor bayonet could effect anything. The Revolution itself became revolutionised by the reaction created by its own mad excesses, and France is now more religious than she was in the profligate reign of Louis XV. Such is the history of all religious persecution. Religion may be partially sapped and mined by corruption and licentiousness, and its power withstood by artful sophistry amongst individuals. When force, however, is applied, the resistance is immediate. The mind at once appreciates the excess of the outrage, and the value of that attempted to be violated—freedom of conscience in religious matters; nor can that resistance cease but with the life of the persecuted.

Such are the negative conclusions to which we are irresistibly led by the foregoing reasoning. The positive results are still more important.

In the first place, it seems evident that the idea of property becomes so early implanted in the human mind, that no nation, however rude, can be said to be altogether destitute of it. Everywhere there exist a *meum* and a *tuum;* and, in some way, the sacredness of the distinction is more or less acknowledged. That which everybody desires, most persons must possess in a greater or less proportion. Nothing but a fiscal tyranny, and extravagance of the most extraordinary nature and extent, can prevent a civilised and indus-

trious people from accumulating the ordinary comforts of life. In England, for many centuries, this was the case, especially under the Plantagenets. Of this absence of pauperism the evidence is irresistible, unless where oppression of a feudal nature in some way exists. The English military codes, from the early Plantagenets up to the Reformation, prove that common soldiers then all possessed property, and were punished by fines for all minor offences. Even in the Turkish empire, the simple method of taxation so mitigates the effects of an imperfect government that pauperism is unknown and population thin. This is the case with all countries not weighed down by a tyrannical military aristocracy, or by excessive taxation. Hence, in all such countries, the sacredness of property is not only universally assented to, but the majority have a direct motive for resenting any breach of its laws. Nor is it any argument against the universality of this assent, to say that its dictates are sometimes set at nought by individuals. This proves nothing to the purpose. It is true that vicious, greedy, and shortsighted persons sometimes fancy they may with impunity, and gain to themselves, violate the distinctions of property ; but such persons never really deny the imperative necessity of those distinctions. Thieves, in fact, feel themselves, like other men, compelled to be honest towards each other. They are at war with society, and set its interests at

defiance ; but, to keep their own community together, they are compelled to preserve amongst themselves the very regulations which they violate with regard to others. Upon the sacredness of property, national and individual, all extended and civilised communities really therefore rest. They could not exist otherwise ; and this is instinctively felt by all. Hence though, in the history of nations, we find a few instances of small communities attempting an equal division of property, there is no instance of any people deliberately setting the law of property at defiance—so strongly is its primal necessity implanted in the minds of men. The conclusion then is, that those alarms in which men sometimes indulge as to the safety of property are visionary. Next to the preservation of life, the preservation of property is the earliest and strongest of human instinctive convictions. All men assent to its necessity who know what it is, and savages are not totally ignorant of it. If property has, therefore, ever been in a partial degree or momentarily endangered, it is from some false step on the part of those who possess it. It would be absurd to conclude that society could possibly conspire against that upon which society feels itself to rest. It has in no instance done so ; and where the law of property has undergone real or apparent violation, that anomaly may always be traced to some anomalous conduct on the part of its holders.

Another result of the reasoning into which we have gone, is the certainty of the maxim that man is always in a state of change, and probably progress. This constant advance from one stage to another is the necessary effect of that constant excitement to better our condition, which is part of human nature. In many cases these changes are not found to bring about the result anticipated; nor do they, in any instance, fulfil the expectations of those who make them. Counterbalancing disadvantages are found to start up and neutralise the expected benefit. But the love of improvement is omnipotent and immortal, though often disappointed. Some nations are more prone to it than others; but in all it exists. When, from the nature of the government or the religion of the people, this progress is materially impeded, debility ensues: the national energy decays; national combination becomes more and more difficult; the military spirit dies; and the nation becomes the prey of others, or falls to pieces through its own weakness. This is necessarily the event; because, where activity and energy are not, sensuality and recklessness and effeminacy are too apt to supervene. The present condition of the Turkish and Chinese empires is corroborative of this truth. The nature of the government has quelled the energies of the people. They have ceased to be progressive, and debility has succeeded to activity. The consequence is, they are now marked out as the

ultimate prey of more ambitious nations, and are only preserved, for a time, by the mutual jealousies of their enemies. It is certain that pastoral communities are less progressive than others, and that commercial countries are most so. Commerce, in fact, in some measure supplies the means, as well as the desire, of change; and hence few countries become highly refined that are destitute of it. In all communities, however, mutation, more or less, is a necessary ingredient; and, where it is wanting, the community itself is ultimately destroyed.

From these considerations, another still more weighty is directly deduced. Civilisation is expansion; and expansion of the mental faculties is the creation of force—the force of opinion, and of the desires that accompany it. For this, it is evident, society ought always to be provided. If it be not so, that peril which springs from the compression of an increasing inward force must ever be imminent. In a community, this pressure, as we have already seen, is upwards. As civilisation, literature, and expanded ideas, descend lower and lower in society, men's minds expand and grow, and their desires and aspirations grow with them. If this be not provided for, and forcible suppression be attempted, the result is political explosion, or else the gradual destruction of the community placed in a position contrary to the law of its nature. If we minutely trace the whole of the causes that have

led to political convulsions and to civil revolutions in states, we shall find them, for the most part, thus to originate. We shall also find that, where civil progress and its natural privileges have been forcibly suppressed, such communities have sunk into sensuality, corruption, recklessness, and effeminacy, and so perished. These results are both necessary and natural. Knowledge is power and energy ; and to attempt to repress that power and energy which result from the increase of popular knowledge, is an attempt almost as desperate as to repress, by force, the expansion in substances caused by the admission of heat. In both cases the structure, be it a civil community or an iron bridge, is at last invariably brought down. Of the former of these results the pages of history afford innumerable instances. One of the most celebrated in ancient annals is the revolt, under Spartacus, of the Roman slave population. These men had many of them great attainments. They knew the military art : they were versed in literature, in medicine, and in philosophy. Some of the greatest Latin writers were slaves, or sons of slaves. These accomplishments they could not have, unaccompanied by a deep sense of their degraded condition. The result was a civil war, which brought the republic, now corrupt and declining, into great jeopardy, and which was only quelled after enormous cruelty and bloodshed. More modern times are rife of such examples. The

Jacquerie in France, and the terrible Revolution of 1789, were the direct results of the oppression, tyranny, and corruption of a profligate court and noblesse, combined with an indebted exchequer and failing taxes in the last instance. Tyler's rebellion, and the grand English Rebellion of 1640, were similarly caused, religious oppression being mixed with fiscal exactions in the latter case. Of the same nature and origin were the revolts in Italy under Mas'Aniello and Rienzi, and in Switzerland under Tell. The numerous revolts in Ireland have sprung from a like source—religious and agrarian oppression carried to the extreme of cruelty; and not far different from these are the successful rebellion of the Negro slaves of St Domingo, and the almost triumphant struggle of the Maroons in Jamaica. From the tyranny and bigotry of the Spanish kings and ministers, we derive the independence of Holland and Belgium; and to the same narrow notions of government, cherished by English parliaments as well as Spanish councils, we owe the republics of the New World.

From the same reasoning, also, results the explanation of the undoubted fact, that, though oppressed communities get rid of some great and galling evils by these convulsive and spasmodic efforts, they rarely succeed in substituting a perfect government in lieu of that destroyed. For this they are seldom prepared. The progress to perfection in society is slow and gradual;

it cannot be obtained by force, or by any brief process. Hence a civilised people, not prepared for liberty, but suddenly obtaining it, fail, from want of due knowledge and discipline, in erecting new institutions. They are misled by crude theories, and an arrogant and shallow philosophy, which knows not, or else contemns, the laws of moral government amongst men. To the want of this saving knowledge may be traced the unhappy results of many political revolutions; and to its presence the success of others. Mirabeau, Sièyes, Brissot, and Robespierre failed, because they mistook metaphysical phantasies and philanthropic dreams for philosophy and statesmanship. The mistake cost seas of blood and tears. Washington, Franklin, Adams, and Jefferson succeeded, because they adopted or copied that which experience had proved to be practically beneficial—the ancient Anglo-Saxon institutions and common-law. The American republic is a close copy of the British government, as it existed under Edward III., and was conducted by him—a president only being substituted for a king, and a senate for the house of peers. The results of both have been nearly similar: diffused wealth—a quiet and happy population—equality of rights and laws—and the peaceful enjoyment of property by all ranks.

When those who naturally govern all countries—that is to say, the ranks created by wealth, leisure,

and high education—mistake their duties, and, failing to make due provision for the expansion of mind which is in perpetual progress beneath them, support, by force, institutions which have now lost their former fitness and aptitude, either an eventual explosion is the consequence, or else the empire perishes by a slow process of gradual debility and decomposition. The steps by which this second process takes place may be clearly apprehended and pointed out, and the analogy between the body politic and a material living body, similarly treated, manifestly demonstrated. If, for instance, we were to take a growing youth, and subject his entire frame to some powerful and irresistible compression, similar to that which the Chinese apply to the foot of the unfortunate female of high rank, what must be the inevitable consequence of such a proceeding? It must be, when applied to the whole frame, an exaggeration of the pernicious effect which the custom of tight-lacing has upon the female frame. The functions of the entire microcosm would be checked and depraved; the secretions would become diseased; the internal arrangement distorted; the muscles would lose their power, the nerves their energy, and a general debility and organic distortion would result—from which must spring, first, disease; and lastly, destruction. An analogous process takes place in the body politic, when the natural expansion of the national mind and intellect is checked by despotic

regulations. Manners become first vitiated: deprived of the field which nature intended for the exercise of the best energies of man's intellectual nature, sensuality, trifling, corrupt literature, and selfish indulgence, usurp the place of patriotism, and of a manly freedom of thought and expression. The virtue which men dare not imitate they soon ridicule, and then disbelieve; and the selfish and slavish intrigues and rivalries of courtiers succeed to the honest aspirations of the statesman and the philanthropist. Gambling, voluptuousness, luxury, and dissipation of time and mind, occupy the field which the duties of the citizen ought to have dignified; and virtue, honour, religion, honesty, and common sense, are superseded by every possible form of selfishness, subservience, and mental degradation. Under such a state of society, government becomes self-subversive. There is no check to the extravagance, the cupidity, the peculation, and want of principle of those who conduct it. Public opinion becomes itself depraved. Men who disbelieve in virtue and integrity soon come to glory in their opposites; and the very nature of vice and crime, and honour and honesty, comes to be confounded in the depravity of intellect that ensues. The press, as well as the professor and the preacher, becomes an instrument of delusion; until, amidst the indifference of the mercenary, the treason of the selfish, and the profligacy of the unthinking, public spirit dies, and the

strength, and safety, and energy of the commonwealth become sapped, mined, and extinguished. In such a case a state becomes ultimately the prey either of foreign conquest or of revolution. To this state Poland was reduced, and also France, during the last century. The result was that the first was finally partitioned by three aggressive neighbours, and the second revolutionised by the consequences of her own depravity and corruption. For one, existence, and name, and language are blotted out; for the other, revolution has wrought a change rather than a cure, amidst torrents of blood and suffering, and catastrophes the most appalling. The throne, the noblesse, the church, nay, for a time, religion itself, have been buried under the torrents of lava thrown up by the violence of that terrible volcano, and a new political structure is now reared upon the still warm ruins of the old institutions which this moral earthquake buried. Such is the history of all nations that become politically corrupt. There are only two fates possible for such—the fate of total prostration and imbecility, or the occurrence of violent and volcanic reaction from the pent-up elements beneath. The whole may be traced to the mistaken fears or selfishness of those who govern; and the only rule of safety is a wise and considerate yielding to that expansion, which no human efforts can either prevent or otherwise control.

If the consequences of the causeless or exaggerated fears of the ruling classes be terrible, they are not more so than the fears themselves are baseless. Property was never for one moment made insecure, save by its own errors or crimes; nor did wealth ever lose its full and legitimate influence over the multitude, save from the like causes. It is true that, at all times, in all countries, and in all stages of civilisation of which we know anything, many individuals are to be found who envy the wealthy, and would unjustly despoil them; but such natures form a small minority, and they are by no means to be either sought for or found amongst the poor alone. The truth is, that the rich are robbed by the rich more than by the indigent. The difference is, that one is done in open defiance, and the other under colour of law; but could an accurate computation be made, it would indubitably be discovered that the fruits of insidious evasion or wresting of the law are far beyond the spoils of its open violation. It would take a hundred "Barringtons" or "Bill Soameses" to make up one "Colonel Chartres," or one "Sir Giles Overreach." It is a misplaced fear, then, to place the perils of property upon the machinations of the poor, who are far more ready to risk life and limb for its preservation than are the more opulent classes. This is apparent in the annals of every fire and of every shipwreck. The fears for the rights of property, however, if its risk is

to arise from the combination against it of any large class, are futile, absurd, and unfounded. No community, even of half-civilised men, ever retraced their steps in this matter. Whatever be their acquired ideas of these rights, the majority ever uphold them; and for this plain reason, because no one thinks a majority can be benefited by the extinction of these laws. It is true that, in France and some other countries, by extinguishing the custom of primogenitural inheritance, and by interfering with individual will as to the descent of property, the former divisions of property existing in such countries have been altered and modified; but this cannot be called, with propriety, any violation of the great principle upon which property is held. Undue accumulations in the hands of eldest sons, to the injury of the younger portion of the family, have been thus prevented; but the principle of property has been held sacred, and its more equitable division amongst its legal claimants only provided for. It is true, also, that in all countries are persons to be found who would not scruple to violate these rights for their own selfish purposes; but this is inconsistency, and not a denial of the principle. Such inconsistent persons are few in number; nor will they be found to dispute the reality of the right of property, at the same time that they think to gain by making an exception in favour of their own release from its immediate effect. Thus, then, these

rights, though trenched upon by some, are really acknowledged by all; and until all men be consistent, we cannot say more as to the universality of the acknowledgment of any proposition. There is no conclusion, however demonstrably true, that the idea of gain would not tempt certain minds to deny; but this is only admitting that there are, here and there, men who will seek gain at the expense of any inconsistency, and does not alter the universality of the truth of the proposition.

If these conclusions spring legitimately from the premises laid down, and the evidence collaterally adduced—and, in the author's opinion, this seems undeniable—they only form a natural avenue to a further and still more important axiom, which naturally results from the admission of their truth. This axiom is, that it is at once the duty and the safety—for duty and good policy are really inseparable companions—of the ruling classes to educate, not only themselves, but those classes which are beneath them, and to emancipate and enfranchise them as soon as they are fit to act the part and understand the duties and rights of the citizen. It is in the right direction of a people's education that the salvation and prosperity of a state really lie. Under all circumstances, a people will advance in some direction, and after some method. Opinion will not be stilled. There is no effectual opiate for the human mind: it will move

in some direction, right or wrong; under the direction of some leaders, wise or unwise. Words, therefore, cannot possibly exaggerate the vast importance of so dealing with a nation's mind as to secure that its advance shall be in the right direction, and its general conclusions healthy and sound. To secure this, a sound and healthy education is the one thing needful; and in this essential most nations have failed altogether, or rightly persevered only for a time: and if, in the wide circle of ancient history, we find some few illustrious examples, though still imperfect, of the beneficial effects of a virtuous discipline, which may put to shame the best of the results that have sprung from more modern systems of national training, we shall, after a careful examination of this matter, discover what have been the defects, and what the excellences of the various systems, exhibiting consequences so different; and how it has happened that modern science, and literature, and philosophy, backed by the precepts of a more perfect religious belief, have failed, in so many cases, to produce that national happiness which might be expected as their fruit. To refer to the happiness and prosperity of the Jewish people, under their great lawgiver, Moses, under their Judges, and under some of the best of their kings, might lay me open to objection, inasmuch as it might be argued that this people were, in fact, under a Theocracy, and to such these results are, for the most part, to be attri-

buted. To the earlier annals of Greece and Rome let us therefore turn for examples not liable to this objection; and there we shall find them. We at once lay our hands upon the Lives of Plutarch, and ask ourselves the plain question, whether it be possible that many of the illustrious men whose actions are there chronicled, could have arisen, save out of a system of national training in many respects excellent, though necessarily very imperfect? It seems impossible to answer this question in the negative, inasmuch as the greater proportion of these statesmen and heroes took their origin from the poorer classes of Greece and Rome, and were only a sample of the best of the extensive class from which they sprang. That education must have been generally good and sound which (not to mention Leonidas, Curtius, Mutius Scævola, and Cocles) produced such characters as Aristides, as Miltiades, as Cimon, as Themistocles, as Pericles, as Socrates, as Dion, as Pelopidas, as Epaminondas, as Aratus, as Philopæmen, as Agis, as Agesilaus, as Plato; or as Junius Brutus, or Camillus, or Cato the Censor, or Cincinnatus, or Fabius, or Paulus Emilius, or Caius Gracchus, or Tiberius Gracchus, or Marcellus, or the Scipios, or Pompey, or Cato the Younger, or Marcus Brutus, or Cicero, or even Cæsar! It is true that the political systems which produced these great and illustrious men sank at last under the decrepitude of corruption which followed their rise and ultimate suc-

cess. This is true. But have the revival and spread of science, education, and a religious belief and morality than which we cannot conceive anything more perfect, produced, in modern times, characters more illustrious as statesmen and patriots? This question will hardly be answered in the affirmative. It is important, therefore, to inquire into the causes of a result at once so unexpected and so extraordinary; for by the solution of this so interesting problem will a light be thrown upon the question of national education, which we might otherwise have sought in vain.

In attempting to elucidate the causes of this so singular result, it is only necessary to ascertain and compare the moral condition of Greece and Rome with the moral condition of modern Europe. In these conditions, when explained and compared with each other, are to be found the reasons that have led to this consequence so unexpected and so remarkable. Morality, as we have already seen, divides itself into two departments—that is to say, into public and private morality. Private morals comprehend only the duties of individuals to each other. Public morals are the duties of the citizen to the state. It is true that the duties of the citizen to the state are not unconnected with the duties of the individual. On the contrary, the maxims on which one set of duties is founded, as laid down by the great Founder of Christianity, need only to be extended in their appli-

cation to demonstrate also the basis of the other. The duties of citizen may, however, be likewise demonstrated by a process of reasoning apart from the considerations of private morality. Public duty may be proved separately; and hence it has happened that men whose notions of individual moral duty were low, crude, and most imperfect, have entertained true and exalted notions of the duties of citizens; and hence, on the other hand, it has also happened that men whose lights on the subject of private morals were clear and pure, have erred through ignorance of the requirements of patriotism properly so called; and, whilst they have been good men, have been bad citizens. If we investigate the moral position of the ancient republics of Greece and of Rome, we shall find them to stand in the former of these predicaments. They were destitute of the light of Christianity, and their notions of individual moral duties were exceedingly imperfect. Their treatment of prisoners of war, and many of their laws and domestic practices, were barbarous in the extreme. That some few of their philosophers—such as Socrates, Epictetus, Cicero, and Annæus Seneca—had purer and better ideas of men's duties towards each other, is true; but the precepts of these great men did not form the moral code of their fellow-citizens, who were readier to admire than to imitate them. Thus, then, their private manners were, upon the whole, vicious and

bad. Of their duties as citizens they had, at the same time, however, high, lofty, and what moderns style "romantic" ideas. These notions of the duties of men to the state arose partly out of their form of government, and partly out of its position. The earlier annals of Rome, and the whole history of the Grecian states, depict to us a set of republics, limited in territory and numbers, and surrounded by other and rival states. With them every man was necessarily a soldier; and, where all men bear arms, and know their use, they will, of course, have a voice in the making of those laws which they are called upon to obey. Hence, in these states, the safety of the whole commonwealth depended upon the devotion to his country of each individual. Hence, also, the government was in the hands of the whole people, who enacted the laws by a common consent, and who only chose the bravest and most virtuous citizens to posts of trust or of peril. Men who are perpetually accustomed to set at nought all private comforts and private views, in order to serve their country, must, of necessity, imbibe lofty and pure notions of the patriot's destination. It could not be otherwise. This is one of the advantages that Providence gives to counterbalance the evils of the military life. In this case, where the citizen and soldier were conjunct, it produced its full crop of fruits. The people instinctively chose for consuls or generals the bravest, most disinte-

rested, and most virtuous citizens. They went to the cottage and the farm-house to seek their conquerors, legislators, and judges. They understood the laws which they themselves made, and which were simple and few. Hence, every distinguished Greek and Roman, during the best times of the republics, united in himself the soldier, the lawyer, and the patriot. He defended laws made by himself and administered by himself, and despised luxury and eschewed wealth, because then poverty and simplicity were the passports to distinction. It is true, the tooth of time destroyed all this. Conquest and wealth at last brought corruption in their train; the lawyer's calling became a trade; and the mercenary soldier sank into a plundering, unprincipled, and ferocious butcher. With the decay of public virtue commenced the political decay both of Greece and Rome. Literature adorned the decline of both, and partly arose out of that decline. Deprived of their former chances of distinction in the state, the finer minds sought a refuge in literature and philosophy, from that sense of abasement which they all evidently felt. The same process is observable in more modern history. It was under the arbitrary Tudors that English literature showed its greatest spring; and the despotism of Louis XIV. and Louis XV. did the same for France. The cause is obvious, surely. Literature, when combined with luxury and deep corruption, is impotent, however, to

preserve a country. Greece and Rome finally fell, overrun by those hordes of barbarians which the rapid growth of population in the East drove westward through so many centuries—and literature and liberty at length found one common grave.

Amidst the dim twilight which followed this gigantic overthrow arose the feudal system, which in time overspread Europe. It was a system of national defence founded upon the division of the lands by the conquerors of those lands. Under it, government was despotic. The king and his nobles did as they pleased. Men held lands upon the tenure of obedience and military service. The lowest classes were serfs. Under this system slavery was first really systematised. Every man, up to the king, owed a limited obedience and service to some other man, and that king and his great nobles were the rulers of all. Under such a system as this, liberty had not even a name, and might never again have owned one, had not one torch remained, from which the fire at length was again kindled on her altars. This torch was Christianity. Whilst everything else was overthrown, religion could not be trodden out even by the hoofs of barbarian myriads. The flame was quenched and the embers scattered, but some sparkles of living fire yet remained. From these the flame was again re-fed. The barbarian in his turn was subdued. The Church, phœnix-like, arose from her ashes; and the hidden treasures

of ancient literature and science, saved with difficulty amidst the wrecks of libraries and the dispersion of their owners, again saw the light. The Church, questionless, by the means of the monks, was the restorer of letters; and with letters came refinement, and gradual mitigation of the feudal system. The revival of liberty in Europe has been only, however, partial. In England it was most complete; in France and Spain it was more imperfect, and in Germany the same. Hence the duties of citizens have never, in modern times, been taught in Europe, as they were in Italy and in Greece, under the ancient Roman and Grecian commonwealths. In England, if we are to believe Chief-Justice Fortescue, and other writers of the period, these duties were certainly taught in perfection, comparatively speaking, from about the reign of Henry II. to the ill-starred wars of the Roses, after which English liberty again declined. The consequence has been that, all over Europe, this portion of the most necessary education of a people has been neglected, distorted, and kept in abeyance, and maxims of government the most absurd and pernicious cherished and promulgated. These maxims arose from the despotism of the Tudors and Stuarts in England; from that of the Bourbons in France, Spain, and Italy; and from that of the house of Hapsburg in Germany and Poland. By these means the ideas of civil rights and duties have nearly been

extinguished in the Old World; and dignitaries of the Church in modern times, oblivious of the lessons of Thomas à Becket and of Stephen Langton, have taught that "the people have nothing to do with the laws but to obey them!" The result has been that, in modern Europe, whilst individual morality has been refined and exalted in its teaching to the standard established by the great Author of the Christian religion, public morality and the education of the citizen have been neglected, or else depraved. In the institutions of that singular race, the Anglo-Saxons, much of the ancient spirit of the Greek and Roman civism was beyond a doubt manifested;—but these institutions have never yet been truly appreciated and understood in modern Europe; whilst in England much of the spirit has evaporated, though many of the forms remain. In republican America they have taken partial root; and we there behold the instructive spectacle of a community—in which individual morality is, to say the least of it, not better than our own—governed under a system of civism more exalted and extended than any which the Old World can at present show. We there see exhibited the at once humbling and astounding sight of individuals and whole communities not ashamed to hold their Negro fellow-men in slavery, at the same time that they are teaching, believing, and obedient to a civic code of abstract rights and duties, totally independent of

monarchical or feudal allegiance, and, though far from perfect, sufficiently so to answer all the general ends of good and rational government.

From all these considerations it seems to follow, that a want of the right education of men as citizens is the great defect of modern civilisation. This defect has arisen from an unworthy fear, in the breasts of the ruling classes, arising out of the want in themselves of that very knowledge they fear to give to others. We see governors encouraging freely all human advances in literature, art, and science. In mechanics, in geology, in mathematics, in chemistry, in medicine, in astronomy, and in metaphysics, we see various theories taught, and taught by professors of institutions founded expressly for the advancement of learning. Theology we see the occupation of an extensive class of teachers, educated with great care for that sole purpose; and with theology we have the duties of man, as an individual moral agent, constantly expounded and enforced. But of the theory and foundation of civil government, and of the rights and duties of man as a portion of the state, we see little or nothing taught. We are led to deem of the writings of the greatest civilians, such as Puffendorf and Grotius, as legal rather than moral works, and as fit to be read by those lawyers only who wish to examine the foundations as well as the superstructure of law. Strange mistake! when we consider that from such writings

one-half of man's moral duties must be drawn, without the knowledge of which, though he may be good as a man, he cannot be good as a citizen. That this mistake has been propagated by the fears rather than the want of judgment of those to whom the encouragement of all teaching is allotted, seems evident in this, that their blindness here is inconsistent with their clearness of sight in all else. In no other science do they endeavour to clog the wheels of advancing knowledge, nor attempt the hopeless task of putting a stop to the onward progress of the human mind. The boldest speculators in physics, metaphysics, and theology, are not only undreaded, but assisted. The foundations of government, and man's duties and rights as the citizen of a state, are alone uncommented upon and unenforced in the routine of national education; whilst the dogmata of unreflecting obedience to assumed privileges are frequently inculcated in their stead, as if citizenship were a code of duties without rights, and government not a science, but a vested interest. So remarkable a deviation as this from a track followed in all else, can hardly be attributed to reason rather than apprehension. Be that as it may, it is hoped the reader can hardly fail to be convinced that in reason it has no foundation, and in fear as little that can be called reasonable. If it be impossible to stop that march of mind which at last convinces man that he is capable of self-government, it is

easy so to deal with that progress as to disarm it of all its apprehended dangers. If it be evident, then, from what has been already adduced, that the more abstract portion of morality which includes civic duty and right ought to be taught to all, it is not easy to see why the clergy, who teach the other half, should not inculcate that also. It may be, and is, perfectly true that, for the treatment of politics, and most especially that species of controversy which is known as party-politics, the pulpit is not the place, nor the clergyman the person. This will be admitted by all reflecting minds. But the subject of the rights and duties of the citizen, and of their basis and their end, belongs to morality, and not to politics. They are true at all times and in all places, and under all forms of government; and if they are incompatible with any, it is only with that pure and simple form of despotism which admits of no rights excepting its own, and leaves the definition of duty in the breast of the despot alone. It is doubtful whether, in the rudest community, such an abstract despotism as this is, however, at any time exerted in reality. The most savage autocrat probably feels that, if others have relations towards him, he has relations towards others. Civil law only teaches the foundation and progress of such relations; and, the more civilised the community is, the more extended is the teaching required: but there is no community easily conceivable in which

these relations are unteachable. Civil law, then, is only public morality, and it would be difficult to show that the teachers of private morality should not also teach public morals. Such teaching, so far from being party spirit in another guise, would, as far as it was efficient, tend to decrease that spirit, and to mitigate its evils. Such, however, has not been the modern practice; and we see the results. If we trace to its source the first appearance of parties in a state, we shall find it to originate in a collision between two classes of thinkers, both of whom are not unfrequently wrong. It is a conflict between those who will not move at all, and those who would move too fast. Both these an enlightened public morality would correct. It would teach one the natural necessity of progress; the other the natural necessity of caution. The result is a gradual public improvement, under a philosophic and progressive legislation; and it is to this want of a national and scientific, and, at the same time, sound circulation of public morality, that many of the deplorable party feuds which agitate nations are owing.

If the sound and authoritative promulgation of the duties of men towards the State, and of their rights as citizens, connected with those duties, be important to all communities, there is another institution, of a more practical nature, of equal importance, the paramount necessity for which is equally proved by the foregoing process of reasoning. This so necessary

institution is a liberal, complete, and efficient relief of the poor and destitute. We have seen that inequality of rank and of condition is one of those consequences, arising out of the mental constitution of man himself, that cannot be evaded. Men ever have been, and ever must be, unequally placed as to mere worldly circumstances. If, however, we may not evade this condition of our nature, we can yet prevent its passing a certain limit. We cannot prevent some men being richer than others, nor would it add to our happiness if we could; but we can cure the real and actual evil of destitution;—and for this we have the most certain of all assurances—the law of religion, as well as the law of policy. In curing this, we, in point of fact, cure almost the only real evil to society that arises out of the uneven distribution of worldly possessions. Men who are poor desire to be rich; and the rich just as earnestly desire to be richer. None of them are, however, miserable; for no man is so because he lacks the luxuries, if he enjoys the ordinary comforts, of life. Deprivation is, however, a real evil; and all communities that have neglected the destitute, however made so, and turned their eyes and hearts from them, have deeply rued the sin. The terrible truth cannot be too deeply impressed upon rulers, that, out of a neglect of the poorest persons of a community, accompanied as such neglect generally is with excessive fiscal exaction, is sure to spring a morbid and

unnatural spread of the pauper portion of the population. As the population thus morbidly spreads, the pressure is increased by it ; and the additional deprivation thus created affords a fresh stimulus to the fecundity of an already impoverished and superabundant people. The ultimate result is, either that worst sort of rebellions, which the wise Lord Bacon designates " rebellions of the belly," or a forced emigration of a starving and disaffected populace to foreign climes, carrying with them a legacy of hatred to the land which has driven them out, to be transmitted to their children and to those children's children. It was not the mission of the Founder of the Christian faith to teach us political economy ; but in placing in the front rank of Christian virtues, and giving us as the first of his commands the care of the poor, he has vouchsafed to add a divine sanction to the greatest and most important lesson of economic science ;—for certain it is that no people ever yet neglected this precept, without that neglect being followed by ultimate retribution ; nor was a State ever yet safe, unless that security reposed upon the diffused comfort of its population.

Such are the weightier conclusions to which the preceding course of reasoning has conducted us. There are, however, some minor considerations connected with the subject, which ought not to be passed over in silence. It is hardly necessary to say, that, having

once convinced ourselves of the impossibility of checking the progress of opinion, we must, at the same time, be convinced of the utter futility of all restrictions upon the press. We need only appeal to experience to become aware, that, as every attempt to check publication has hitherto failed, so all future attempts must be unsuccessful. Since to stop the promulgation and diffusion of obnoxious writings and opinions, the dungeon, the halter, and the stake have been tried in vain, we may safely assert that all other efforts must be useless. Immense, however, as is the power of the press to disseminate opinion and doctrine, we should deceive ourselves if we rashly concluded that its potency to propagate truth was in the ratio of that power of dissemination, or that a power to teach is synonymous with a power to advance. It must never be forgotten that the same engine which can multiply truths can fully as easily be made to multiply errors; and that, as for one sound doctrine ten fallacies may be broached, truth is sometimes, by the aid of the press, placed in a fearful minority for a time. Thus, therefore, wicked rulers, who cannot stop the press in its propagation of what is good, may counteract that good by making it the instrument of multiform and perpetual delusion. Such is the imperfection of all human schemes; and so surely do inventions which, on a first view, would seem to carry with them unadulterated blessings, include in their practice

countervailing evils. Before the invention of printing, books were never extensively multiplied until their value was known, proved, and acknowledged. With the press, a glittering, specious, or convenient fallacy has an equal chance of dissemination. The superficial and the fashionable often over-lay, for a period, the veritable and the wise; and it is only after a long struggle that undying Truth extricates herself from beneath the *avalanche* of folly under which she is buried. From the bewilderment of intellect which this multiplicity of doctrines, theories, schemes, and sophistries is so apt to cause, the only security is an early and sound tuition. When a solid foundation of truth is laid, it is not easy to erect a superstructure of falsehood; and hence, in modern times, a sound and authoritative teaching of the duties of the man and of the citizen is more important than at an epoch when literature was less voluminous, and truth and error lay in a smaller compass.

If the early teaching of the citizens' rights and duties be important to the safety of a state—and to a neglect or ignorance of these duties may most of the difficulties, financial and social, of modern states be attributed — equally so is the preservation of that national military spirit, to which alone the defence of national privileges and blessings can be safely intrusted. It may be safely said, that no country ever preserved either its liberty or its independence from serious

peril by the aid of mere mercenaries; and to expect that, in the present state of civilised man, wars and aggressions shall cease, seems a hoping against hope. Without the preservation, therefore, of the military spirit, no nation can be safe; and we have already seen that the feeling of the soldier has its concomitant mental benefits and advantages. That position which impresses upon men that, not only their property, when needed, but their lives, must be dedicated freely to the service of the state of which they are citizens, cannot but improve and exalt the character of all placed in it. Wherever these grand principles fall into abeyance, cowardice, selfishness, usury, and corruption, at once step in to sap the vitals of the commonwealth, and its decadence becomes certain and inevitable. Another advantage which arises from the use of arms by all citizens is, that it helps to teach the principle of self-reliance, which is the manhood of nations. No people was ever yet either really great or free, for whom its government is expected to do everything, whilst itself does nothing. It was in this that the value of the Anglo-Saxon institutions resided, that they taught the nation in detail the great art of self-government. By means of the divisions of counties, and parishes, and hundreds, and townships, together with the local offices thus created, the country became self-governed, and the general executive had little to do but stand by and see that fair play

was preserved under this system of independence. The sheriff was the military and civil head of the county, and could at will call out the "*posse comitatus*," which was all the men of age to fight who were within his bailiwick. The magistrates were elected by the people, as were the bishops by the clergy; and each township had its petty constable, of whom the high constable was the head. Upon the constabulary devolved not only the repression of petty offenders, but the collection of the county rates; and by a session of magistrates the county expenditure upon roads, bridges, &c. was controlled. The courts for the trial of minor offenders were held by the sheriff, and to his custody were consigned all persons for whom duress was deemed necessary. When upon this was ingrafted the system of "free towns," governed by a mayor, aldermen, council, and the free burgesses, sending also members to parliament as well as the counties, self-government became universal in England; and to this the once vast diffused wealth and vast public spirit of the country was owing. All the taxation was local. The Crown was supported by its own lands; and by means of the modification of the feudal system, extraordinary war-expenses were borne by the landlords for the most part, the richer boroughs sometimes contributing at a later period. Under this arrangement the country was self-governed in all essential matters: the king and privy council only

interfered on particular occasions. They granted charters for boroughs, established annual fairs, regulated trade, and held the high courts of justice; but this was nearly all. The routine of rule was vested in the people themselves; and hence, even with violent changes in the succession, and occasional civil conflicts, civil confusion did not arise. The machinery of self-government still went on, though the throne was shaken. The throne overlooked that machinery, but hardly formed a part of it; and hence its safety and its regularity even amid civil storms. Such is the value of self-reliance and self-government to a nation, and so sure is the basis thus afforded to true liberty and prosperity. All ranks are thus brought into close contact, and work harmoniously together. Inequality of condition becomes more of a name than a reality. No man is isolated; and every man feels himself an integral portion of a system, the basis of which is freedom of action, and the fruits of which are general ease, content, and prosperity.

Such are the conclusions, negative and positive, to which the foregoing reasoning seems inevitably to lead us. It now only remains to sum up, as it were, the whole—to give the reader a bird's-eye view of the process through which he has gone—and to fix his attention upon the salient points of the theory which, the author hopes, he has now established upon foundations not to be shaken. If that theory be founded

in truth, man's happiness resides in action, mental and bodily. In the exercise, in some way or other, of his faculties, his true comfort and serenity reside; and to look forward to and advance towards some desired mark of fortune or of fame, so it be virtuously done, is to be as happy as man is permitted to be in this imperfect state of existence. All action, mental and bodily, arises from excitement. There must be motive for us to act before we can act. The mind must first be acted upon. Reflection is then stirred into activity; the desire of something supervenes, and the act follows. The most prevalent motive to act is first the necessity to procure for ourselves food, raiment, and shelter. After those necessary motives, the higher excitements follow. Riches, rank, power, and fame are set before our eyes, and as the mind happens to be constituted the man acts. It follows, however, from the very nature and constitution of our minds, that there are certain directions in which our wills are always impelled or attracted. Men are gregarious by nature and necessity. In solitude man cannot work out the ends of his being, nor enjoy the refinements of which his nature is capable: he therefore eschews solitude, and lives in the society of his fellows. Thus arise tribes and nations, having a peculiar language, a peculiar code of laws, and a peculiar literature, with perhaps a peculiar religion. Hence nationality, patriotism, and national ambition

and national aggression. Hence also treaties of commerce and amity; treaties of mutual defence; definition of frontiers; armies, fortresses, and all that distinguishes the two great conditions of war and peace. From excess of national spirit of acquisition and aggrandisement arises war; and with it arise its concomitants, ravage and bloodshed. With war come, however, other concomitants. From the necessities of defence, on one hand, and of encroachment on the other, men come to learn and to practise the great maxims and duties of the patriot-citizen. They are thus taught to sacrifice comfort, ease, pleasure, property, self-interest, health, and life itself, in their country's service. National danger is the great teacher of the sublimest of our civil duties. By national peril man is taught that the interest of the individual is as nothing when in competition with that of the community; and that the duties and rights of the single citizen are ever subservient to those of his country—a sublime lesson, and one without which no man can be exaltedly and loftily virtuous. From the tyrannies and excesses of conquest, and the ravage of war, flows also another great consequence: suffering and privation promote fecundity; an oppressed people speedily becomes superabundant in numbers. "The more they are afflicted with their burthens, the more they multiply and grow!" Hence comes emigration of surplus population; hence colonies; hence the

foundations of new empires; hence the spread of civilisation, commerce, and religion, into lands uninhabited by man, or only by man in his most primeval, simple, rude, and savage state; hence maritime adventure, maritime discovery, and the triumphs of navigation. But the impulse of self-aggrandisment and acquisition acts upon the individual as well as upon the nation. Man, of necessity, must labour to acquire for himself and his family food, shelter, and raiment. He soon, however, learns to want more than this. Ambition and avarice beset almost all human minds. Few living men can resist the passion for accumulation, when opportunity offers. Some men succeed; others fail, or else waste what they accumulate as fast as the accumulations grow. Hence comes inequality of property; and hence comes inequality of rank and power: for though talent alone sometimes confers both, property does so much more surely. Thus, in most communities, the rich solely govern. They always do so at first. Their power of combination, the actual power which riches give, and the moral influence which the idea of great wealth exercises over all half-instructed or mean minds, give the rich a preponderance which only the utmost efforts of education and religion can at last neutralise. Hence in all countries wealth and rank are the objects of ambition, because wealth and rank rule those who have neither. From this principle arises the division

into families, and the various degrees of relationship are recognised and acknowledged. Society, as well as the law of religion and of natural sympathy, compels each man to protect and nourish his offspring, and the mother of his offspring. Hence the division into families. But upon these families the love of wealth and power also act. Hence hereditary titles; hence the arrangement of primogeniture; hence entails and settlements by will. The ambition of the family is added to that of the mere individual; and the motive for exertion is thus doubled, tripled, and quadrupled. Thus, in all civilised communities, there is a constant struggle upwards; and from this tendency to climb springs the eagerness for education. This tendency has also other aids. The spread of religion helps forward that of education. To be a religious being, man must be advanced to a certain stage of knowledge and of refinement. The clergy, therefore, all promote education of some kind; and to this stimulus the press has added another. Literature, at first confined to a few select minds, becomes, as it spreads, not a luxury, but a necessary of life. It is the interest of the press to make it so; and to this consummation all civilised societies tend. But as literature, science, refinement, are increased, so must the ambition of those who cultivate them, and excel in their culture. Knowledge is power. So is genius. So is even refinement. The man of genius does not brook a

superior. Neither does the man of science. Hence the tendency upwards increases as literature and science open men's minds more and more generally. The desire of power and its possession must follow. With the growth of mind comes the growth of equality. They cannot be disjoined; and it is the mistaken resistance to this inevitable consequence, on the part of rulers, that leads to civil disturbance. If the resistance be successful on the part of those above, those below become abased, and a national corruption is slowly but surely introduced. If it succeed not, then revolution supersedes gradual change and a progressive improvement. The balance of society is overset. Mind is cut loose, and passion unrestrained. The immediate evil is overcome, but new evils supervene. Crude theories and fancies take precedence of experience, moderation, and caution, and disappointment is the result. The truth lies, in fact, between the two extremes. That state can only be fortunate the rulers of which are free from vain fear and apprehension on one side, and from rashness and phantasy on the other—who meet the advances of society by a gradual amelioration, and look forward to the time when a perfect freedom of legislation, on the part of the people, shall consist with the perfect safety of property, rank, law, and religion. This is the true euthanasia of government by classes—necessary at first, but superfluous and perilous at last. It results in the

gradual admission to the rights of citizens of class after class, as knowledge prepares each for the trust, until man be self-governed, and amenable to the power of law and religion alone. Thus we sketch the grand outline of mundane moral government. We perceive certain great laws laid down, which it is not in our power to alter, nor for any length of time to violate. We see powers set up which we cannot put down. We see these powers liable to run to excess. We speedily, however, perceive also that a cure is provided. These excesses produce benefits as well as evils. The benefits are perennial, the excesses are in time checked and extinguished. Within given limits, man's reason may be said to be omnipotent. The great scheme he cannot alter, but he is free to carry out the details. Ignorant power is gradually subdued by enlightened energy, and a perfect equality of rights and duties takes gradual place amidst an inequality of conditions. This is all the perfectibility of which man is capable; for with every new stage of refinement peculiar evils arise, to make work for the freest and most enlightened legislation. An imperfect state of being cannot be carried further. In certain directions it is limited. In others it conceives not of limits. Whilst we are confined to certain conditions, in all the rest we are free. To knowledge and its fruits there is no conceivable limit even here. No one can assign boundaries to knowledge or refinement.

There are only bounds to the forms under which they exist. Why should we desire more ?

In conclusion, it is easy to trace betwixt this scheme of mundane moral government and the government of the material world a strong and plain analogy. In the arrangement of the material world we perceive the same primal, grand simplicity. Great and unchangeable laws of motion, of climate, and of division, are established. They do not alter ; but, within them, perpetual changes and countervailing reactions are going on. Tied down to some few great and immutable conditions, the material globe is in a constant state of progressive mutation, and has ever been so. New lands submerge, whilst old countries crumble away. Vegetation gradually cures sterility, and deposits new soil on ancient rocks ; whilst the hand of nature and that of man combine to cultivate that which is fertile, and improve that which is capable of amelioration. Thus corn-fields, meadows, and pastures take place of the primeval forest ; and a drainage, partly natural and partly artificial, converts morasses into alluvial plains, and damp prairies into fertile glebe. Where the wolf roamed the ox and the sheep depasture ; and, for the wild berries of the forest and swamp, we have the fruitful orchard and the luxurious garden. Excess becomes checked ; and the sweep of the general law, which has ordained merely the grand divisions of climate, of internal and external heat, of

land and water, and of island and continent, is modified by countless minor reactions of an interminable variety and description, in which man comes to the aid of nature, and the universal wilderness grows into the universal garden. In the moral world it is the same. Civilisation and science, morality and religion, act within the limits of a few great laws, the excesses of which they gradually mitigate and extinguish. Power becomes subdued. Might becomes modified by the influences of right and duty; and law and order, and private and public morality, at last extinguish the fires of passion, the lusts of power, and the fears of possession; and man becomes, at one and the same time, a free agent, moral, religious, and self-reliant, looking alone to those laws which he has helped to frame, and to that moral code which he has helped to establish. In both we equally behold the handiwork of an all-powerful and all-benevolent Creator, whose might we can only conceive to be subjected to one sole limitation, self-impressed—that of making less perfect than Himself the varied beings to whom it is His will to give existence, and the power and sense to appreciate and to enjoy it.

APPENDIX.

ON CERTAIN METAPHYSICAL DISTINCTIONS.

ALTHOUGH the author of these pages may hope that the majority of those who may do him the honour to read them will not complain of want of perspicuity of language, he is yet conscious that there are minds to which a further explanation may seem wanting. It has been seen that, at the commencement of the foregoing chain of reasoning, all human action is traced to EXCITEMENT as its sole cause. To persons of a metaphysical turn of intellect, some account of the precise meaning affixed by the writer to that term may seem necessary. It shall now be given; and with as much metaphysical precision as the author can command.

It has always seemed undeniable to the author of the foregone pages, that there is not in human beings any inherent independent power of activity. The human mind only acts after having been acted upon. Bodily actions are the result of mental determinations or mental feelings, though some of them, by constant use, become almost mechanical; but to all mental determinations there is wanting that which metaphysicians name "motive." This is the exciting cause of the mental determination to act or forbear to act, as it may happen. Without the excitement of motive, the mind

cannot act, simply because there is no ground for any particular direction of its activity in preference to any other possible direction. Until the motive excites it to act, therefore, the mind is passive; there is no cause nor reason for its moving in any direction. Nothing is presented to it to excite it to come to a decision. It is, therefore, in the absence of all motive, inactive. The power of active decision is there waiting to be called forth. Until excited, it is, however, a sleeping power, incapable of awaking through any inherent independent activity of its own.

It by no means appears to the writer that he is called upon to meddle at all with the *vexata questio* of whether all our ideas, and consequently all our knowledge, is from without, as Locke and his followers hold; or whether the mind, as Kant and others have asserted, possesses a direct, innate, and intuitive knowledge on certain points, independent on all experience and all phenomena. This question there is no need, on the present occasion, to decide. The author is not without convictions on this subject; but as there is no necessity for any attempt to substantiate them, no such attempt shall be made. It seems to him very clear that, whether our ideas are all from without, as Hobbes and Locke assert, or whether part of our knowledge is inherent and innate, as Kant and some others asseverate—whether all our mental acts are derived from *phenomena*, or some of them from *noumena*, still *excitement*, arising from the mind's great power of reflection, is necessary to all action, bodily acts always being preceded by mental acts. Thus, when the mind comes to a determination that certain things are desirable, it is from its reflection on certain sensations or ideas which it has first obtained. When a man exerts himself, for instance, to obtain some kind of food, it is owing to certain sensations first impressed through the medium of the senses of sight and smell. These sensations come from without, and reach the intellect through the avenue of the senses; the mind reflects

upon them, and by this excitement is induced to come to the determination to do those bodily acts requisite to obtain the food. This is one case. Suppose, however, the opposite case to be possible. By the German philosophical school, man is asserted to obtain his idea of God by an inherent, direct power, and not by inference. If this be so, still it is only by the *excitement* of the mind's reflecting upon this idea, so inherent, or so obtained by a direct objective knowledge, that man is induced to the determination to worship the Divine Being. In both cases equally, the excitement arising out of the mind's reflecting power is necessary to the mental act of determination, and from that the bodily act of worship flows. When, therefore, the author asserts, as he has done, and does, that excitement is as to the moral world what gravitation is as to the material world—the primal cause upon which all other phenomena rest—he asserts that which is not deniable, under any existing metaphysical theory, as to the sources of knowledge; and which is equally true under the theory of Kant, and under the scheme of Locke. Under all conceivable systems of the origin of knowledge, the mind must be excited, by means of reflection, to its determinations. That reflection may be exerted upon phenomena, or mere sensations *ab externo*—or upon noumena, or ideas known independently of the senses, by some inherent force of the mind itself; still, however, it must be exerted first, to excite the mind to the further act of determination; and upon the aims or determinations of the mind all our bodily acts depend. Hence, then, however the mind comes by its knowledge—whether ideas come to it by conveyance of the outward senses of sight, hearing, touch, and smell; or whether certain ideas are apprehended directly by it, and thus made food for its reflective faculty, still its action is caused by something without itself. It only apprehends, and does not create ideas. They are to be supplied in some way—indirectly or directly. Having apprehended them, the faculty

of reflection is exerted upon them. Without them the faculty would be in abeyance—a mere unexerted, abstract capability. Out of reflection, so caused, the excitement, which again causes the mind to form determinations, distinctly flows; without it, the mental man would be destitute of an aim; and without aim or end of some kind, bodily action is not conceivable. As man derives all his happiness from action, excitement is, therefore, the real *primum mobile* of felicity: when in excess, it becomes pain, and is the cause of infelicity. Fear, and the determination to avoid certain things, only arise from our experience of an excitement too violent attending these things; and man's life is spent in grasping some things and avoiding others, in accordance with excitement of a pleasing or a painful nature.

Such are the author's ideas as to metaphysical necessity of excitement as the cause of human action. There is, however, another point, embracing some metaphysical considerations, as to which explanation may be desirable. In the preceding Essay it is shown that, under certain circumstances, men's wills take certain directions, and this constantly and without fail. In short, a certain position is with all men followed by certain trains of volitions; and this without fail. Men placed under given circumstances, for instance, invariably unite for self-defence. This universality of consequence is all, however, that is meant to be asserted in this case. It may be said that this assertion of *certainty* of consequence is the assumption of a moral necessity; but it is not so, nor is it so intended to be. It is true that those whose pleasure it is to argue for the moral necessity of all human acts, and all human volitions from which the acts flow, would construe this certainty of consequence into "necessary" sequence; but this construction is by no means requisite to the truth of the foregoing theory. All its author intends to assert is, the certainty of these consequences; and for this certainty he appeals to

the testimony of experience, universal and uncontradicted, and not to theory of any kind. The volitions which lead men to certain acts, such as the formation of communities for defence—the choice of chiefs—the enactment of common laws—the division of ranks—and the recognition of families and relationships of blood,—the volitions, he repeats, which lead men to these things may be the exertion of what is called "free choice;" the ground or motive may be "passive" as to inducement, as some writers assert, and the mind, in coming to a choice, may do so by some unexplained power of its own, independent of the force of motive; or, on the other hand, the volition may, as others hold, follow the motive as a necessary sequel to it;—all the author has to say here is, this is a question which he does not attempt to settle. Whether choice be made in freedom from any and all necessity, or is the necessary effect of a prevailing motive, it is not his province to explain. His assertion is derived from an uninterrupted experience, in all ages, that men follow a certain line of conduct when placed in a certain position and under certain circumstances; and this being (as he thinks it must be) admitted, this admission is all that his theory requires. The writer of these pages may, or may not, have opinions as to the controversy as to "free will and necessity," as defined by philosophers; but he is unwilling to embarrass this argument with anything of a questionable nature. For the certainty of the occurrence of certain consequences, he therefore appeals to the evidence of experience alone; the *modus operandi* of the mind, in willing to do certain acts, he leaves to others to settle—assuming only the sure occurrence of the acts themselves under given circumstances, and appealing to the testimony of experience alone to prove the perfect propriety of that assumption. In taking this course, he believes he is acting with even more caution than is exercised by those who treat of questions of physics, where less of assumption would, on a first view, seem to be required. For instance,

in the proof of the tendency of bodies towards a common centre, the quality called attraction is assumed to be inherent in bodies, and their tendency towards the earth's centre and towards each other is called a "law of attraction." Now, this may or may not be. The only fact proved is, that bodies do move in given directions, and at certain rates of motion. This motion may be the result of a mysterious quality, such as we fancy attraction to be, or of some other quality of a nature quite different. In asserting the constant direction of men's volitions in certain lines, when they are under certain circumstances, the author, however, asserts nothing beyond that fact. He attempts no explanation of the *modus operandi*, or of the law by which men's wills are made to accord with circumstances thus. All he asserts is that constant accordance of men's wills and actions with certain circumstances, be the proximate cause what it may; and for proof of the correctness of the assertion, he does not even pre-suppose the existence of any imaginary or known law, but refers solely to the evidence of tradition and history which record the fact.

In short, with the doctrines of metaphysicians as to the origin of ideas and the freedom of the will, the author does not meddle. He leaves them as they are. Be they decided, however, as they may, the facts from which he has drawn his conclusions remain undisturbed, and in that assurance he rests contented. He has deemed these explanations of sufficient importance to induce him to try to impress them upon the mind of his reader at the expense of some repetition and much tediousness of detail. Should he have erred in this, the motive, he hopes, may excuse the deed. In conclusion, the reader is requested, when such expressions as the wills of men being "impelled" or "necessarily induced" to take certain directions, not to construe them too literally, or as involving any idea of constraint upon the free action of choice on the part of the

agent. That human beings placed in certain positions and under given circumstances will always, and to a certainty, prefer certain lines of action, appears to the author undeniable, however freely the choice may be come to. This is all he means by "impulsion or necessary inducement" of circumstances. From the fact of a constant sequence he alone argues, without pretending to explain the nature of the certainty under which given motives always produce given effects, or the mode by which the human will, guided by the last dictate of the understanding, is led or impelled to those determinations at which it ultimately arrives.

There yet remains one other metaphysical view of this question, as to which, though very remote, the author deems it may be proper to say a few, though a very few, explanatory words. It may possibly be objected by a certain though not numerous description of reasoners, that the question of the real nature of "the material world" is, itself, not settled; and that the author may be arguing upon mere mental impressions as if they were physical realities, without the ability to prove that they are so. The answer is, that if there be yet remaining any persons who abide by the crude theory of the ingenious Bishop Berkeley, and the dubious conclusions, or rather sophisms, of Hume, as to "the non-existence of matter" under the attributes generally assigned to it—such as extension, colour, impenetrability, divisibility, ponderosity—such persons are as little able to prove that side of the question as the materialists are able to prove the other side. It may indeed be shown, in a way perhaps incapable of being refuted, that if we consider the ideas of extension, matter, time, and space, together with the collateral ideas of colour, resistance, ponderosity, and divisibility, as *other* than ideas affixed to substances, for the sake of enabling us to perceive their existence, in the same way as, in algebra, we calculate by means of algebraic signs standing for unknown quantities, we may be entangled in plain and palpable

contradictions, from which there is no logical escape. This unquestionably may be the case, but this by no means settles the question; because it still remains most probable that these ideas may be affixed to real and existent substances, in order to enable us to perceive these substances, although, at the same time, the ideas thus affixed may not be by any means necessarily involved in the real nature of such substances. Nobody can, or ever did, deny the positive and unquestionable existence of that which every man feels himself to possess—*videlicet*, those powers of perception and reflection which must be the attributes of *something;* which "something" Spinoza has designated by the terms "*Ens cogitans;*" but of the substantial nature of which no man pretends to have any conception. We may, indeed, predicate of it, negatively, that it cannot involve the ideas which we call "materiality, extension, colour, or ponderosity," because, if we suppose these ideas to be really involved in the actual nature of any existing substance, we are led inevitably at last into the admission of contradictions amounting to a "*reductio ad absurdum.*" This seems undeniable; and, if it be so, it follows that a truth which is true of the human mind or soul may be true as to other things, which may also have real existence, notwithstanding that we cannot perceive it save by the aid of certain ideas, arbitrarily affixed to them for that purpose; and that, therefore, all that is laid down as to the laws that govern the material world may still be true, although we come to know it not directly but indirectly, and only through the medium of ideal signs, similar to algebraic signs. And the author further replies that, even upon the improbable supposition that the Berkeleyan Theory can be true, still the fixed recurrence of material impressions would, in that case, amount to material or physical government, just as surely as upon the theory of the separate and positive existence of matter, independently of our own impressions of it; and all which is laid down in the

foregoing Treatise as to the similarity of moral and physical government would hold good, and the conclusions therefrom stand as firmly under one supposition as under the other. The Theory of Bishop Berkeley is itself, however, plainly a crude and imperfect thing, however ingenious and subtle—a step, perhaps, in a right direction for obtaining further knowledge—but clearly, as it stands, the mere fragment of a method of reasoning which, at some future period, increased knowledge may push onward to some extraordinary results.

THE END.

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DETAILING THE LABOURS OF THE

FARMER, FARM-STEWARD, PLOUGHMAN, SHEPHERD,
HEDGER, CATTLE-MAN, FIELD-WORKER,
AND DAIRY-MAID;

AND FORMING

A SAFE MONITOR FOR STUDENTS IN PRACTICAL AGRICULTURE.

BY

HENRY STEPHENS, F.R.S.E.

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SUBJECTS TREATED OF IN THE BOOK OF THE FARM.

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ON THE BEST OF THE EXISTING METHODS FOR ACQUIRING A THOROUGH KNOWLEDGE OF PRACTICAL HUSBANDRY.
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ON THE BRANCHES OF SCIENCE MOST APPLICABLE TO AGRICULTURE.
ON THE INSTITUTIONS OF EDUCATION BEST SUITED TO AGRICULTURAL STUDENTS.
ON THE EVILS ATTENDING THE NEGLECT OF LANDOWNERS AND OTHERS TO LEARN PRACTICAL AGRICULTURE.
ON OBSERVING THE DETAILS AND RECORDING THE FACTS OF FARMING BY THE AGRICULTURAL STUDENT.

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